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ABSTRACT 
The natural calamities and conflicts faced by Chinese farmers were overwhelming 
during 1929 to 1933. In this thesis I compile village level data from John Lossing Buck’s 
nationwide survey, using techniques of regression with robust standard error and analysis 
of covariance to compute changes in village yields to normal or best yields as a function 
of agricultural area, province, time, and catastrophes. The analysis shows the 
geo-political governance of a province had greater impact on agricultural productivity 
than agricultural area did. Also time of the investigation was taken matters, which is in 
line with the dynamic events that arose over the 1929-1933 timeframe. Surprisingly the 
key impacts on agricultural productivity were natural calamities despite the wide spread 
warfare of the time. This is however due to a selectivity problem in that a survey team 
could not be sent into an area with high risk of warfare.
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem Statement 
In the period between January 1
st
 and July 10
th
 in 1933 the National Relief 
Commission in China itemized the following natural catastrophes: Chekiang with flood 
in 6 districts; Kiangsi with flood in 14 districts; Hunan with flood in 32 districts; Honan 
with flood in 11 districts, drought in 7 districts, frost in 4 districts, hailstones in 11 
districts, locusts in 3 districts, and windstorm in 6 districts; Shensi with drought in 13 
districts, frost in 31 districts, hail in 7 districts, wind in 37 districts, and flood in 3 
districts; Kansu with earthquake in 7 districts, drought in 4 districts, famine in 30 districts, 
and plague in 1 district; Anhwei with wind in 2 districts, flood in 4 districts, and hail in 2 
districts; Kweichow with drought in 13 districts, hail in 3 districts, flood in 4 districts, an 
wind in 3 districts; Kiangsu with flood in 1 district. A week after releasing this report the 
Yellow River, often named as “China’s Sorrow”, “The Ungovernable” and “Scourge of 
the Sons of Han” began to rise. In Sanyuan, Shensi province, the river rose rapidly 
drowning some 5,000 peasants from both farmlands and mountain area. Flooding spread 
to Honan, Hopeh and Shantung. By the time the Yellow River subsided, approximate 
50,000 Chinese in total had perished, 2 million were rendered homeless and 1 million 
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starving. In Changyuan district of Hopeh alone, losses were evaluated at $37,210,000 
(Mexican silver), with 2,223 villages flooded, 619,000 Chinese homeless and 475,000 mu 
(1 acre = 6 mu) underwater. 
Meanwhile China was embattled. As the Yellow River began to rise an Armistice 
was signed by Japan and China halting further militarism in Manchuria and areas north of 
the Great Wall. Between 1931 and 1932 some 222,000 Chinese, including 54,000 
civilians were killed or wounded in conflicts with Japan in Manchuria and Shanghai. In 
Southern China Szechwan was in the midst of a senseless civil war with casualties 
running into tens of thousands. Communist forces under Chuh Teh and Mao Cheh-tung 
were in constant battle with the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek in Honan, Hunan, 
Fukien, Hupeh, Szechwan, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Kwangtung at a horrible toll of the 
agricultural economy. In Western Honan in 1932 it was reported that 50,000 people died 
in the strife and in Fukien the land was laid to waste and abandoned. In June of 1933 a 
burial detachment from the Shanghai Red Swastika (Red Cross) proceeded to Anhwei to 
bury 18,000 un-interred bodies. 
Even in areas that were not vested in civil war or anti-communist campaigns or 
communist insurgency, roving warlords left over from the post republican period formed 
massive bandit gangs laid the havoc to rural regions. In some instances warlord armies 
reached tens of thousands and they joined the formal government with provincial controls. 
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But these were not truly governing forces and exploitation of farmers through dues or 
common confiscation of crops. To maintain the warlord army farmers were taxed 
senseless. For example Shensi province wrecked in recent years by drought and famine 
was one of the poorest in China. But poverty in China was not always driven by natural 
calamities with the remnants of the warlord period playing havoc on farm income and 
consumption.
1
 Shensi had been under the control of the “Christian General” Feng 
Yu-hsiang since 1920 and it was he who ordered the paying of a land tax through 1934. 
The nationalist government had outlawed Likin (gift in cash) in 1930 but this was simply 
replaced by taxes in disguise. The central government had ordered production and 
consumption taxes but at the local level there were also a host of taxes and duties which 
farmers had to pay including land tax, poll tax, bandit-suppression duties, military dues, 
commissary dues, ming-tuan or militia dues, land registration fees, opium land duty, 
shares of provincial bank, provincial treasury note, village pacification fee, rice duty, 
trade tax, special tax, land deed examination fee, stamp tax and other duties and 
surcharges levied by local (rather than provincial) governments. Some of these taxes were 
extraordinarily extortionary. If the farm registration fee was not paid the land could be 
confiscated; the bank shares were never issued to farmers, the stamp tax was paid 
whether or not a shop was in the village, provincial treasury notes were apportioned and 
                                                 
1 Liu, H.S.T. January 7th, 1933. The Poverty of Shensi. China Weekly Review vol. 63. 
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issued to farmers whether they wanted it or not, the lands planted to opium were decided 
by the province, but when yield was not sufficient the $10/mu duty had to be paid by 
those farmers that had not yet planted opium. And when the provincial government sent 
its agents to press farmers for these taxes, the agents had to be fully, and generously, 
accommodated and entertained at the expense of farmers. In the region of Hanchung, 
fertile with irrigation the net proceeded from double cropped grain, wheat and beans 
netted the farmer about $8/mu. The land tax on this was $3.50/mu with $12/mu required 
to pay for other taxes and duties, meaning the farmer had to come up with $8.50. In 
mountainous region of Liupan the cost of production per mu was about $3 but the levies 
and taxes were over $11. When these could not be paid the farmer sells or pawns 
whatever possessions he had (clothes, furniture etc.) and when that did not satisfy the 
demand, he simply moved off the land, risking torture or even death if caught. 
Taxes, of course had to be paid in cash, with no facility for credit and when pressed 
at harvest, farmers could not afford to store grain for future sale. Hence with all farmers 
selling at the same time, abundance lowered the price, so that any possible benefit to 
store post-harvest was lost to taxes while benefits of storage were accrued to the 
marketers and wholesalers. And in times of scarcity, due perhaps to drought, the farmer 
had no crop to sell and could not afford the steep rise in prices that accompanied famine. 
And even if the farmer had surplus worth selling, often the commodities could not be 
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moved. For example the local price of rice in Sian (Xi’an) was $20/picul while the local 
price in South Shensi was $3/picul. A merchant could profit by transporting from south to 
north. But the exactions and extortions along the way by ‘special’ tax collections, 
extortion by agents and city gate keepers, bandits, and lack of communication with 
potential buyers made the venture perilous if not unprofitable. 
In the modern era strong assumptions are made in regards to agricultural 
productivity. The production function which captures the relationship between inputs and 
outputs is assumed to be well behaved and smoothly linear or non linear as the case might 
be. Government policies provide protection in many forms and markets are well 
integrated with transparent price discovery. This modern view of agricultural production 
and productivity rapidly breaks down in an agricultural economy in which calamities and 
catastrophes are more the norm than the exception, and these are not well understood. 
This thesis examines the effects of catastrophes on agricultural productivity in rural 
China from 1929 to 1933. These were tumultuous years in Chinese history and data is 
scarce. However, between 1929 and 1933 Nanking University professor John Lossing 
Buck conducted a far reaching survey across many provinces in China. Not only was this 
the largest land utilization study ever conducted in China but also villages were surveyed 
at different points in time it provides a real-time opportunity—a natural experiment—to 
investigate agricultural productivity. This data, when mapped against the 
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contemporaneous calamities or conflicts of the day provides a rare glimpse into the 
agricultural economics of disaster. The abbreviated list includes drought and famine, 
floods, civil war, banditry, the rise of communism and military action against communists, 
Japanese invasions and annexations of Manchuria and the Sino-Japanese war in Shanghai. 
In some areas of China none of these events occurred, in others all of them occurred and 
the natural experiment that provided by Buck’s data offer the opportunity to investigate 
how each affected China’s agricultural economy. 
While the thesis is primarily an historical retrospective there are many insights that 
are enlightening for the present. These include a greater depth of understanding the 
economics of catastrophe. Nowadays agricultural productivity still fluctuates widely due 
to climatic variability but irrigation, genetic modification, technological adaptation all 
have been designed to mitigate it. As such it is difficult, for example to fully measure the 
social benefits of modern technologies without fully understanding the opportunity costs 
associated with their absence. Only a retrospective study of this sort can truly benchmark 
for such measures. Another area is in the valuation of land, or in the case of China Land 
Use Rights, and to what extent land values might respond to catastrophe induced losses in 
agricultural productivity. This is of particular interest to China today as it moves towards 
extending and providing long-term mortgages for farm land. 
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1.2 Objectives of the Thesis 
The overall objective of this thesis is to investigate the economic consequences of 
calamities and conflicts on agricultural production in China from 1929 to 1933. This is 
supported by the following specific objectives: to explore the relation between specific 
events of drought, flood, conflict and agricultural productivity; to check how agricultural 
productivity depended on the time surveyed or on the location of provincial level; to 
study the impact of natural calamity and manmade conflicts on agricultural productivity; 
and to compare the effect of both categories of catastrophes. 
Regression with robust standard error and analysis of covariance are the tailer-made 
modern econometric techniques for processing Buck’s statistical volume to examine the 
effects of calamities and conflict on agricultural productivity.  
Because Buck’s data was gathered at different times over the five year horizon it is 
important to understand and interpret these data in the context of the contemporaneous 
environment. The contemporaneous history was gathered primarily from the China 
Weekly Review, an English weekly news magazine out of Shanghai that reported on 
events from multiple sources as they arose. As best as it was able each page of each 
volume was scrutinized to identify factors that in one way or another might affect 
agricultural productivity as reported in the survey period relative to normal productivity 
or the best productivity as reported by the villages surveyed. Events were categorized as 
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major flood, major drought, bandits, civil war, communist excursions and communist 
eradication by Kuomingtang (KMT) nationalist forces. In addition the events of Japanese 
occupation in Manchuria, and incidents in Shantung and Shanghai were also considered 
(but ultimately abandoned from the analysis). In addition for at least two events, the 
central China drought of 1929 and the great flooding of 1932 were also identified as key 
factors. Each of these events were tabulated and converted to categorical 1-0 binaries and 
matched with villages in the provinces in which the events took place and that were 
surveyed in the same period as the event took place. 
From a methods point of view the work of this thesis is original in terms of matching 
productivity measures gathered by survey across China with contemporaneous events. In 
many ways the historical developments provide a natural experiment in which to gage the 
various impacts examined. However the method also has its drawbacks and these 
ultimately appear in the results with respect to conflict. Buck’s survey was not a 
randomized design and this has important implications, particularly with respect to 
conflict variables. It is highly unlikely that Buck would have sent surveyors to conflict 
regions of civil war, banditry, communist insurgencies or anti-insurgent battles between 
bandits, warlords, communists and the national forces of Chiang Kai-shek. While villages 
were surveyed in provinces at the time of conflict it is not known whether they were 
surveyed before or after a conflict, nor is it known the exact locations of the villages 
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relative to the conflicts. Indeed, because a ‘positive’ relationship is found between 
agricultural productivity and conflict it can be surmised that the surveys in provinces 
during conflict periods were actually conducted at locations either distant in time or space 
from actual battles or centers of banditry. In comparison significance is found for 
calamities that had much wider and systemic covariant effects and can write of these with 
some confidence. Even so, with either conflict or banditry there were many events that 
are not matched with provinces or villages. For example except for a single survey in 
Liaoning, there are no villages in northeast China/Manchuria to capture the events of the 
Japanese annexation and subsequent excursions south of the Great Wall between 1931 
and 1933, nor are there villages surveyed around the time of the Sino-Japanese conflict in 
Shanghai in 1932.  
While there is always a temptation to avoid selection bias of this sort by removing 
event variables from the statistical analysis, there is a much broader interest in actually 
maintaining the variables to illustrate and document such biases in future analyses of 
Buck’s data so that the futility of such an analysis of conflict can be avoided. On the other 
hand, as is believed to be the most important contribution of this thesis, the analysis 
shows that any further examination of Buck’s data should be done so in the context of 
calamities and conflict events. On this aspect alone, the efforts contained in this thesis are 
well justified.  
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1.3 Organization of the Thesis 
In sum, this thesis reexamines historical data using modern techniques. Deeply 
rooted in the History of China, history of land utilization is reassessed from the 
perspective of agricultural productivity alteration to comprehend modern economic 
production theory. Another attempt of the model is to identify how farmers responded to 
calamities and conflicts thereby adjusted their agricultural production strategy, in a view 
of sociological background and cultural anthropology. Chapter 2 provides an overview of 
China’s agricultural conditions as described in Buck’s Land Utilization in China, Chapter 
3 provides an overview of the calamities and conflicts thought to bear influence on 
agricultural productivity, chapter 4 describes data and methods, chapter 5 the model 
development, econometric results and analysis, and the thesis concludes in chapter 6. 
Finally, because of the time inherent in this thesis and the sources used, the old 
spelling of provincial names is kept. This is consistent with the usage in the Buck 
references as well as references to China Weekly Review. However, for consistency with 
the modern era Illustration 1.1 and 1.2 shows the maps for 1933 and 2014 with the 
provinces named accordingly. Note that the 1933 map also included Japanese annexed 
territory in Manchuria and Jehol. Table 1.1 lists the provincial names for 1933 and the 
corresponding spelling for 2014. 
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Illustration 1.1 Historical Name and Range for Provinces in Old China
2
 
 
Illustration 1.2 Modern Name and Range for Provinces in New China
3
 
                                                 
2 http://www.mikalac.com/ww2/ch/pho/china1.jpg. 
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Table 1.1 Historical and Modern Names for Provinces Surveyed 
Province in Historical Names Province in Modern Names 
Kansu Gansu 
Liaoning Liaoning 
Ningsia Ningxia 
Shansi Shansi 
Tsinghai Qinghai 
Shensi Shaansi 
Suiyuan Inner Mongolia 
Honan Henan 
Hopeh Hebei 
Anhwei Anhui 
Kiangsu Jiangsu 
Shantung Shandong 
Chekiang Zhejiang 
Hupeh Hubei 
Kiangsi Jiangxi 
Fukien Fujian 
Hunan Hunan 
Szechwan Sichuan 
Kwangsi Guangxi 
Kwangtung Guangdong 
Kweichow Guizhou 
Yunnan Yunnan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-UzAYWiQantg/UkVZEvocBxI/AAAAAAAAADs/ugXG82jxMdk/s211 
/province-english.jpg 
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of Buck’s survey and methods, 
and to describe the conditions of agriculture related to agricultural productivity. This 
chapter deals only with the conditions as described by Buck. As noted in the introduction, 
Buck was to a large extent silent on the calamities and conflicts of the day and how these 
might have affected agricultural productivity. These calamities and conflicts are discussed 
in Chapter 3 and how Buck’s data should be interpreted in these contexts makes up the 
remainder of the thesis. 
2.1 Introduction: John L. Buck’s Survey 
The scope of Buck’s study mainly contains household surveys of 2,866 farms in 17 
localities and seven Chinese provinces between the year 1921 and 1924 in Chinese Farm 
Economy (1930); 16,786 farms in 168 localities, and 38,256 farm families in 22 
provinces between the year 1929 and 1933 as published in Land Utilization in China 
(1937). The data used in this study are those from Land Utilization in China, but Chinese 
Farm Economy provides many insights into agricultural conditions of the day. 
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2.1.1 Chinese Farm Economy
4
 
Survey method was carried on through collection of all data and it seemed the only 
practicable application. Tedious work had been done, in which the inclusion of a large 
number of farms offset the disadvantage of no written records since most Chinese farmers 
were illiterate but remembered each item of expense quite clearly. Errors attendant were 
relatively small, provided the sample was representative and the number of records was 
large enough to eliminate bias. 
Chances of a farmer to estimate the price of an item to be too high or too low were 
equal and the average undoubtedly represented conditions more approximately than 
would information obtained from limited written records. Given that imperfections and 
disadvantage resides within any method, Buck found that the survey method, along the 
lines of emerging methods at Cornell University, proved efficient for a good 
understanding of farm business in China. Investigators put their main effort on part of the 
schedule pertaining to farm business and if possible, continued to complete the 
questionnaire though the length might cause difficulty. Consequently parts of the latter 
half were not thoroughly filled for all localities. 
About one-half of the data were collected by advanced students registered for 
                                                 
4 Buck, J. L. 1930. Introduction. Chinese Farm Economy: 1-8. Illinois, US: The University of Chicago Press. 
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university credit while the rest were gathered by paid assistants. Each investigator was 
native to the locality surveyed and was assigned on a basis of his knowledge for farm 
conditions. He should be acquainted with the farmers and know how to approach them, 
proper methods of which could only be learned by years of living and association with 
farmers. 
Records were frequently sent in to office for checking and more times were required 
when some of the computations were quite complicated. Entire work of one investigator 
was discarded to eliminate any questionable value. The chief fear from farmers was that 
they would be taxed more based on information they offered, or their land confiscated by 
a new militarist. Such difficulties were resolved with the help of friends or relatives living 
in the localities studied and successfully wiping away any serious doubts in the farmer’s 
mind. 
2.1.2 Land Utilization
5
 
There is an incisive connection between Buck’s monograph and Cornell. Idea of a 
study for land utilization in China was first suggested by Dr. O. E. Baker6 from the 
Division of Agricultural Economics, United States Department of Agriculture at the 
Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held in Honolulu in 1926. A project was 
                                                 
5 Buck, J. L. 1937. Preface. Land Utilization in China. Illinois, US: The University of Chicago Press. 
6 The Baker Library in Cornell University is named after Dr. Baker. 
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drawn up which called for the study of China’s land utilization in Washington, D.C. Later, 
when Dr. J. B. Condliffe, Research Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations, visited 
China in the winter of 1928, he and Dr. L. T. Chen, Secretary of the China Council of the 
Institute, visited the University of Nanking. They were favorably impressed by the work 
of the Department of Agricultural Economics and asked the Department to submit a 
research achievement. A carefully planned study was presented. It was approved by the 
China Council and later by the International Research Committee of the Institute of 
Pacific Relations which appropriated from funds given by Rockefeller Foundation7 a 
series of grants for the next five years. 
There was a threefold purpose: to train students in methods of research in land 
utilization; to make available China agriculture knowledge for its improvement, also as a 
basis for national agricultural policies; and to make available to people of other countries 
interested in certain China welfare elements about land utilization, food, and population. 
Data were collected by the sampling method from 22 provinces. Each regional 
investigator was assigned a major natural region and was special trained graduate of the 
College of Agriculture and Forestry, University of Nanking. Intensive farm studies were 
implemented in 168 localities scattered in 22 provinces. Sampling was as representative 
of major farming types in China as possible. Sometimes the most desirable locations were 
                                                 
7 The Rockefeller Hall in Cornell University is donated by the Rockefeller Foundation. 
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not available due to absence of suitable local investigators, or disturbed political 
conditions, for instance, southern Kiangsi was not under the control of Central 
Government at the time of investigation. 
Areas studied were determined by types of farming, which were differentiated by 
crops using 20 percent or more of the farmer’s labor, and extending over several hsiens 
(counties). Preliminary approximate boundaries to such areas were determined by 
obtaining estimates from at least three persons familiar with conditions in that and 
adjacent hsien. After having set the representativeness of an area, particular villages 
accepted were selected according to availability of a suitable local investigator and the 
personal contact which could be made. Personal approach for investigational work in 
China is absolutely important in order to ensure as accurate information as possible. 
There were some villages where surveys were actually started but suspicion was great 
that they had to be discontinued and other villages chosen instead. 
For each type of farming area, a representative village (or group of small villages or 
hamlets) was selected, and 100 farms were studied in detail by use of the Farm Schedule. 
Over 250 farm families, were selected in the same village or neighboring villages for the 
Population Schedules. Food Surveys were procured from twenty families in most of the 
localities in which Farm Surveys were made. One Locality Survey schedule was filled for 
each community studied. One Hsien Survey schedule was acquired for each hsien where 
 18 
 
Farm Survey occurred. These schedules were used in purpose to check accuracy of 
estimates obtained by sampling method with outcomes in the more detailed schedules 
applied for individual families or farms. 
Instructions to investigators were to select farms and families in one village, or to 
take them consecutively along typical streets or sections for a large village. In many 
localities, however, this did not prove feasible, and bias might occur in data, probably 
resulting in the selection of samples better than average. 
The country was divided into eight agricultural areas8 and the representativeness of 
the studies can be observed from Table 2.1, where there is positive correlation between 
proportion of the studies to the cultivated area and farm population. 
  
                                                 
8 Reference Chapter 2: 26. 
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Table 2.19 Percent of the Number of Farms Studies in the Eight Agricultural 
Areas to the Gross Area, the Cultivated Area, and the Farm Population 
 Percentage of total for each item in each area 
Gross 
area 
Cultivated 
area 
Farm 
Population 
Farm Survey 
studies 
CHINA 100 100 100 100 
Wheat Region 33 51 41 42 
Rice Region 67 49 59 58 
Wheat Region Areas 
Spring Wheat 9 7 4 8 
Winter Wheat-millet 11 9 6 12 
Winter Wheat-kaoliang 13 35 31 22 
Rice Region Areas 
Yangtze Rice-wheat 8 12 16 23 
Rice-tea 18 12 16 16 
Szechwan Rice 11 14 11 5 
Double Cropping Rice 11 6 11 7 
Southwestern Rice 19 5 5 7 
The total number of hsien in which one or more types of studies were made was 308. 
The location of the Farm Survey studies by provinces was 154. In a few cases, 
information called for in the schedules had not been tabulated because it was 
unobtainable, unreliable or inadequate. 
Shortcomings of the study were fully recognized. It had been carried out under 
difficulties of a limited number of trained personnel, insufficient funds for the size and 
comprehensiveness of the study, and amid other duties on part of the Director and 
members of the staff. The study was supposed to show relationships between facts rather 
than obtain data for current value. It was unrealistic that no errors crept into the work, but 
                                                 
9 Buck, J. L. 1937. Preface. Land Utilization in China. Illinois, US: The University of Chicago Press. 
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every effort had been made to prevent them and all statistical computations had been 
carefully double checked. 
Statistical validity of all factors studied in individual localities was believed to be 
reliable because at least 100 farms from each village were sampled. Whether these were 
random or not is not clear. Thus, statistical comparisons between areas must be made 
cautiously, since for several areas the number of localities studied was not great due to 
the limitation of funds, which has been taken into account and conclusions were drawn 
only where data were adequate. 
2.2 China Agriculture Economy
10
 
The agricultural regions and areas were much more effective as units for the 
understanding agriculture of the country than did the political units of provinces, the 
boundaries of which, in most instances, did not comprise homogeneous economic or 
physical conditions. This was assumed by Buck, but as will be shown later our statistical 
analysis brings this into question. It is found for example that the geo-political boundaries 
of provinces is much more significant that the agricultural regions when it comes to 
agricultural productivity. In fact the analysis of covariance which is undertaken shows 
that the combination of province and time-of-survey was far more important than the 
                                                 
10 Buck, J. L. 1930. Chinese Farm Economy. Illinois, US: The University of Chicago Press. 
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agricultural regions as described by Buck. In Chinese Farm Economy, Buck accepted 
the cursory division of China into two major regions: the North and the South, and set the 
boundary as the Hwai River and westward. Given the multiple typical features of North 
China, such as the use of carts, drilling rather than broadcasting of grain, and the abandon 
of liquid night soil; and the prevalence of rice growing for South China, the section 
between Hwai River and the Yangtze River was predominantly southern and designated 
as “East Central China” though it presented a gradation between North and South China 
conditions. (Again, when it is tested whether the broader region of north and south China 
were adequate descriptors of differences in agricultural productivity, no evidence is found 
to support the assertion.) 
 
Illustration 2.1 Two Agricultural Regions
11
 
                                                 
11 John L. Buck. 1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter II: 25. 
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Good agricultural production required optimizing every way for land usage. Besides 
crop growing as the principal purpose, farm land was also utilized for buildings, 
threshing floors, space for stacks and tethering of animals, paths, roads, ditches, dykes, 
boundary lines, and graves. Confining farmstead to the smallest possible area was 
necessary since land available for a farm family was limited. Though areas occupied by 
graves, boundary lines, and dykes were not a sheer loss from production perspective 
because the grass there could be used for pasturing animals, for fodder, or be allowed to 
grow until being cut for fuel. While facilities especially graves, still deprived quite 
amount of good land12 for better utilization in that provided total amount of arable land, 
an increase in size of a farm would cause a corresponding decrease in some other farm 
unless the increase came from newly deposited soil by rivers or streams, or by the 
exploitation of arable land not formerly included. 
Size of farm business was in general positively correlated with profits and capital, 
but it did not determine yields. Farm earnings for seventeen localities surveyed amounted 
to $106 for farms in the small size-group compared with $439 in the large size-group. 
Earnings increased significantly with each succeeding size-group of farms and merely 
two localities exhibited a constant or diminishing tendency on returns as exception.13 
                                                 
12 The grave area accounted for 1.9 % of area for the whole country; and 7 % of total farm land area. Buck, J. L. 
1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter VI: 174; Buck, J. L. 1930. Chinese Farm Economy Chapter II: 32. 
13 The succeeding size-groups are: small, medium small, medium, and large; The standard for size classification is: 
profits, labor efficiency, quality of business, as well as capital efficiency, such as receipts per mu, expenses per mu, and 
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Typically both capital amount and farm size would show the same extent of increase in 
farm labor earnings, since most of the farm capital was reinvested on land. In order to 
support family, small farm could not hold as much unproductive land (such as low, alkali, 
or sandy land) as the large farm did. Hence yields on small farms in several localities 
were greater than on large farms due to larger proportion of the more fertile land, 
however, the difference of crop yields between small and large farms was very slight, 
about 3%. Given relation of farm size to profits, labor efficiency, business quality, and 
capital efficiency, farms in the large size-groups were the most profitable. But since the 
most economical unit of farm was usually family sized, the optimized size of farm would 
vary according to family size, types of crops grown, and soil productivity. 
Property right played a pronounced role on impacting labor efficiency. Given 
observation that profits were higher for owners, if these same owners need to pay rent or 
interest on the value of their property, they would receive even smaller income than the 
tenants because owners seldom struggled as hard as tenants did by taking advantage of 
obtaining income from their property. The more inherited property a farmer owned, the 
less need he felt to exert himself to utmost for a living even though he has little education, 
and ultimately the less well he would perform. Thus from the perspective of man labor as 
input, tenants with little inherited property would better the yield. 
                                                                                                                                                 
interest on capital investment. Buck, J. L. 1930. Chinese Farm Economy Chapter IV: 107; 101. 
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2.3 The Productivity of Farmland
14
 
Production on farmland was affected by many elements, all of which could be sorted 
into three types: Geographic Physical Prerequisite, Historical Inherited Convention15, 
and Current Artificial Temporal. 
First geographically, physiography16 combined with topography shapes climate, 
represented by monsoon, cyclonic storms and anticyclones. For example, the unreliability 
of rainfall caused by particular summer monsoon17, which brought longer growing season 
for most agricultural areas in China than in the United States, would either reduce crop 
yields to even a complete failure, or delay crop planting at the proper timing to prevent it. 
Evaporation was additionally eventful on determining the needed amount of water for 
irrigation, not only for dry land crops, but also for rice. Factors of climate included 
moisture18, temperature, sunshine, wind and hail. Oftentimes as calamities19 to farmland 
                                                 
14 Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in China. Illinois, US: The University of Chicago Press. 
15 “Custom is often responsible for the type of farming”. Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter VII: 
208. 
16 Such as the “karst” topography in Double Cropping Rice Area. Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in China 
Chapter II: 82. 
17 In the case of the summer monsoon, the heat and the saturation of the atmosphere alone are not sufficient to 
bring rain. Air cooling by the passing of depressions is necessary, either in the violent typhoon type which bring heavy 
rainfall, or in a form of marine depression. If such depressions are few then rainfall becomes inadequate. Because the 
complication of the mechanism is general, the lack of any above factor may bring disaster. Buck, J. L. 1937. Land 
Utilization in China Chapter IV: 112. 
18 The rate of precipitation decrease becomes quite marked between the Yangtze and the Hwai River Valleys and 
along the Tsingling Mountain Range, which is the most important factor in determining the boundary between the 
Wheat and the Rice Regions as amount of precipitation in China decreases from the southeast to the northwest until the 
great deserts are reached. Rice Region has a mean annual precipitation of 51 inches, as compared with the Wheat 
Region which has less than one-half as much, 21 inches. Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter IV: 108. 
It is the combined effect of the monsoons and of the continental cyclones which gives the Rice Region more 
precipitation than the Wheat Region. Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter IV: 109. 
North of the “rice-line” the rainfall is both much less in amount and less dependable on the monsoons. Buck, J. L. 
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production, flood, drought, wind, frost, hail and even insects were triggered by climate. 
Among these, droughts and floods were chief causes of famines20, which was another 
calamity. The former (droughts) occurred twice frequently as the latter (floods) averaged 
to hsien.  
Soil was grouped into different classifications: calcareous alluvium, 
chestnut-colored earths and black earths, gray and yellow-gray desert soil, and alkali soil 
belonged to Calcium Soil; non-calcareous soil, purple-brown forest soil in Szechwan, 
slightly podzolized and neutral brown forest soil, red and yellow soil, podzolic soil, and 
rendzinas belonged to Leached Soil. Soil was sorted according to the extent of being 
leached from moderately to strongly, or from slightly to none. Appropriate coordination 
between sufficient supply of irrigation water and plenty of organic manures would 
possibly give rise to good yields even on the sterile sandy soil, while heavy fertilization 
without irrigation could definitely lead to a bad effect. Since addition of fertilizers onto 
dry land caused the soil water concentrating severely with soluble materials for the plants 
unable to absorb it, plants would die of “physiological drought”. Irrigation could dilute 
                                                                                                                                                 
1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter IV: 119. 
19 Classification of calamities references to Table 9 in Chapter 1: Number of Calamities Occurring during the 
Period 1904-1929 and the Average Percentage of Damage Caused by Them. Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in 
China— Statistics: 13-15.  
20 Famines in China are caused chiefly by unfavorable weather conditions, mainly performed as droughts and 
floods. Water, too much or too little, is the greatest element affecting the precariousness of farming in China. Highest 
number of famines occurred in the Szechwan Rice and the Winter Wheat-millet Areas. Famines are more severe in the 
Wheat Region than in the Rice Region, in the Spring Wheat and Winter Wheat-millet Areas than in the Winter 
Wheat-kaoliang Area, and in the Szechwan Rice Area than in other areas of the Rice Region. Buck, J. L. 1937. Land 
Utilization in China Chapter IV: 125. 
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the fertile soil solution to some concentration that was beneficially absorbed by plant 
roots. Conversely, soil erosion, arose from the loss of soil fertility, choked stream 
channels and intensified the likelihood and severity of floods. 
Second, with Historical Inherited Convention, such as the success of the land use, 
the tenancy relationship, racial custom21, and the prior sales channel, China was divided 
into two major agricultural regions— the Wheat Region and the Rice Region22, and eight 
sub-regions named “areas”— the Spring Wheat Area, the Winter Wheat-millet Area, the 
Winter-kaoliang Area; the Yangtze Rice-wheat Area, the Rice-tea Area, the Szechwan 
Rice Area, the Double Cropping Rice Area, and the Southwestern Rice Area. The Wheat 
Region comprised first three areas while the Rice Region the last five. All the tables in 
Buck’s statistic data23 were strictly constructed under the frame of the eight agricultural 
areas, and so would this thesis adopt to recognize the distinction among these areas due to 
the Geographic Physical Prerequisite and on which the Historical Inherited Convention 
                                                 
21 “The influence of racial custom, at least, cannot be eliminated from any study of land use, and it may be greater 
than is generally surmised”. “Turki, Mongolians and Tibetans in the northwest raise and consume more animal products 
than do the Chinese… tribes in the southwest raise corn in the mountains while the Chinese raise rice in the valley. 
Topographical differences no doubt account for this to some extent. But the freedom of the invading group…to select 
the sites for settlement in accordance with the suitability of the land for the type of agriculture to which it was 
accustomed, probably explains these differences seemingly due to topography.” Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in 
China Chapter I: 5. 
22 Buck summaries some essential characteristics by contrast between the Wheat Region and the Rice Region: 
Proportionally, the productive uncultivated land is considerably greater in Rice Region than in Wheat Region because 
of more favorable climatic conditions. Modification of land is greater in Rice Region than in Wheat Region. Twice as 
many farmers own the land they work in Wheat Region as they do in Rice Region. Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization 
in China Chapter II: 43. 
Risk in farming is much greater in Wheat Region than in Rice Region due to the low and variable precipitation 
which limits crop yields in spite of the inherently richer soils. Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter II: 
45. 
23 Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in China – Statistics. Nanking: The University of Nanking. 
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was based. 
 
Illustration 2.2 Eight Agricultural Areas
24
 
To evaluate farmland production was equivalent to assess the land utilization. Buck 
emphasized the necessary combination of Geographic Physical Prerequisite and 
Historical Inherited Convention when to analyze land utilization: “Some reformers assign 
most of the Chinese agricultural ills to a faulty agrarian situation… appraisal must take 
into account the basic or natural factors affecting both the type and success use of land, 
the factors determining the type of use of land and those factors responsible for the 
                                                 
24 John L. Buck. 1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter II: 27. 
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degree of success in use of land”. Buck also reminded scholars the potential interaction 
between Geographic Physical Prerequisite and Historical Inherited Convention: “the 
vicissitudes of the Chinese climate make crop production hazardous— perhaps a little 
more so than on other surfaces of the earth of equal size. Such risks, however, can be 
minimized with a greater degree of economic organization, with better transportation and 
communication facilities, and with conservancy projects”. 
A crucial interaction between Geographic Physical Prerequisite and Historical 
Inherited Convention was transaction cost that limited the diversification of production 
type for some specific location. For instance, bulky products of small value per unit of 
weight did not deserve to be shipped long distances. Great distances across the whole 
China with primitive methods for transportation, such as carrying goods by a pole over 
the shoulder, or by cart and junk, made access to markets a fundamental factor in 
determining the type of production. Though rail and steamboat transportation was 
increasing, predominant methods were still the laborious and inefficient ones. 
Historically, convention also intervened with total amount and average crop 
production per unit area through keeping overwhelming percentage of crop area. 
Approximately 90% of farmland area was in crops, while merely over 1% in pasture land 
and wooded pasture. To the contrast, 42% of farm area in US was for crops, and pasture 
constituted 47%, almost reached a half and half balance. Herein denoted a much smaller 
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animal industry in China and a consequent quite lower food consumption of animal 
products, as compared with those in many of the Western countries. Early Chinese 
civilization reported no evidence of greater animal products usage than for 1920-30s. 
Excess reclamation was common in China, as artificial modification of land that had 
taken place more profoundly than in a young and less densely populated country like US. 
Cheap labor and high land value meant the land, which in other countries might be 
marginal for forest, or pasture, would be used for crops in China. For instance, rice had 
extended upon slopes of the hills which could be possibly better for other crops. People 
on these lands preferred rice to other crops basically in that their experience was 
restricted to rice, where the Historical Inherited Convention functioned. They planted rice 
on every available piece of land without sufficient consideration of any water supply, and 
some rice fields were even on top of a hill. Then the productivity would “depend upon 
heaven”, namely every bit of water for such fields was from direct rainfall. 
Tenancy system connected farmland property right with scale economy of crop 
production. Land was almost entirely privately owned, with merely 7% held by the State. 
Privately owned land was almost in the hands of individuals and over one-fourth was 
rented. Owner farms were larger than tenant farms, averaging 4.22 acres as compared 
with 3.56 acres. A little over one-half of the farmers were owners, less than one-third 
farmers were part owners, and 17% tenants. The extent of renting crop land was the 
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benchmark to define the ownership type. For example, Farmers who owned their 
farmsteads, but rented all their crop land were classified as tenants rather than part 
owners. Tenancy was much more prevalent in south China than in north China and varied 
greatly in amount for different sections of the country from no tenants to all farmers as 
tenants.  
Fragmentation of land, the ownership by individuals of scattered pieces of land, was 
the rule in China. Contrary to some countries such as England, where farmers seemed 
preferring to be tenants because they were thus relieved of certain responsibilities taken 
by landlord and could enjoy considerable security of tenure, Chinese farmers tended to be 
owners of land themselves to escape the fate of being slaves of some ferocious landlord. 
Whereas the first class of land25 was limited to 52.1% averagely for China. To maximize 
the interest for large population of farmland owners who were simultaneously pursuing 
the good quality of land, fragmentation of land as Historical Inherited Convention, was 
the inevitable Nash Equilibrium for the game of farmland allocation. Objectively such 
fragmentation of land reduced efficiency of farmland productivity. It had disadvantages 
of increasing the number of boundary disputes, consuming time to reach the plots (nearly 
six pieces, or parcels, per farm averaging a little less than an acre in size), increasing the 
difficulties of irrigation, restricting the size of fields for machinery farming (also dense 
                                                 
25 Classification of land quality by productivity references Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in China—Statistics 
Chapter II: 38, Table 9. 
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population made labor cheap and machinery operation uneconomical), and making 
integrated crop protection difficult. Chief advantage was, however from the perspective 
of risk management, one farmer might have land of differing qualities and this was vital 
in a country of small farms where a complete crop failure would be disastrous. 
The loop of population and crop production exacerbated density of population and 
the predominance of crop productivity. On one hand, crop production was more intensive 
due to absence of hay and other fodder crops required for the animal industry as in Japan, 
India and even Soviet Russia, compared with that in most Western countries like US or 
Western Europe. On the other hand, double or even triple cropping on nearly two-thirds 
of the cultivated land was a way by which the Chinese have adjusted production to the 
density of population. Such trend and ascendant proportion of crops grown in turn 
indicated much more labor were required per acre, to meet the needs of an increasing 
population. Such loop further facilitated the monomania for the staple crop, the farming 
for seed or tubers until the possible greatest amount rather than to devote the land into 
pastures or crops for animals which in turn supplied a smaller quantity of food in a form 
of animal products. Moreover, land farmed for grains and tubers produced six to seven 
times the food energy as land used for raising dairy cows per unit, of which the difference 
encouraged grains and tubers growing on every possible inch to meet the bare subsistence 
needs of a dense population. 
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Unemployment did not prevent labor shortage during peaks of labor particularly at 
planting and harvest time. Hand methods impeded a more equal and smooth distribution 
of labor throughout the year. Labor saving devices for these peak periods would obliterate 
such difficulty and permit some farm population to have full time for other pursuits. 
A particularly important characteristic of rural China was expenditures on 
celebrations, gifts, wedding and funerals etc. These expenditures required ready cash for 
conspicuous delicacies that enriched diet on festive occasions, for utensils and wearing 
apparel, for tobacco or other luxuries, for schooling and recreation, for weddings and 
funerals, and for religious observances. Farmers sold the superior cash crops like tobacco, 
opium, peanuts, rapeseed, cotton, cocoons or raw silk and cereal crop like soybeans or 
wheat, while consumed inferior grains themselves, like kaoliang and sweet potatoes. 
Without the need for such price gap, agriculture in China could be much more 
self-sufficient than in any Western country; yet still China had a highly developed 
civilization to both satisfy home necessities and show off social status or family 
prosperity. Chinese farmers thus developed innumerable cropping systems to produce 
variety of crops required and to utilize his labor throughout the growing season. Some of 
these systems were suggestive as international advanced for adoption in other countries 
having similar climatic, soil, industrial level and market conditions. 
Since most of the Chinese were farmers and most of farmland area was in crops, 
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frequency of crop failure was an indication of land utilization performance. Risk of farm 
management chiefly existed in calamity prevention and mitigation— irrigation control, 
culminating in drought or flood— “is a major problem and its removal will do more to 
increase production than any one other thing”. Irrigation, as the paramount Current 
Artificial Temporal26, was the device farmers mainly resorted to for offsetting the 
aftermath brought by drought. The feeble performance of irrigation accounted for the 
severe absence of comprehensive and progressive irrigation facility in general and even 
conversely hinged on the prices of agricultural products. During drought years before 
1932, farmers themselves undertook the task of digging canals for irrigation. After 1932, 
prices of agricultural products decreased though taxation of irrigated land had increased, 
thus the opportunity cost of irrigation increased and resulted in irrigated land being 
abandoned. Hence slim achievement of irrigation on boosting productivity with the 
counteraction from the prices of agricultural products induced that calamity still stood as 
the chief menace for agricultural production. In such case, impact analysis of calamity 
factor onto crop production would be the highlight in this thesis. 
Animals were generally treated as farm labor instead of either source for meat 
industry or fertilizer productivity. Density of animal population, contrary to the lack of 
animal industry, was quite high over large part of the country. Farms were moderately 
                                                 
26 “Among the changes made to land by man in China, irrigation and terracing are the most important.” Buck, J. L. 
1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter VI: 186. 
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well-stocked on animals, in spite of the fact that 10% of the farms had no animals at all. 
Big animals were usually deemed as loyal partners on farming to each family, thus 
farmers seldom killed them except being driven to desperate.27 Each family kept a 
couple of big animals on average and such animal labor can be even shared between 
close neighbors. Therefore limited amount of animals contributed finite fertilizer. 
Apparently, increased implement of fertilizer would be profitable, but insufficient capital 
and unavailable fertilizer by machinery production obstructed such development. 
Size of farm and optimized size for crop production was a topic Buck had been 
focusing on. First, large farm had the economy of scale. Dense population utilized less 
proportion of cultivable land for crop production rather than more. Housing and farm 
administration severely swallowed acreage of small farm where it was most needed. 
Large farms had advantage over the small farms also in that parcels and fields were larger 
and the crop acreage per man-equivalent and per labor animal unit were 2.5 times as great. 
Second, size of family was tightly positively correlated with size of farm. Third, smaller 
size of farms induced few animals per farm. The average size of farms in Wheat Region 
                                                 
27 The extent of this can at times be best understood from literature. Pearl S. Buck, the Nobel Laureate author of 
The Good Earth was John Buck’s wife and frequently travelled with him to the countryside. Her perspective on this 
was reflected in her novel about rural China: When the famine came, Wang Lung “kept the ox on the threshold until it 
grew lean as its skeleton… But there came a day when there was no rice left and no wheat left… the old man said, “We 
will eat the ox, next.” Then Wang Lung cried out, for it was to him as though one said, “We will eat a man next." The 
ox was his companion…from his youth he had known the beast, when they had bought it a small calf. And he said, 
“How can we eat the ox? How shall we plough again?”… But the old man answered, tranquil enough, “Well, and it is 
your life or the beast’s, and your son’s life or the beast’s and a man can buy an ox again more easily than his own 
life.”… He said roughly, “Let it be killed then, but I cannot do it.” Buck, P. S. 1931. The Good Earth: 71-72. 
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of 3.56 acres was larger than in Rice Region of 2.27 acres inasmuch as less favorable 
climatic conditions, primarily a shorter growing season and a more variable climate. The 
most economic-sized farms would be in the very large size-group on a scale of 13.02 
acres of farm area; of 3.7 man-equivalents; of 3.02 animal units; of 2.25 labor animal 
units; and a production of 10,376 kilograms of grain-equivalent per farm, when all the 
farms were grouped into five size-groups.28 
Trends in the Chinese price level had influenced the intensity of land utilization. 
China set the currency on the silver standard for a long time until late of 1935. From 1885 
to 1931 silver fell in value compared with all other commodities due to the world 
demonetization of silver; and price level rose quite rapidly since in China prices were 
measured in terms of silver. Consequently, silver hoarding began in 1931 as well as gold 
hoarding during monetary difficulties in gold standard countries. Then a rise of silver 
value and a fall in prices came, which resulted in the Chinese depression which lasted 
until devaluation and the establishment of a managed currency on November 3
rd
, 1935. 
At first the rising prices caused agricultural commodities and other raw materials to rise 
in price more quickly than other groups. Wages lagged in the rise to make it profitable to 
apply comparatively more labor and fertilizer to increase production. In other words, 
rising prices made more intensive farming possible. Falling prices, however, had the 
                                                 
28 The criterion of measurement for size is vague, and the exclusive known is the designation for these five groups: 
small, medium small, medium large, large, and very large. Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter IX: 287. 
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opposite effect because agricultural prices as well as prices of other raw materials fell 
first, and most rapidly. Other costs, such as labor and taxes, lagged in their fall. Therefore 
costs of production were high and must be curtailed especially in view of the low prices 
received. Production thus shrunk. 
Buck suggested a series of criterion to measure the success of farmland utilization, 
such as yields, production per capita, wage of farm labor, taxation of land, the standard of 
living (the amount and ratio of debt and savings as a measure of adequacy) and 
population density… “In general, China’s yields are better than those of India or Russia, 
not as high as those of Japan, and are less favorable than those of Italy, Germany, Great 
Britain, and the United States. Floods, droughts, soil erosion, insufficient fertilization, 
absence of control of insects and diseases, and inferior seeds are among the factors 
accounting for this situation”. Further improvement of yields could stem from adoption 
of modern transportation, economic organization and technical promotion in agriculture. 
2.4 Summary 
Observation of agricultural production are scattered and hidden within volumes of 
Buck’s academic composition. The aim of this literature review is to search for as many 
clues as possible and dig them out to construct a frame for expounding what were the 
prime factors that affected the agricultural productivity and how each factor worked. 
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All factors are sorted into three groups by the author in this thesis: Geographic 
Physical Prerequisite, includes climate, topography and soil; Historical Inherited 
Convention, includes the type of the land use (excess reclamation, fragmentation), the 
tenancy system, racial custom (ready cash for conspicuous delicacies on momentous 
occasions, dense population), and the prior sales channel, etc; and Current Artificial 
Temporal, includes irrigation system, animals as labor and offering livestock waste as 
fertilizer, size of farm, and trends of price. Calamity, such as flood, droughts, famine, 
wind, frost, hail and even insects, can be triggered by any factor in either group or in 
combined groups and it is supreme in this thesis because China was exposed to frequent 
catastrophes so severe that those calamities undoubtedly exerted an important effect on 
reproductive performance.29 Some factors are across-group: Transaction cost was shaped 
through both Geographic Physical Prerequisite and Historical Inherited Convention. 
People in Rice Region had become so habitualized to rice that they continued to make it 
the chief staple of their diet, even when it was more expensive than wheat. This is the 
case how Current Artificial Temporal converted to Historical Inherited Convention. 
Besides what are emphasized above, other supplementary explanation of farmland 
productivity should be mentioned: Official statistics were unreliable because land area 
was often misrepresented by the owners to evade taxes, and newly reclaimed lands might 
                                                 
29 Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter XIII: 381. 
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not be reported. Land surveys in several hsiens had shown the error in reported cultivated 
area reached as much as one-third from the actual number.30 Tax rate, surprisingly, had 
little correlation with land productivity but was controlled by the political administration 
within each hsien.31 
Grave land constituted a real problem in densely populated China, and stressed by 
Buck in every of his essays, not only because the land was taken away from cultivation, 
but also in that graves created obstacles for scale management. If those graves could be 
removed, crop area in China would increase by 1.1% or 2,552,000 acres, which could 
support over 400,000 farm families. Within the area of grave land, more than half, 64%, 
was in cultivated fields, 15% in arable uncultivated land, and 21% in non-arable land. 
Regionally over four-fifths of the grave land in Wheat Region was in cultivated fields, 
while less than one-half in Rice Region since quite amount of graves were settled in 
accessible hill and mountain areas.32 
Tenancy system is indispensable as Historical Inherited Convention and the rent 
reflects average yield. But rented area accounted for merely over one-fourth of the 
farmland. By regional comparison, ownership was more prevalent in Wheat Region 
where one-eighth was rented than in Rice Region where two-fifths was rented.33 
                                                 
30 Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter VI: 162. 
31 Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter VI: 171. 
32 Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter VI: 178. 
33 Buck, J. L. 1937. Land Utilization in China Chapter VI: 194. 
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Preference of Chinese farmer for crop growing visibly reflected the sequence of 
desirable characteristics, high yield ranked first, and early maturity was the next in 
importance.34 Cropping system, or rotations of crops, comes from the experience that 
better yields were usually obtained by alternating crops instead of growing them always 
on the same land. It was the yield and the price of crops, seasonal distribution of labor 
and proportion of the most profitable crops together that determined the profitableness of 
a cropping system. To boost output, better care of the crops was necessary, such as 
improved fertilization with nitrogen and phosphorus, irrigation, drainage, control of flood, 
control of insects and disease, and pruning of fruit trees. To be specific, Rice region 
suffered mostly from insufficient capital while Wheat Region insufficient fertilizer.35 
Extending credit at reasonable rate to farmers for purchase, generalizing of modern 
transportation to decrease transaction cost, and discovery of sanitary use for night soil 
without diminishing the fertilizing value were solutions to fertilizer problems in China. 
For an individual, a farmer was better off living in a more densely populated area 
with better yield because of the more favorable conditions for agriculture. However, to 
the entire farmers in China, the true cause for low standard of living as compared with 
US was the low production per man-equivalent, which explained why the one-quarter of 
the total farmers in US provided more agricultural products per capita than three-quarters 
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of the total Chinese farmers could.36 
As farmland value, income from agricultural production sales was disturbed by 
currency trends. Gradual decline in silver value, expressed in a rise of prices paid by 
farmers for commodities consumption of living and production, in wages, in prices of 
labor animals, in farmland taxes, during the period from 1888 to 1931, exerted a 
substantial influence onto the farming prices expressed in terms of silver.37 Before the 
year 1925, the rise in farmland value was about equivalent to the reduction in value of 
silver currency, but after 1925, farmland value did not rise because of a diminished 
demand for land owning to agitation against landlords and confiscation of land 38 
launched by Chinese Communist Party to recruit armies in the aim of supporting the 
Northern Expedition to overthrow the governance of the Northern Warlords. Earnings 
from output sales fluctuated synchronously. 
Transaction cost induced higher price of grain several months after harvest. Grain 
was with higher moisture content immediately after harvest than later, hence dehydration 
and storage of products begot an expense, and losses might occur through insects, rodents, 
dampness, fire and theft. Sometimes price was high enough to enable the person holding 
grains for profit regardless of the storage risk. Scale economy of transaction cost rooted 
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in that local transportation would cost even higher than longer distance transportation did 
since shipment in larger quantities for longer distance was cheaper. Competitiveness of 
China was undermined due to the high transportation costs and heavy tax levy on 
agricultural produce, compared with foreign countries exporting agricultural products to 
the mainland. 
Following this review of the literature a variety of control variables are selected to 
capture agricultural productivity. Although Buck provides many variables in the same 
class, multicollinearity forced us to use only a limited number of key variables that Buck 
deemed important. These include farm size to capture potential economies of size and 
scale, distance between farm parcels to capture land fragmentation and diversification, 
human labor invested in marketing to capture transaction cost, irrigation, and percent of 
arable land to capture land quality. The dependent variables in our analysis are the actual 
productivity (indexes) as reported in the survey period and the ratio of these productivity 
measures to normal yields and best yields. Dummy variables for location of village in 
agricultural areas, provinces as well as time period of survey are included to capture the 
broader effects. And it is these variables combined with calamities and conflict that is 
most interested. The regression coefficients and tests in Chapter 5 would be applied to 
interpret marginal changes in designated relationships, for instance, how much influence 
an event such as Yangtze River flood in 1931 had imposed on yield oscillation through 
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location and time. Current affair remarks derived from news in China Weekly Review is 
rearranged in Chapter 3. More detail of variable generating and selection can be traced in 
Chapter 4, Data and Method. 
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Chapter 3: CALAMITIES AND CONFLICTS 
In the previous chapter certain aspects of the agricultural economy in China were 
reviewed as described in Land Utilization in China. However, if land use in China is to be 
criticized it is that Buck never placed any of the statistical data in context. In other words 
farm productivity in Shensi in 1929 and 1930 was treated no different and without 
qualification to say Hunan in 1933. This is believed to be a material oversight. China 
between 1929 and 1933 was in tumult from a variety of natural calamities and manmade 
conflicts and each of these in one way or another can qualify the data. For example 
reports in August 1930 stated that under current conditions massive amounts of land were 
being underutilized. Floods, insects, drought, wars, banditry, and communist disturbances 
were forcing farmers to leave land uncultivated.
39
 Of those that remain on the land the 
vast majority did not have the scale to adopt new technologies that could improve yields, 
they consumed their own stocks in times of crisis therefore depleted supply available for 
general consumption. Furthermore, the calamities and conflicts on which this chapter 
report have much broader economic consequences. For example, while there was 
probably enough rice land in China to feed the world, there was in 1930 a shortage  
which encouraged hoarding behavior driving the price up to the highest levels ever 
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recorded ($24/200 lbs or per “shih”). Due to famine and war, the lack of shipping and 
transports limited importation of commercial or relief grain into depressed areas which 
exacerbated conditions, while in all areas the rapid rise in price reduced the consumption 
especially for poorer households that relied on rice as a staple. In Shanghai dock workers 
and factory workers went on strike in order to get a “rice allowance” added to their 
wages.
40
 
The costs of militarism on agriculture can also not be ignored. In Kiangsi alone the 
losses due to militarism between 1926 and 1931 were 6,600 houses burned with 22,600 
casualties and property damage of $5 million; in Kweichi 3,000 houses were burned with 
60 casualties and $400,000 for property damages; in Yichuan 700 houses were burned 
with 100 casualties and $20 million for property damages; in An-fu 5,000 houses were 
burned, with 7,000 casualties reported but property damages for only $35,000. The list 
goes with maximum property damage of $40 million in Kwungfeng, 8,000 houses burned 
in Yinshin and 22,600 casualties in Shuichan.
41
 
Yet, other reports show advances to agricultural productivity with certain aspects of 
militarism, especially those related to communist activities.
42
 To the peasant class many 
of these were attractive elements especially those related to the redistribution of land and 
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working conditions so it is no wonder given conditions in the rural areas that the 
communists could attract members and forces. Even so, context matters. For example 
while the communists in establishing a soviet eliminated all forms of taxation, this was 
unlikely to be economically neutral for often the tax on grain was in physical commodity 
and not cash, and what was taxed was consumed without being necessarily sold in the 
cash market. Consequently, to fund activities, systems of fees and surcharges were put in 
place in addition to the forced surrender of grain when needed. 
For our purposes the activities related to agrarian reform were so sweeping that they 
cannot be ignored. On one hand is the militarism itself which can not only destroy crops 
and dislocate farmers, but the commandeering of trains for troop transport meant less 
freight for shipment of grains and produce to markets, contracts with middlemen could 
not be guaranteed for delivery, and so on. But it also meant that with thousands of 
farmers joining the red army, labor productivity would decline or wages would have to 
increase accordingly. In areas with large tenant populations it was unlikely that landlords 
would keenly invest in inputs and improvements if there were a risk that lands and titles 
would be confiscated and redistributed to peasants and soldiers. Credit, were it available 
would melt away with declarations that all notes bearing high interest and pawn shop 
tickets, and therefore would be considered null and void. 
On the other hand improving the farm economy by farm reconstruction, 
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improvement in irrigation, prevention of floods and droughts, support emigration to 
reduce farm population density, establishment of Farmer’s Banks and cooperative 
societies to provide credit on easy terms, unify currency and weights for measures, and 
maintain efficient control of waterways were all designed to improve agricultural 
conditions and productivity. In Kiangsi much of these reforms were put in place including 
the removal and burning of all deeds and the removal of boundary markers to destroy all 
evidence of ownership boundaries. The land was redistributed to the able-bodied 
regardless of sex, and additional land was allocated to households for persons with 
disabilities and children under age of 16 by up to 25% of the normal allocation for the 
household. To aid in recruitment, land held by soldiers of the Red Army would be tilled 
by others. The labor class including poor and middle poor peasants and workers were 
organized into unions. The middle and upper class gentry were excluded from all political 
activities for fear they would manipulate a class struggle in order to get land back. The 
bandit class, including the various societies (small sword, red spears etc.) was absorbed 
into the soviet and the military so long as they renounced any authority other than the 
soviet. In doing so the communists removed a significant element of banditry. 
In economics the term ceteris paribus means other-things-being-equal and in some 
instances principles of homogeneity are appropriate. But in Buck’s study with various 
villages being surveyed at different locations with different exogenous factors to interpret 
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the data as if all other things were equal is likely to be incorrect. For example except for 
one village surveyed in Liaoning there is no observation that might provide insights into 
the impact of productivity on agriculture following the Japanese annexation of Manchuria 
and provinces north of the Great Wall between 1931 and 1933, nor is there any 
observation of villages in the battle zone around Shanghai during the Sino-Japanese 
conflict in January to March, 1932. To add complexity many of the village names no 
longer appear in current maps or have been changed so that it is not possible to readily 
pinpoint precisely where a particular village was located. The Analysis of Covariance 
approach used in the chapter of results and analysis bears this out: not all provinces were 
in conflict and not all provinces met a calamity. In addition from a point of methodology 
it is highly unlikely that the villages surveyed were truly representative, nor would Buck 
have sent his students and surveyors into areas controlled by warring bandits, warlords, 
communists, or nationalists for safety reasons. Further, not every particular village was 
known when it was precisely surveyed. So if it was in a war zone it might have been 
surveyed before the war, after the war, or during the war if it was some safe distance from 
the front lines. If the randomized survey protocol was indeed practical, the ceteris paribus 
interpretation of the results could be rested on with some sense of confidence. Because 
such doubts are open to question, results must be interpreted in the context of the 
historical developments at the time. 
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The empirical part of this thesis is essentially geared to understanding how 
calamities and conflicts and other natural and geopolitical influences can collectively or 
individually explain the productivity measures in Buck’s study. Context, as it is argued, 
matters. In the empirical section regressions are first run while considering the inputs to 
the production process, the agricultural area, the province and the time at which the 
survey was conducted for each village. 
The time span at which each village was investigated is provided in the statistical 
appendix to Land Utilization in China but little mention of the dates appears in the actual 
text book. Thus without context a reader of Land Utilization in China might naturally 
assume that productivity in Shensi was lower than that of some other province without 
fully comprehending that Shensi was in the midst of a drought and famine that was 
unparalleled in decades; or some other province was surveyed after a massive flood; or 
some other village was inundated by communists, bandits, warlord armies or nationalist 
forces fighting these groups, nor are conditions given to explain the geopolitical 
differences across provinces. Indeed, Buck focused differences in productivity according 
to agricultural zone, whereas our findings will show that the significant differences in 
productivity are tied to provincial matters. 
To investigate this, our regressions use productive controls, and a series of dummy 
variables to capture the time frame, provincial and agricultural regional factors. In 
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addition, then a number of variables are added to apprehend the flood, drought; 
communist, bandit, warlord, other civil military activities, and Japanese militarism and 
other factors. But before presenting these econometric results, the remainder of this 
section summarizes by year the various calamities and conflicts across China at the time 
Buck’s survey was taking place. 
This summary is almost entirely reliant on the contemporaneous news reported in 
the weekly volumes of China Weekly Review (CWR). The benefit of sourcing history 
from CWR is that it provides continuity of depth on any particular issue drawing from its 
own reporters and editors as well as other contributions from Chinese and English (and 
Japanese) language dailies and weeklies. It would also pick up on regional news sources 
as well as news items of national importance. On the other hand it is unlikely that the 
news made available is entirely complete. Banditry and civil wars that could easily lay 
waste to large sections of agricultural land might not always be reported. In other instance 
it might simply be a 25-word statement that some village or region was invaded by 
bandits or warlords. However, if any such action rose to some serious threshold in all 
likelihood it was reported and recorded for our purpose. Nonetheless, while it is believed 
major calamities and conflicts facing rural China are all caught between 1929 and 1933, 
it is more than likely that there were many incidents not recorded for one reason or 
another. In the following paragraphs the various calamities and conflicts were obtained 
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almost exclusively from the contemporaneous reporting in the China Weekly Review. 
3.1 Flood, Drought, Pestilence and Famine 
The most significant calamity of 1929 was the on-going drought in China’s north 
and central provinces including Shensi, Shansi, Honan, Kansu, Suiyuan, Chahar, 
Shantung, Hopeh, and Hupeh. Initial reports in December 1928 of a famine arising in 
Shensi resulted from drought. The rivers Wei and Kin were drying out with reports of 
plague and locusts. 91 districts were affected with reports of young girls being sold for 
marriage at a price of $4-5. At Kuanshien in Shantung 100,000 reported as being destitute. 
The China International Famine Relief Commission reported that in one hsien in the area 
between the Yellow River and Sianfu in Shensi, 70,000 of 120,000 were completely 
destitute of foods or substitutes with the remainder living on meager diets. Dried grasses 
were being grounded with which to make a sort of porridge. Draft animals had 
disappeared having been eaten. In one district 100 families committed suicide rather than 
continued to suffer.
43
 Edgar Snow provided the historical context of the disaster 
unfolding. Approximately 50 million persons were affected by the drought and famine in 
Shensi, Honan and Kansu an area that was relentlessly impacted by a host of calamities 
including the “quintet” of drought, famine, flood, earthquake, and locusts. The range of 
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calamities and conflicts affecting China since 1850 included 1850-1864 Taiping 
Rebellion with 20 million killed and 9 provinces decimated; 1878 Famine in Shensi and 
Shansi with 8 million dead; 1894 war with Japan; 1899 Severe drought in Shensi; 1923 
drought and famine in Shensi and Honan; 1923 earthquake and mountain slip in Kansu, 
killing 200,000; 1924-1929 continued drought and famine in Shensi, Honan and Kansu.
44
  
And from personal observations in Kansu, only in the valley of the Yellow River 
were crops normal. In other sections crops were poor but if rationed properly could have 
been sustainable. In other locations the crops were devastated and without a 
precautionary stock, famine took hold very quickly. Harry Paxton Howard wrote 
“Throughout this vast territory conditions are such as are unknown and incomprehensible 
in modern countries today. From eating bark of trees, grass roots, and vermin of every 
available kind, the starving people have gone on to eating what they hopefully call 
‘bread-stones’, which are simply a kind of rather solid clay with no food value whatever. 
Finally has come cannibalism, and the emaciated bodies of the dead are consumed to 
maintain, for a little while, the spark of life in the living…There is cannibalism over most 
of the province at present but particularly in the south. Not only the emaciated dead are 
eaten, but sometimes nourishing victims are found. A detachment of 10 of Col. Chao 
Si-ping’s soldiers, near Lingshih, failed to reach a city before dark, and slept out in the 
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open. It was their last sleep, as about all that was left of the detachment in the morning 
were gnawed bones and some clothing. They had been eaten.”45 Edgar Snow, visiting the 
famine regions in Suiyuan in Inner Mongolia observed “…stepping over a skin-draped 
skeleton in which a faint agitation told that life still loitered, as though waiting for an 
unseen hand to order it to shuffle away forever… a withered young woman who was 
frantically burrowing a hole into a little mound of earth, digging for the roots of a 
leafless, almost limbless, dust coated tree that somehow had managed to escape complete 
dismemberment…A family group...spent a week in tramping across the dusty semi-desert 
of the southwest…there were four sons each with 12 mu of land, enough to support the 
family… to keep from starving they ate their seed grain. An opportunity came to sell their 
women and girls to wealthy Chinese in the east, rather than watch them starve to death, 
they agreed to the deal…It was almost unbelievable that human beings could survive with 
so little flesh clinging to their frames… one fellow-the ghost of a once powerful man, was 
particularly pitiable. The muscle had dropped away from his broad shoulders and stout 
arms; one could have joined the fingertips of one’s two hands around his waist, and 
encircled his biceps with the thumb and forefinger of one hand. They all wore such rags 
that the greatest mystery was how the countless tatters managed to hang together as one 
garment…. signs of famine disease. Their faces were puffed like bloated sausages, and in 
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color their skin was like stagnant water. Their eyes, in which lingered no trace of the 
alert curiosity so characteristic of Chinese children, were watery and sometimes almost 
obliterated by the bags of mottled flesh that surrounded them.”46 
By May in 1929 however, the full extent of the drought was recognized. Famine 
conditions in China were affecting about 10 times more people than the past major 
famine of 1920-1921 and the entirety of shipments of grain into the famine areas ending 
on April 1
st
 of 1929 was less than the amount of grain moved from Manchuria in each 
week of the 1920-1921 famine. In the famine regions of Hopeh and Shantung grain was 
moving elsewhere than Manchuria and assistance was mostly financial with local 
agencies purchasing the required grain. But in other provinces where grain was not to be 
found the money was useless for without grain being shipped it could not be purchased. 
Relief was not effortless. The China International Famine Relief Commission (CIFRC) 
leased locomotives and cars for relief purposes and were given assurance by local 
military that famine shipments would travel without incident.
47
 
Into 1930 conditions improved in many areas but not for Shensi. In June of 1930, 
the CIFRC reported a wide-spread drought in Shensi was requiring burial squads to make 
two rounds per day in Sian. Up to the Sanyuan plain in Shensi, there was only 5% yield 
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on crops and poor conditions were also reported in western counties.
48
 In addition there 
were also reports of a serious famine in the eastern part of Chekiang requiring massive 
food aid.
49
 In the district of Paotachen, Suiyuan province, already under famine 
conditions, crops were damaged from a rare summer cold spell that dumped up to 6 
inches of snow in June.
50
 In 1931 famine conditions were reported in west Honan and 
Kansu.
51
 
With an unusual warm March weather increased the current of the Yellow River in 
Tsinan became so strong that it breached a dyke at Litsin hsien, resulting in damage to 
100 villages with tens of thousands of farmers affected and sheltering on the dykes.
52
 In 
August 1929 rains in north China caused the Yungting river to overflow, inundating 10 
villages flooding 200 sq miles of land with many persons drowned as well as thousands 
of cattle and all crops lost. The floods affected nearly 500,000 people who in great 
starving numbers were living on the sides or tops of hills. Efforts at relief were hampered 
by the enormity of the flood and the isolation of the villages and the stranded.
53
 In  
Shantung a 1,000 ft breech in the Yellow River flooded a strip of land 50 miles long and 
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10 miles wide, destroying the bean and grain crop in an already famine ridden area for 
which the destroyed crop was a promising aid.
54
 
In June and July of 1931 the China Weekly Review posted two short articles that 
were prescient. On June 13
rd
 of 1931, in one of the first signs of the disastrous flooding to 
engulf the Yellow and Yangtze River basin, northeast Hunan was inundated with 
rainfall.
55
 Landslides were reported and rainfall from the mountains was so intense that 
debris covered the valley for several square miles. Many lives were reported lost and crop 
losses were immense with newly sown fields laid to waste. The second, on July 4
th
 1931 
discussed improved production in many areas of China.
56
 Despite the drought of 1929 
and its residual into 1930 and various civil wars and strife, the agricultural outlook for 
China was projected to be the largest crop ever. North of the Great Wall in the spring 
wheat area production was projected to be 146% of normal yields with yields in 
Heulungkiang being 171% of normal. Winter wheat in the southern provinces of Shansi 
(49%), Hopeh (74%), Shantung (105%), North Kiangsu (92%), Anhwei (74%), Honan 
(87%), Hupeh (79%), and Kiangsu (71%) were expected to be lower (86%). Although 
crop conditions were good in Shantung, Hopeh and Honan, fewer acres were planted in 
Hopeh and Honan due to poor weather conditions and warfare. 
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Optimism about bumper crops was soon to be dashed by the great floods of the 
Yellow and Yangtze Rivers. On July 11
th
 there were reports of serious flooding across 
China. The west and north rivers at Kwangtung had overflowed their banks and the 
Yungting and Taching rivers in Tientsin were similarly inundated. In Kiangsu the Grand 
Canal had risen 10 feet and had submerged several villages. In Eastern Honan near 
Tangshan the Yellow River was overflowing and flooding large sections of farmland.  
Refugees were already beginning to congregate on nearby hills. Heavy rains in Nanking 
saw several buildings collapse.
57
 On July 18
th
 of 1931 it was reported although 
conditions had become less serious in many places which had been affected, rail traffic 
was disrupted by excessive flooding in Honan with one train wrecked when the road-bed 
gave way.
58
 In north Kiangsu one district was turned into a lake as the consequence of 
continuous downpour. Water on the streets was knee deep and most houses submerged. 
Elsewhere in Kiangsu the dykes at Tsingkiangpu and Chuchow collapsed flooding rice 
fields with damage estimates of $6 or 7 million. The Huai River had risen 20 ft and in 
peril of inundating many districts in northern Ahnwei if the weakened dykes failed. On 
July 7
th
 most of Peiping was under water and electricity was cut out putting most of the 
city into darkness. Along the Yellow river, which had risen to 85 ft above sea level, dykes 
and embankments collapsed in both the upper and lower parts of the river. In Pengpu a 
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dispatch dated July 13
th
 stated that after 10 straight days of heavy rains the city was 
several feet under water with boats moving goods and people around and 5,000 people 
were homeless. On August 1
st
, 1931 widespread flooding in Nanking was reported with 
1,000 houses collapsed due to heavy rains.
59
 Conditions in Kiangsu were so severe that 
famine conditions would be confronted in the fall. Near Wuhu in Anhwei province the 
collapse of embankments flooded 200,000 mu of rice fields. Farm houses collapsed and 
many livestock drowned. Wuhu was also flooded. Reports of flooding in south Shantung 
followed heavy rains on July 16
th
 combined with hail. Many cities along the 
Shanghai-Nanking railway were flooded. At least 30 % of rice fields were damaged and 
granaries were washed away requiring sampans (river boats) to be used for storage. The 
Chientang River in Chekiang province was on the verge of overflowing due to heavy 
rains and many districts inundated with flood waters. On August 8
th
 of 1931 it was 
reported that the Yangtze River near Wuhan flooded drowning several hundred people on 
August 1
st
.
60
 A Dam at Hankow collapsed on August 2
nd
 and hoarding and profiteering in 
coal and foodstuffs was outlawed. In Anking, losses in 39 districts exceeded $4 million 
but with a provincial deficit already a ban on the export of rice was imposed. The Yellow 
River in Shensi broke its banks and flooded a wide area in Pingmin. In Tsingyuan, about 
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60 miles northwest of Canton 1,297 persons were drowned, 10,000 persons rendered 
homeless, 36 fish ponds ruined, 25,000 mu of land damaged and losses totaling some $2 
million. In Hunan, General Ho Chine, Chairman of the provincial government ordered all 
slaughterhouses to close for one day so that the wrath of Heaven might be appeased and 
the people spared. By August 15
th
 of 1931, the full scope of tragedy was being realized as 
potentially the worst flooding since the 15
th
 century with much of central China flooded 
including Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, Anhwei, Szechwan and Shangtung hit the hardest.
61
 
The General Relief Committee at Nanking reported that some 50 million persons were in 
distress and 16 provinces were affected by floods. They petitioned Nanking for $20 
million for relief and another $5 million to be raised in Shanghai ($25 million). As at 
August 11
st
, the Grand Canal had not yet burst but the Kiangsu provincial government 
was alarmed by the rise of water. Starving peasants in the vicinity of Kiukiang were 
reduced to selling their oxen and buffalo for $4 and $5 each to buy food for themselves. 
Although water was receding all hopes of a harvest were lost. 220,000 in Hankow were 
rendered homeless. It was observed that peasants removed bodies from un-interred into 
coffins in order to transport themselves from one place to another. Because of water 
levels ships could not be unloaded at Hankow. Tugboats used for temporary storage and 
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food shortages in Wuhan forced the Hupeh government to telegraph Kiangsi for an 
immediate shipment of 100,000 piculs of rice. Flood damages in Hupeh, Hunan, Kiangsi, 
Anhwei, Kiangsu and Honan estimated at $8 million and in Kiangsi some tax relief on 
arrears was provided to farmers. 
By October in 1931 the floods had subsided in most parts of central China but too 
late in many cases for planting a winter crop. Land could take years to reclaim so the 
outlook for 1932 was not expected to be high. And yet the calamities in 1932 and into 
1933 continued with famine and drought continuing in Shensi, more flooding in Hunan 
and Kiangsi, cold and drought in Kansu, flooding in Harbin of Manchuria, drought in 
Anhwei. 
3.2 Bandits, Warlords, Civil War and Agricultural Conditions 
Banditry was rampant across China. In a letter to the editors of CWR John Lossing 
Buck wrote of meeting farmers in a tea house to discuss credit cooperatives.
62
 A farmer 
said “if any financial help is rendered to us now, it would only bring more harm than 
good, for our greatest distress and sorrow is no other than the bandits. We can neither 
work in the daytime nor rest at night…well-to-do families have taken refuge in the city. 
Those who are poor…hurry away and hide with their children wet and cold, in the bushes 
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and streams of the mountainside in spite of the mosquitoes and snakes…many deaths 
have occurred. We do not grieve over the dead, for it is better to die of sickness than to be 
killed by bandits…we would rather die than suffer”. 
Bandit forces arose for many reasons. In some instances it was the inability of the 
economy to absorb soldiers being released as the national government was trying to 
disband its numbers after the northern expedition to eradicate the northern warlords 
between 1927 and 1928. Other bandit forces were remnants of former warlords, or by 
warlords that escaped the Nanking forces. 
In many rural areas remnants of the Boxer societies still persist along with the 
superstitions in China. In Honan at least 3 secret societies prevailed.
63
 The Heavenly 
Obedience Society was formed in 1925 by a Wang Lao-feng who declared that he was the 
“Real dragon” and would soon be China’s emperor. That organization comprised of many 
women as well the structure was the leader and then male and female military 
commanders. Believing in special powers in charms and spells they decided one day that 
that Ki hsien would be their capital but were badly beaten and dispersed with members 
becoming bandits or joining other societies. The Heavenly Gate Society was formed by 
Han Yu-ming, a stone cutter, who found a stone seal and pretending that he cut it from a 
large stone established an alter at which he referred to himself as the Old Corps Tutor. He 
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convinced members that they were immune to gunshots and rousted a city from which he 
called himself emperor and started to collect taxes. The Cannon Society emerged in 
western Honan in 1927 or 1928 with the slogans destroy the bandits and refuse to pay 
taxes. By and by they became the bandits and had to be disbanded by the Kuominchun. 
Members could freely kill their enemies and burn their houses. Eventually the leader, 
Chang Peng-chu was killed at Loyang, his subordinates burned alive and the remainder 
becoming bandits. The most notorious and perhaps long lasting society was the Red 
Spears who acted depending on the circumstances as a rural crop protection force or 
bandits. On September 23
rd
 just outside of Penglai in Shantung a large force of Red 
Spears were destroyed by provincial troops. These Red Spears, largely a bandit group 
rather than a society had been terrorizing the areas burning 80 villages, looting and 
murdering even women with children who had escaped into the corn fields. 
But calamities also led to banditry. In Kansu the famine provided conditions for the 
rise of a formidable “Mohammedan” bandit force of some 35,000 soldiers led by an 18 
year old Major Ma Chung-yin. Ma intended to eradicate the provincial warlord force of 
Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang, the leader of the Kuominchun, who was having problems of his 
own with General Chiang Kai-shek. In reality, the Mohammedan bandit force leaned 
more towards plunder and burning than administration.
64
 Elsewhere in Kansu another 
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Moslem uprising was reported with a force of 20,000 associated with Szechwan warlord 
Wu Pei-fu (and other war lords) taking control of Southern Kansu except Tsinchow and 
Kongchang.
65
 In a horrific squabble between Chinese and Moslems in Kansu nearly 
10,000 Moslems were killed and many hundreds of Chinese. In May 1929 rebellious 
Moslems under a warlord attacked Chinese and Tibetans killing 80 Chinese in Old City, 
followed by 700 killed and another 100 drowned above Lupasi. In retaliation Chinese 
entered the Old City killing all Moslems unable to flee. When the Moslems returned in 
August they were separated with all men between ages 15 and 50, led outside the city 
gate and executed killing some 2,996 Moslems.
66
 
Elsewhere the seemingly independent roving of armies was in display in Hunan 
where Gen. Lu Tih-ping was forced into exile at Nanking. Lu’s provincial forces were 
spread throughout Hunan on bandit suppression when on February 28
th
 a large military 
force dispatched by Wuhan Central Political Council entered the province on the grounds 
that Gen. Lu was tolerating bandits, sympathetic to communists, and abused financial 
power. Lu could not mobilize a defense and did not want to plunge the war-torn city of 
Changsha into further turmoil.
67
 By March 1929, the situation in Shantung was 
deteriorating for farmers, particularly in the eastern part and around Ankiu and Tsingchow.  
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The Japanese protection zone along the Kiaochow-Tsinan railroad had formed a barrier 
that the nationalist troops could not cross from the west and which warlord Gen. Chang 
Chung-chang’s bandit soldiers roamed with impunity to the east with no interference 
from the Japanese. The bandit soldiers had split apart from the main force and set up 
small feudal locals over claimed territories in which many atrocities occurred. Farmers 
were robbed and when there was nothing to rob they were executed. Rape was rampant 
with bandit soldiers billeting in farm houses. Children were thrown to the roadside and 
women committed suicide rather than were raped. Desperate farmers rose up against the 
bandits but were no match and were killed in the hundreds and thousands with entire 
villages leveled.
68
 
In October of 1929, 1,600 villages destroyed by fire, 20,000 people killed and 
10,000 carried away for ransom by bandits starting about October 8
th
. The bandit force, 
10,000 strong, rode with impunity since the villagers obeyed a central command to 
disband local militia. The bandits were eventually defeated by forces from Nanking and 
Kaifeng.
69
 
1929 also saw a rise in communist activities, although the communists were treated 
more as a bandit force than a political threat. But by August of 1929 the communists had 
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been very active in the southern provinces. In some instances the communists kidnapped 
people for ransom. For example on September 30
th
 of 1929, 13 missionaries were 
captured from the Dominican Mission by Chu Teh and Mao Cheh-tung, eventually being 
released for $10,000 ransom. 
Communist forces were reportedly active in western Fukien, northwest Kwangtung 
and parts of Kiangsi. Liencheng in western Fukien was taken by Chu Teh and Mao 
Cheh-tung on August 6
th
 of 1929; the Suishui district of Kiangsi was taken by on August 
4
th
 with considerable loss of life and property. On September 23
rd
 of 1929, the 
communists under Chu Teh recaptured Shanghang. The communist forces did not appear 
to have any stable hold for as one place was taken another had to be abandoned. However, 
in the abandoned areas the old land titles and contracts between landlords and peasants 
were destroyed. As the (liberal elements of) nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) pushed 
communist forces out, they did not necessarily restore the old system of land tenure but 
actually reconstructing the districts on a new and equitable basis, preventing the landlords 
from “regaining their old position of privilege and exploitation”.70 By March 1930 and 
through 1933 Communist activity was reported in Honan, Hupeh, Kiangsi, Fukien, and 
Kwangtung. It was not until March 1930 when editorials finally concluded that the 
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communist forces were likely a permanent force. In many instance the communists would 
establish “soviets”. They would stamp out all vices when they took over a town including 
gambling and opium and sometimes even tobacco, but they are not very tolerant of the 
bourgeoisie resisting efforts. In April and March 1930, some 5,000 uncooperative land 
owners were executed. Other “oppressors of the people” were either exiled or shot. 
Religions and idols were banned, but reports from missionaries and other foreigners 
testified that looting was not rampant.
71
 
The communist “Red Army” was made up of an amalgam of deserted nationalist 
soldiers, warlords and bandit gangs defeated by Red Army, and peasants. Recruiting 
peasants to the Red Army was an easy task. Corrupt magistrates and other officials as 
well as merciless militarists had gouged the farmers and peasants out of their solitary pig 
and mules, deprived them of what little stores of grains they held, and left them without 
any worries at all except the all-absorbing grim alternative of life or death. In contrast the 
communists protected farmers while growing their crop, eradicated local government, 
destroyed deeds, confiscated hoards of food and redistributed it all, asking only for a 
small share in return. “Could there be a more appealing argument to a farmer who has 
been forced to sell his wheel barrow to pay his tax?” From this cruel realities facing the 
Chinese farmer any change could only have been viewed as a gain, “for simple arithmetic 
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proves that no matter how much you subtract from zero, you get only zero. Having 
nothing left, they stood to lose nothing. Therein lay the strength of the communist 
appeal”.72 
The Red Army also worked alongside the so-called “Peasants Union” which was 
very aggressive at taking control of governments where Nanking’s influence was weak. 
At times the peasant’s union would lead combat raids ahead of the Red Army with hoes 
and clubs. The majority of union members were from the landless class or labor class that 
had nothing to lose with the structure of tenancy and sharecropping. Landowners, small 
and large may make a minimal living from renting out the land but sharecroppers must 
pay huge dividends in crop share to the landowners.
73
 
In addition to bandits and warlords and communist insurgencies China in 1929 and 
1930 was faced with the prospect of two civil wars against the Nanking Kuomintang 
government under Chiang Kai-shek. These were largely political conflicts in which the 
warring parties were largely supporting the Kuomintang but under the principles of KMT 
founder Sun Yat-sen rather than the republicanism of Chiang Kai-shek. In the southern 
provinces two forces arose and combined to challenge the government in Nanking. These 
were largely from the Wuhan faction in Hupeh province which held an alternative 
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government to Beijing. The second civil war was instigated by the Shensi Christian 
general Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang who would ultimately pressure for yet another 
government in Peiping (Peking). Feng, once known as the Christian general, controlled a 
force of nearly 150,000 with the main force settles in Shensi. Feng was an officer during 
Qing (Manchu) dynasty (pre revolutionary 1911) but secretly joined, and was loyal to 
Sun Yat-sen and moved his forces against the Manchus. Between then and now his forces 
were republican loyalists with many excursions in battle and bandit control. It was argued 
that his forces were probably the best of all military forces in China, and a force to be 
reckoned with. Feng was solidly in support of Sun’s three principles, but after Sun’s death 
and the rise of the Northern Expedition forces towards a unified China he saw the 
revolutionary powers being more interested in control than the principles. Outright civil 
war in Shensi, Shansi and Honan was averted (at least in 1929) but the southern rebellion 
was more militaristic. 
As mentioned, the governing and military authority of Chiang Kai-shek had always 
been tentative with armies comprised of seemingly loose alliances and even looser 
loyalty to the nationalist movement. In Hunan, three generals ousted an appointee of 
Chiang Kai-shek which upset the general balance of power. Shek with 150,000 troops 
from the First Route Army in the area started to send troops to Hunan. Gen. Li Chung-jen 
commander of the fourth route army and part of the Wuhan or Kiangsi faction also had 
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available 120,000 troops. How troops behaved depended upon whether the various 
generals were allies or opponents within the KMT. The various generals still sought 
political and economic control over particular provinces. Gen. Li Chung-jen was 
attempting to bring Kiangsi under his control while Chiang Kai-shek was still trying to 
extend his control over Honan. It was clear that Nanking was losing patience with the 
Wuhan faction and that if the Wuhan generals did not submit to Nanking and the 
mandates of the Central Government another extended civil war would be inevitable. 
Indeed a mandate against the Kwangsi faction was issued later on March 26
th
 with a 
manifesto on why civil military action was required issued by Chiang Kai-shek on March 
27
th
 stating that what was at play was more than a simple fight between Hunan and 
Hopeh but a challenge to the revolution itself.
74
 
By April 1929, the situation along the Yangtze was very fluid with a showdown 
between the Nanking government forces under Chiang Kai-shek and the so-called 
Kwangsi forces that were loyal to the nationalist government but not loyal to Chiang as 
leader. The Kwangsi and Wuhan faction were being advanced upon in three directions by 
Chiang’s forces from Nanking but no real fighting had taken place, although Wuhan 
defenders reportedly placed mines in the Yangtze River downstream of Hankow.  
However, in a surprise move on April 4
th
, a Kwangsi supporter Gen. Hsia Wei who 
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headed the 7
th
 route army, switched sides to support Chiang and the 1
st
 route army.  
Consequently Kwangsi troops refused to fight and turned towards Hunan to return to 
Kwangsi. The conflict in Wuhan was deemed over so much so that Chiang’s orders to 
have Cantonese troops attack Kwangsi troops was refused on the grounds that the 
retreating Kwangsi troops were unlikely to engage in any further attacks. As Kwangsi 
troops fled to Hankow, Chiang’s troops moved in causing many civilians to seek 
protection in the foreign concessions.
75
 Ultimately the Kwangsi rebels and so called 
“Ironside” troops became a rebel force requiring a military response from Nanking.76  
These were by no means minor skirmishes. In two separate battles in Hunan between the 
Kwangsi or Ironside forces and nationalist troops, there were 21,000 casualties of which 
5,000 were government troops.
77
 
Militarism in China was not confined to banditry and civil war. For years prior to 
1931 the Japanese had sought ways to increase its influence in Manchuria and China 
proper. On September 18
th
 of 1931, a Japanese force of about 40,000 troops occupied the 
Chinese territories in south Manchuria (north Manchuria at the time being controlled by 
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the Soviets).
78
 The occupied areas included southern Fengtien province, including its 
capital Mukden which was also the seat of the Chinese political administration in 
Manchuria, and a considerable portion of Kirin province. Also occupied were key port 
cities of Newchang, Antung, and Changchun. Changchun was also the junction of the 
Japanese South Manchuria Railway and the Soviet China Eastern Railway. Some 30 
million Chinese, one-third of all Chinese in Manchuria were then under Japanese 
occupation. 
Within this territory laid Chinese railways that were adversely competing against 
Japanese and Soviet railways and also the Peiping-Mukden line which made up the main 
artery between Mukden and Peiping, south of the Great Wall to southern Chinese markets. 
In essence Japan had control over all ports, all rail and thus the shipments of all goods 
into and out of Manchuria. The Japanese also took control of all telegraph lines and radio 
stations, so that all communication into and out of Manchuria was under the control of 
the Japanese. In fact the only news about the occupation came from Japanese sources and 
even foreign consular offices had to send communiques via Japanese lines and then 
retransmitted. Business interests in Shanghai and other business centers south of the 
Great Wall had no means of communication with interests in Manchuria. 
What instigated the occupation is an interesting story. The Japanese accused the 
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Chinese of blowing up a bridge on the south Manchuria Railway at Liutaiokuo station 
north of Mukden. What ensued was a clash between Japanese railway guards and Chinese 
troops. This was reported at 10:30 pm. By 6:30 am, the walled city of Mukden was 
occupied and its Chinese forces and police disarmed. As daylight broke on the morning 
of Saturday, September 19
th
, Japanese troops within Manchuria and from Korea were 
mobilized and on the move. In addition, Japanese citizens in Mukden had been 
pre-warned. Later it will be discovered that the bridge was actually blown by Japanese 
militarists looking for an excuse for occupation; the connivance worked. By the 20
th
 riots 
had broken out in Kyutsekai and Lungchingson near the Korean borders putting Japanese 
in grave danger. By this action the militarists were able to convince Tokyo to expand 
military activities. Thus, if Japan were to increase its military presence in Manchuria it 
was believed at the time that the cause would have been the murder of two Japanese 
militarists by Chinese or bandit forces. The two soldiers were travelling on civilian 
passports in plain-clothes in Inner-Mongolia and might have been declared spies on their 
discovery. Nonetheless the so-called “Nakamura Affair” was to be settled amicably at the 
political level between Tokyo and China Foreign Office and as late as September 17
th
 was 
not a cause for military action. Indeed, by September 19
th
 reports were made that the 
murder of Captain Nakamura was by Chinese regular forces and that several Chinese 
officers were to be taken to Mukden for trial and execution. It was a report out of Tokyo 
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that first suggested the bombing was a consequence of a clique of young “hothead” 
Japanese militarists who were enraged by the murders and political solution, seeking a 
military retaliation instead. 
In actuality the Japanese often sought reasons to expand military presence in 
Manchuria. Nakamura, travelling as a PhD researcher was probably a spy and justly 
executed according to the law at that time.
79
 The Chinese seeing that the affair could lead 
to increased militarism and mobilization evaluated the political calculus and concluded 
that the lives of a few officers were a small price to avoid an all-out military conflict. For 
those Japanese seeking this conflict, a new excuse was necessary. Also the timing was 
impeccable. With the Nanking government faced with military activism in Canton and by 
communists elsewhere, combined with the severity of the Yangtze and Yellow River 
Valley flooding, there was not much China could do immediately except to protest. On 
the Cantonese Chiang Kai-shek urged a halt to actions to deal with the Japanese 
occupation, but to the Communists Chiang Kai-shek would make no peaceful 
compromise. 
The annexation of Manchuria was followed shortly thereafter by the Shanghai 
conflict.
80
 The so called “Shanghai Incident” of January 29th in 1932 refers to the 
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military clash between Japanese marines and China’s 19th Route Army. The incident itself 
was the culmination of a great many stressors and a general distrust of the Japanese’ 
intension to occupy Shanghai as it was presently doing in Manchuria. 
The Manchurian occupation and the massacre of Chinese civilians in Korea led to 
wide spread boycotts of Japanese goods and services starting around July of 1931. The 
boycotts were enforced by such organizations created for the purpose such as the 
Ant-Chinese Boycott Association which enforced the boycott by picketing shops selling 
Chinese goods, harassing Chinese working for Japanese employers, and intimidating 
Chinese buying any sort of Japanese goods or services. In some provinces and political 
jurisdictions legal authority was given to remove Japanese goods from stores and 
imprison sellers or buyers who violated the pact. 
Protests by students denouncing Japan and calling for war with Japan over 
Manchuria led to increasing hostilities between Chinese and Japanese. These protests also 
made derogatory remarks about the Japanese Emperor who was believed to be a son of 
Heaven. On January 18
th
 of 1932, five Japanese including several monks were attacked 
by a Chinese mob outside the San Yeh towel factory in the Shanghai district of Chaphei. 
Two of the Japanese were wounded with one of them, a monk, dying shortly thereafter. 
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On January 20
th
 a mob of 50 Japanese from the Japanese Youth Protection Society 
retaliated, and with knives, daggers and clubs on hand burned the towel factory and 
clashed with Chinese municipal police, wounding two and killing one. Three Japanese 
were shot by police, killing one. 
That same day Japanese residents sent a message to Tokyo requesting the Japanese 
government to send warships and troops to completely suppress the anti-Japanese 
movement. These same Japanese clashed with police of the International Settlement 
wounding a British soldier. In the afternoon of the 10
th
 the Japanese Consul-General 
presented an ultimatum to the Mayor of Shanghai concerning the events of the 19
th
 
including 1) a formal apology by the mayor, 2) the immediate arrest of assailants, 3) 
payment of solatium and hospital bills, 4) adequate control of anti-Japanese movements 
and 5) the immediate dissolution of all anti-Japanese organizations involved in fostering 
hostile feelings, riots and agitation. 
On January 21
st
 the mayor notified the Japanese consul that he could acquiesce to 
the first 3 points but the latter two points could prove difficult. Later on the 21
st
 the 
admiral of the Japanese fleet announced that it the mayor could not provide a satisfactory 
response then the admiral was determined to take appropriate steps to protect the rights 
and interest of the Empire of Japan,
81
 indicating that the text of a telegram from Tokyo 
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implied that the admiral’s ultimatum was explicitly referring to the use of the armed 
forces of the Japanese navy in order to dissolve the Anti-Japanese Society and give 
protection to Japanese residents. The Chinese actually closed the Anti-Japanese society 
but the Japanese applied force nonetheless. This article published in print form on 
January 30
th
 would not have included the January 29
th
 incident in its text and thus 
provides a prescient view of how the Chinese viewed Japanese aggression and the belief 
that Japan one way or another was going to use the towel factory incident to flex its 
muscles in Shanghai. The mayor for his part was working with the municipal council to 
avoid any possible conflict and succeeded in closing down the Anti-Japanese Boycott 
Association. Nonetheless, by January 24
th
 Japanese reinforcements arrived off Shanghai 
while Chinese troop reinforcements moved into Chapei. 
The Japanese admiralty and the consul general’s ultimatum expired on 6pm of 
January 28
th
 and before expiry the mayor delivered a note to the consul-general acceding 
to the demands in their entirety and this was deemed satisfactory by the consul general.  
While the ultimatum was playing out the International Settlement Defense Committee 
had issued a state of emergency, but did not lift the state of emergency for fear that the 
Chinese could not enforce its promises or that the Chinese citizenry would riot at the 
humiliation of succumbing to the ultimatum. The state of emergency established certain 
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defense rights within the boundaries of the international settlement but nothing was said 
about areas outside the international settlement including areas of western Shanghai that 
included Hongkew park where many Japanese lived and the Woosung railway station. 
Although this area was outside the international settlement it was not unusual for 
Japanese marines to have security posts in the region. Around 11 pm on January 28
th
 the 
admiral notified the defense council that it was going to move a detachment of marines 
into the Chapei region and that Chinese troops should remove themselves to the western 
side of the Woosung railway station. 
Chinese troops refused to move as demanded and fighting broke out between 
Chinese regular troops and Japanese marines. The Chinese held their ground at the 
Woosung rail station and was able to use an armoured train against the Japanese. The 
Japanese in turn bombed the rail station and the train and then proceeded to bomb the 
surrounding buildings with incendiary bombs to remove sniper positions. 
The provincial Kuomintang and the Anti-Japanese association in Honan announced 
a series of laws regarding the boycott including fines of $50-500 for minor offences and 
execution for serious offences. Twenty large stores selling primarily goods from Japan 
have closed their doors.  
By early March 1932 the Japanese had not only advanced through Shanghai but had 
extended their reach to about 45km from Shanghai, deep into the farming countryside. By 
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then the battle had left Shanghai and diminished to a number of skirmishes between the 
two forces, while the League of Nations attempted to address the issues from Geneva, 
with the Chinese demanding that all Japanese troops remove to their warships. In a 
surreal image the battlefield outside of Shanghai and the Chapei district is a clutter of 
images of farmers tilling the fields after the vast armies had maneuvered over the area, to 
villages in which peasants and villagers worked at the end of a Japanese bayonet doing 
odd jobs while Japanese civilians burned outlying buildings not destroyed by Japanese 
bombs. Farmers were killed on mass by both bombs and bayonets in this area. 
By May 7
th
 in 1932, a Sino-Japanese truce was signed ending hostilities between 
Japanese and Chinese with Chinese troops remaining in the positions current at that time 
and Japanese troops returning to the international settlement in Shanghai. 
Despite Japanese aggression, internal conflict was not arrested in the remainder of 
1932 and into 1933. Communist suppression in the south and Japanese aggression in the 
north laid waste to many farms and disrupted the agricultural economy in many ways as 
has been discussed above. The main focus is: Militarily was in communist suppression in 
the southern provinces, although civil wars in Shantung and Szechwan were also reported.  
Japanese hostilities in Manchuria extended to Jehol and the Great Wall but by May 31
st
 in 
1933 an armistice was signed holding the Japanese to the north of the Great Wall. 
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3.3 Geopolitics and Agricultural Conditions 
What is largely unobserved in Buck’s data is the provincial or regional geopolitics.  
Lease arrangements, farm tenancy, taxation and so on are all factors with credible impact 
on agricultural productivity. For the most part these are systemic and cannot easily be 
captured by factor-specific variables. Rather these are captured regionally by provincial 
instruments and more broadly by agricultural areas. These impacts were discussed by 
journalist Harry Paxton Howard
82…“The peasantry is the backbone of the Chinese 
people. The cultivators of the soil are the greatest productive elements of the country. And 
it is they who are the worst sufferers from war when it invades their districts. They have 
everything gain from peace— if it is a peace based upon enlightened policy and not 
merely on bayonets…A policy devoted to the interests of the peasantry is not mere 
altruism. Every thought of altruism may be cast to the winds (as it already appears to 
have been by many leaders unfortunately), and the stubborn and undeniable fact remains 
that a policy in the interest of the cultivators is the soundest and most intelligent policy 
that can be pursued. That free labor is far more productive than involuntary is a clearly 
established economic fact. A class of cultivars feeling themselves the master of their own 
soil and free to enjoy the fruits of their labor is a sound basis for political and social 
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stability. A class driven to desperation by rent, taxes and usury is a basis for an 
impoverished economy and perpetual discontent…A peasant policy is not a simple thing 
to be worked out particularly in the widely varying conditions throughout China. But if 
the essential aim is clarified the details become less complex. This aim must be devoted to 
the welfare of the actual cultivators of the soil. Whether owners, tenants or farm laborers, 
they must be dealt with as cultivators— if they are. The cultivator feeds everyone else, 
whatever may be the form of land tenure…It is probably fair to state that most farmers of 
China would be quite satisfied to be let alone. If the question was put to them as to what 
the government could do for them, the first thought of most of them would probably be 
(though it would perhaps remain unspoken), ‘Ah, please get off our backs!’…If the 
agrarian policy be taken as basic, a policy may be founded upon their fundamental 
necessities. The primary need is freedom from pillage— this making them a basic factor 
for peace. Beyond this there is required a policy which will free cultivation from taxation. 
Taxes should rest upon non-productive ownership rather than upon productive cultivation. 
The ratio should be according to the value of the land, not according to the value of its 
product. The proposed new land law is the most important move yet made by the Nanking 
Government with regard to internal policy— but it is still only a proposal…As regards 
rent, the tenant farmers in some districts— even here in Kiangsi— have solved the 
problem themselves by simply refusing to pay it and terrorizing the collectors into 
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keeping away from their villages. In some places the government has not interfered. The 
Nanking Government has far more important things to do than protect the property of 
absentee landlords against the cultivators who feed the nation. Nevertheless, there are 
many districts where the tenants have so taken affairs into their own hands. From the 
governmental viewpoint, a practicable policy would be to take up the rental value of land 
from the landlord and apply it to public uses. The proposed land law appears to aim at 
this…With the elimination of crushing rents and taxes on cultivators, comes the 
possibility of a positive program. Such a program has already been projected by the 
Kuomintang, but its realization still belongs for the most part to the future. The most 
essential features would appear to be (1) cheap credit, best of all in the form of 
co-operative credit unions; (a start on this has already been made.) (2) Cheaper goods, 
which necessitates the elimination of the various business and transit taxes which weigh 
so heavily upon commerce here, and could be furthermore assured by the formation of 
co-operative consumers’ societies; (3) better prices for products, which could best be 
gained by cooperative marketing; (4) improved communications, which will make 
exchange easier and facilitate the production of surplus (but only if the cultivator can see 
himself receiving the benefit of this surplus); (5) better seeds, new crops, other technical 
improvements…The above remarks are applicable to most of the country. Some districts, 
however, are faced by even more urgent needs— flood control and irrigation. At the same 
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time, it must be remembered that the ultimate cause of famine is the lack of any margin in 
normal years. Most of the victims of famine in Shantung today have been sucked dry and 
rendered destitute by merciless taxation year after year. If improved conditions permit the 
cultivators to accumulate a surplus in good years, and some check is put on steady 
growth of population, the basic causes of famine will be removed, though floods will still 
remain a danger until some of the rivers (particularly the Huang and Hwei) are brought 
under control, and droughts will be a nuisance until communications and industrial and 
commercial development make it possible for the population of affected districts to turn 
to other occupations in bad years”. 
In addition to the absence of economic infrastructure much of China was largely 
separated by distance and geography that made trade amongst regions complicated if not 
prohibitively costly. For example by one account it took 22 days to travel from Shanghai 
to Chunking in Szechwan, a distance of about 1,000 miles as four days up the Yangtze 
River to Hankow, another four to Inchang and four more to Chungking for a total of 12 
days and then on to Chengtu overland by chair in 10 days. The road from Chungking to 
Chengtu is actually a stoned path about three feet wide over most of the distance, laid out 
in stone slabs about 5 inches thick, one foot wide and three feet long. Transport is done 
by professional coolies who would organize gangs to carry man and luggage. Hilly and 
mountainous terrain made railroad construction difficult and expensive which added to 
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the economic isolation of the region but in 1929 some headway was being made in the 
construction of roads for a motor way, but the roads built to grade, village by village, 
were unpaved and almost impassable in rainy weather.
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Furthermore the actions of provincial governors, mostly former warlords or 
militarists of one sort of another acted with near impunity in terms of allocating funds 
transferred to the provinces from the central government. For example, Gen. Feng 
Yu-hsiang, the warlord premier of Shensi had on Nov 28
th
 of 1928 made an appeal on 
behalf of Shensi, Honan and Kansu for $100 million to cover labor relief and direct aid 
including infrastructure, well sinking and irrigation. Brigandage, the formation of bandit 
groups was on the rise as a result of the famine. Nanking authorized $1.25 million (1.25%) 
in December 1929 to be split Kiangsu, Kwangtung, Chekiang, Anhwei, Hupeh, Hunan,  
Hopeh, Szechwan, Fukien and three eastern provinces but it was not clear whether these 
were general allocations or specific to reported famines. Ultimately Feng had received 
nearly $800 million from Nanking for famine relief but used the money to buy airplanes 
and armaments. With a very awkward logic, apparently Feng saw no point in sending 
money into the countryside and then going in and removing money in taxes, even though 
he did remit taxes. On the other hand the farmers were in no position to pay taxes in any 
                                                 
83 Nyhus, P. August 17th, 1929. Some agricultural and Economic Notes on a Trip to Szechaun Province. China 
Weekly Review vol. 48: 516-518, 521. 
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case, and those that did came nowhere near close enough to support famine relief.
84
 
As previously discussed the communists used the problem of excessive taxation to 
win over peasants in the establishment of soviets and for military recruitment. But by 
1933 other aspects of progress were being made, largely in response to the flooding and 
observed conditions in agriculture by the University of Nanking.
85
 A series of credit 
relief efforts were organized by the School of Agriculture at the University of Nanking 
(D.Y. Lin). Included in this relief is the establishment of agricultural banks and in fact a 
central agricultural bank was to be considered. 
The Nanking managed relief had restored nearly 1 million mu of land using refugee 
labor (presumably with wheat payment) but in order to get farmers back on the fields an 
amortized loan system was established. Under this scheme farmers could borrow seed 
grain directly or money to purchase seed grain, fertilizer or implements for the planting 
of winter crops. These loans were to be administered by Ningshu Agricultural Relief 
Association “to afford a permanent agency for promoting the agricultural and economic 
welfare of the rural population of this (Ningshu) region”. One of the first projects was to 
colonize some uncultivated land in the Chuyung hsien along the Ching Hwei River which 
was badly damaged during the 1931 floods. About 3,500 mu was set aside to support 
                                                 
84 Howard, H. P. June 1st, 1929. Famine and “Mohammedan” Banditry Again Devastating Kansu. China Weekly 
Review vol. 48: 17. 
85 Editorial. February 4th, 1933. Some Practical Applications of Farm Relief. China Weekly Review vol. 63: 
407-408. 
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some 150 farm families. Colonists would be provided a loan to cover the costs of seed 
and other inputs, food, and material for a shelter for the first year and this would then be 
repaid within a 3 to 5 year period. 
In addition short term loans and mortgages were issued to rice farmers facing the 
low rice prices in spring of 1932. Farmers would have had to sell twice as much of their 
stores than normal, and this provided an opportunity to bridge the price gap with a loan. 
To guarantee the loan the farmers were required to deposit their cheap rice as a mortgage 
in one of 101 depots scattered across the area. It was reported that some farmers were 
walking as much as 30 miles with rice on their shoulders to get the loans. Most of the 
3,014 families assisted by the commodity loans held less than 30 mu of land. Larger 
farmers who had resources were not eligible. At most a farmer could deposit 1,500 catties 
(1 cattie = 500 g or about l bs) and could receive up to $30 in credit of ($0.02/cattie or 
$2/tan with 1 tan = 100 cattie). Interest was set at 1% and loan terms were from 4 to 6 
months. When the loan was paid the farmer would remove the rice from the depot. An 
average loan was about $15. Farmers would be issued a Deposit Receipt which itemized 
the transaction and its terms and this was the only record of the transaction. And the 
deposit receipt was transferable and could be sold to a third party and the rice released to 
the third party so long as the loan was repaid with interest. If the loan was not repaid then 
the rice would be auctioned. 
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In addition Nanking University reorganized cooperatives in the district to encourage 
wheat production using wheat cultivar #26 which was tested by Nanking University to 
increase yields by 10-15%. #26 seed was also loaned to farmers on the condition that they 
would follow certain cultivation practices in line with the cooperatives.  
Dean Lin stated “These cooperative societies are, in our opinion, most important, 
and we hope to make them a permanent feature of our work in the Ningshu district. Think 
of the hundreds of things that we could do for soil and crop improvement, animal 
breeding, forestry, and for general rural betterment through such societies. The solution 
of China’s agricultural problem in my opinion lies in having such co-operative societies 
properly organized and properly directed.” 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter reviewed the history of China over the period 1929 to 1933. The main 
events were the 1929 drought and famine, the 1931 floods, communist insurgency and 
warfare with the KMT, banditry and civil war. This environment is believed critical to the 
understanding of Buck’s data and to truly appreciate the economic determinants of 
agricultural productivity during that time period. The economic conditions as described in 
Chapter 2 are combined with the historical developments as context provided in this 
chapter to construct the econometric model which is described in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: DATA AND METHOD 
4.1 Data Source and Missing Values 
This thesis uses data from two sources. As discussed in Chapter 3 the China Weekly 
Review was used to identify the timing and locations of major calamities and conflicts. 
The primary data for agricultural productivity, inputs to the production process, village, 
provincial and agricultural area definitions are compiled from the third volume of Buck’s 
series of academic magnum opus, Land Utilization in China—Statistics. This volume 
summarizes at the village level individual household surveys from 16,786 farms in 168 
localities, and 38,256 farm families, in 22 provinces in China, from the year 1929 to 1933. 
It was first published by the University of Nanking in 1937 as a report in the International 
Research Series of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and issued under the auspices of the 
National Economic Council and the Central Bank of China. Exclusive distributors were 
all senior as the ratification for the professional and accuracy of Buck’s investigation: for 
China and the Far East was the Commercial Press, LTD., Shanghai; for the United States, 
the University of Chicago Press; for the Great Britain and the Continent, the Oxford 
University Press. There are 12 chapters, including Climate, the Land, Nutrition, 
Livestock and Fertility Maintenance, Prices and Taxation, Crops, Size of Farm Business, 
Farm Labor, Marketing, the Standard of living, Population, and Sources of Information. 
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Localities in each table are arranged under the frame of the eight agricultural areas. Land 
Utilization in China was Buck’s analysis and interpretation of this data set. This thesis 
utilizes the same database, but for a thoroughly novel research of agricultural productivity. 
Process to digitize the statistical volume took two semesters.86 
Out of our control are a large amount of missing values chiefly stemming from two 
circumstances: Name of places were omitted to save space in tables where information 
did not apply or exist; every of 58 localities was divided into more than two parts, and 
some even have 5 parts. Different tables cover various localities and subparts. For 
instance, Nancheng occurs as Nancheng (1) in table A, as Nancheng (1) and Nancheng (2) 
in table B, as Nancheng (1)-(5) in table C, as Nancheng in table D, and disappears in 
table E. Thus for most tables taken into account, Nancheng (2)-(5) are presented as 
missing values. It must be kept in mind that these data were collected and summarized 
during a very difficult period in China’s history and without the foresight of database 
structures, computer programs, econometric methods and tools, or economic theories that 
had not been developed at that time. Our approach is tested by the rudimentary (yet still 
sophisticated) collection and computational methods available at the time, but with the 
advantage of modern econometric and statistical tools. 
                                                 
86 See Appendix Part II. 
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4.2 Dependent Variables 
Our basic approach was to discern amongst the various variables available that best 
capture the key influences on agricultural productivity. This was discussed in Chapter 2 
to some extent but here the data is described in detail. Our data set was constructed by 
hand-translating Buck’s data tables into a digital format. These input-output factors were 
in accordance with the literature review and in line with modern production theory, to 
decipher the agricultural land production markup and slump from the year 1929 to 1933. 
There are three variables chosen as dependent variables: “Average_yield”, “Ratio_avg_ 
to_normal”, and “Ratio_avg_to_best”. Page 208 displays average yield, normal yield, 
and best yield as crop index
87
 based on most frequent yields as 100 for each locality. The 
change of index for different localities as relative change cannot be compared directly 
with each other because their base numbers are all 100 and each 100 equals to a different 
total amount of yield. Literally “Average_yield” denotes the average yield of all farms 
surveyed in a particular locality. “Ratio_avg_to_normal” denotes the ratio of average 
yield to normal yield, and multiplied by 100 to magnify the alteration. “Ratio_avg_to 
_best” denotes the ratio of average yield to best yield, and multiplied by 100 to truncate 
the decimal digits. Both normal yield and best yield are fixed historical numbers. Hence 
                                                 
87 Crop index refers to the most frequent yield per hectare of the important crops measured in quintals for crops 
found on 20 percent or more of the farms. 
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the ratios provide a contrast between average yield and normal or best yield. The latter 
two ratios convey the marginal effects of the conditions at the time of the survey. In 
essence our econometric approach using these dependent variables measures the degree 
by which the production variables, calamities, conflicts, location, and time frame 
impacted agricultural productivity. This determination is the principle objective of this 
thesis as outlined in Chapter 1. 
4.3 Candidate Control Variables 
There are 12 candidate control variables or production variables in the regression 
(listed in rank of significance according to results of the first unrestricted model
88
): 
“Pct_crop_area_irri”, “Num_parcels_per_farm”, “Total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing”, “Pct_ 
cult_landarea”, “All_farms_ind_doublecropping”, “Avg_dist_of_ farthest_parcels_km”, 
“All_farm_fertilizer”, “Sold_immediately_after_harvest”, “All_farms_la”, “Size_crop_ 
hectare_area_mean”, “All_farms_manequiv_per_farm”, and “Total_l_cost_yl”. 
“Pct_crop_area_irri”, on page 214, denotes the percent of crop area irrigated for all 
crops in each season, including winter crops, spring planted crops, summer crops planted 
after winter crops, summer crops planted after spring crops, fall crops planted after spring 
summer crops, and perennial crops. Another parallel variable, “Pct_all_land_irrigated”, 
                                                 
88 See Appendix Part I. 
 90 
 
on page 53, refers to percent of all land irrigated but does not involve the crop area. 
Therefore, as the analogous description of irrigation, it is not identical to “Pct_crop_area 
_irri”. And only one of the apparently similar variables should be kept to avoid 
collinearity. 
“Num_parcels_per_farm”, on page 47, denotes the number of parcels per farm. Hold 
the average size of farm and land quality constant, the more parcels a farm comprises, the 
greater agricultural production that farmland may yield. Since variables of farm size and 
land quality are given as below, number of parcels per farm makes sense. “Number of 
fields per farm”, on page 47, is ruled out because all numbers in this column are greater 
than or equal to the numbers for number of parcels per farm. Some area of uncultivated 
land, such as uneven hill land, barren land, and oddment land, was mixed in when the 
larger unit of land—field, was taken to replace the smaller unit—parcel. In that sense, 
number of parcels per farm stands for the more arable land with better quality thus might 
provide higher yield than number of fields does. 
“Total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing”, on page 343, denotes total man work days per farm 
need in marketing products. This variable comprehensively and essentially declares the 
total man labor required as transaction cost of marketing. 
“Pct_cult_landarea”, on page 38-39, denotes the percent of cultivated land area to 
land area. This variable is to substitute the percent of land in each class of productivity 
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(usually by tax classification) because the weight of each of the six classes is unwarranted 
to decide for constructing a conclusive index of productivity. Moreover as mentioned in 
literature review, tax class was determined primarily according to political boundary 
without special consideration of land quality for each locality. And large amount of 
missing values for land productivity classification would result in much more loss for 
degree of freedom compared with percent of cultivated land area. 
“All_farms_ind_doublecropping”, one page 296, denotes the double cropping index 
for all farms. Double or even triple cropping on nearly two-thirds of the cultivated land 
was a way by which Chinese farmers had adjusted production to the density of population. 
Ceteris paribus, the more cropping times a farm experiences, the better yield would be. 
 “Avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km”, on page 47, denotes the average distance of 
farthest parcels in kilometers, implying the transaction cost within each farm. On one 
hand, longer average distance of farthest parcels indicates the more time and energy 
wasted on commuting, which increases the likelihood of missing opportune nurturing for 
some parcels. On the other hand, long average distance of farthest parcels signifies 
fragmentation, which hinders the scale economy of cropping but accomplishes risk 
management. 
“All_farm_fertilizer”, on page 137, denotes amount of fertility produced on the farm 
for all farms. Animal manure and night soil per crop hectare in kilograms is offered. 
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Since industrial production of fertilizer was unrealized in that era, this variable can be 
deemed as the direct data for fertility indicator. 
“Sold_immediately_after_harvest”, on page 343, denotes percent of farm products 
sold immediately after harvest. This indirectly introduces percent of farm products that 
did not need inventory, which abates the transaction cost of dehydration, and man labor 
input for storage risk management against insects, rodents, dampness, fire and theft, as 
mentioned in literature review. Another case revealed could be the transportation 
convenience and capacity. Crops in some localities that should be immediately sold after 
harvest had to be stored for at least a while waiting to be integrated together for collective 
transportation due to the limited amount of wheelbarrows or carts. Or for farmers could 
have profited from storing crops until the price went up after abundance faded away for 
those sold immediately after harvest, extraordinary extortions of senseless heavy taxes 
and perilous venture might compel farmers to sell crops as soon as it was harvested. 
“All_farms_la”, on page 135, denotes labor animal units per man-equivalent for all 
farms. Among all the candidates describing labor of animal, this is sole relevant since 
total amount of animal labor invested does not exist. A merit of this variable is labor 
animal units per man-equivalent displays the diverse marginal rate of substitution 
between animal labor and man labor in line with local species of animal input as animal 
labor. For instance, the cattle were prevalent for plowing in the north— Wheat Region 
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while the buffalo were widespread in the south— Rice Region. 
“Size_crop_hectare_area_mean”, on page 286, denotes size of farm as measured by 
mean of crop hectare area. As stated in literature review, farm size did not determine 
yields. In order to support family, small farms could not hold as much unproductive land 
(such as low, alkali, or sandy land) as large farms did. Hence yields on small farms in 
several localities were greater than on large farms but the difference was very slight. The 
most economical unit of farm was usually the large and family sized one. But optimized 
farm size would vary in terms of family size, types of crops grown, and soil productivity. 
 “All_farms_manequiv_per_farm”, on page 297, denotes man-equivalent per farm 
for all farms grouped by size of farm. “Man-equivalent measures the number of workers 
according to the equivalent of one person doing the work for a period of twelve 
months”.89 It gauges how the average amount of human labor input per unit area varies 
among different localities. The larger the number is, the better the production would be, 
or the greater difficulty could be due to the time spent on risk management, such as 
regular irrigation and the rescue of crops for calamities. Possible substitution variable is 
“Pct_farm_allwork”, on page 305, referring to percent that farm work was of all work 
(farm and subsidiary). Reason to abandon this replacer is that it does not incarnate the 
amount of man labor. 
                                                 
89 Buck, J.L. 1937. Land Utilization in China— Statistics: Preface. 
 94 
 
“Total_l_cost_yl”, on page 328-329, denotes total labor cost of year labor as farm 
wages in silver yuan. Day and monthly labor (during growing season) cost are excluded 
in that the quantity of days and months farmers work varies in different localities, and all 
other data of cost is presented annually. For instance, farmers in south China work longer 
than farmers in the north because cropping systems alter due to the discriminating length 
of growing season. Though not all workers are hired as year labor, to drop day and 
monthly labor cost is imperative since the proportion of the three types of employment is 
not available. 
4.4 Dummy Variables 
Dummy variables are treated as instrumental variables
90
 for incidents, consisting of 
mainly three parts: location on provincial level recorded with its agricultural area and 
region, time span for investigation, and calamities and conflicts. These three groups of 
dummy variables are designed to track the impact of specific events by clarifying the 
locality within which province, agricultural area and region, the point of time or duration 
for which type of calamity or conflict that occurred to reduce residual. 
Three groups of dummy variables cannot show up together in a regression because 
                                                 
90 To be instrumental variable, it should satisfy four conditions: it is uncorrelated with stochastic error term; it is 
uncorrelated with all other independent variables; it is highly correlated with the independent variables it substitutes for; 
it is uncorrelated with other instrumental variables. In sum, the instrumental variable is exogenous and relevant for 
explaining variation in independent variables. Wooldridge J. M. 2009. Introductory Econometrics—A Modern 
Approach Chapter 15: 508. 
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once the location and time is ascertained, the calamities and conflicts occurred within the 
province that investigated locality pertained to is consequently definite. Error might exist 
for that the major calamity or conflict happened on provincial level may not disturb the 
surveyed village. The catastrophe variables including major drought, major flood, 
aftermath of major drought or flood, civil war, the rise of communism and banditry, the 
military action against communists, and Japanese invasions and annexations of 
Manchuria thereby can be used to substitute provinces, time spans or both groups. 
 
Table 4.1 Definition of Variables 
Variable Name Page Meaning 
Dependent 
Variable 
Average_yield 208 average yield as crop index based 
on most frequent yields as 100 
Ratio_avg_to_ 
normal 
208 ratio of average yield to normal 
yield×100 
Ratio_avg_to_best 208 ratio of average yield to best 
yield×100 
Independent 
Variables 
(listed 
according to 
significance 
 ranking) 
Pct_crop_area_irri 214 percent of crop area irrigated for 
all crops in each season 
Num_parcels_per 
_farm 
47 number of parcels per farm 
Total_mwd_pfn_in_ 
marketing 
343 total man work days per farm 
need in marketing products 
Pct_cult_landarea 38- 39 percent of cultivated land area to 
land area 
All_farms_ind_ 
doublecropping 
296 double cropping index for all 
farms 
Avg_dist_of_ 
farthest_parcels_km 
47 average distance of farthest 
parcels in kilometers 
All_farm_fertilizer 137 amount of fertility produced on 
the farm for all farms 
Sold_immediately 343 percent of farm products sold 
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Variable Name Page Meaning 
_after_harvest immediately after harvest 
All_farms_la 135 labor animal units per 
man-equivalent for all farms 
Size_crop_hectare 
_area_mean 
286 size of farm as measured by 
mean of crop hectare area 
All_farms_ 
manequiv_per_farm 
297 man-equivalent per farm for all 
farms grouped by size of farm 
Total_l_cost_yl 328-329 total labor cost of year labor as 
farm wages in silver yuan 
Dummy 
Variables 
(three groups) 
location on  
provincial level 
From all 
tables 
in which province, agricultural 
area and agricultural region the 
locality was 
time span  
for investigation 
464-472 during which period, between 
which months in which year the 
investigation or survey took 
place 
calamities  
and conflicts 
From 
CWR 
which type of catastrophe 
happened 
 
Table4.2 Description of Variables Except for the Dummy 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Average_yield 211 98.93 15.65 30.3 160.9 
Ratio_avg_to_normal 201 78.94 13.74 21.9 133.6 
Ratio_avg_to_best 211 69.60 12.95 15.9 112.1 
Pct_crop_area_irri 208 48.43 38.54 0 100 
Num_parcels_per_farm 217 5.34 4.60 1.1 59 
Total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing 174 24.93 27.20 0.5 179 
Pct_cult_landarea 213 54.57 34.45 0.5 100 
All_farms_ind_doublecropping 213 149.54 38.50 100 266 
Avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km 217 1.09 0.64 0.2 3.4 
All_farm_fertilizer 197 7916.69 7449.55 981 71607 
Sold_immediately_after_harvest 210 53.59 24.09 0 100 
All_farms_la 199 0.53 0.31 0 1.84 
Size_crop_hectare_area_mean 217 1.97 1.27 0.36 11.06 
All_farms_manequiv_per_farm 201 1.91 0.55 0.7 3.9 
Total_l_cost_yl 210 83.10 27.61 4.11 160 
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4.5 Method 
In this thesis regression with robust standard errors (to correct for heteroskedasticity) 
and analysis of covariance are applied to study the consequences of specific events of 
calamities and conflicts on agricultural productivity. Because of missing observations 
several challenges are faced with respect to robustness. First, when all of the candidate 
control variables were put into the regression, only 121 villages were included. This 
model was most informative to understand the production relationships between the 12 
candidate control variables and productivity, but the low number of villages concerned us, 
especially when it came to examining calamities and conflict which are best observed 
over a much broader space representation. To increase the geographic degrees of freedom, 
then a number of step-wise regressions were run to determine whether there is a mix of 
control variables that would not reduce R
2
 by too large an amount meanwhile adding the 
regional diversity. This resulted in using only three control variables with an increase in 
villages to 151. Finally models that excluded all of the control variables were processed, 
essentially spreading their effects to the intercept and regional or temporal dummy 
variables and this increased the number of villages to 201, but this too came at a cost of 
reduced R
2
. Due to the inverse relationship between spatial degree of freedom and R
2
, the 
full suite of regressions was provided in the results.
 
Because of the large number of dummy variables, Analysis of Covariance was 
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employed with different combinations of dummy variable groups including Agricultural 
Areas, Provinces, and Time Spans for three dependent variables. Furthermore, restricted 
regressions with only dummy variables are posted, including Time Span and Provinces, 
Time Span and Agricultural Areas, Provinces and Catastrophes, for two ratio dependent 
variables separately. Analysis of Covariance is implemented to conclude whether 
Catastrophes affect average yield change. The effect of each major calamity or conflict 
can thus be measured and compared at the provincial level. Five representative provinces 
on behalf of different relative yield change level are screened out to be targets for genetic 
analysis of agricultural productivity alteration. 
Production theory is the footstone to examine the effects of input factors, such as 
irrigation, land quality, transaction cost, labor wage, fertilization, size of farm
91
, and 
cropping system. The causal influence of contemporaneous events in such an analysis is 
methodologically new and an innovation of this thesis. As previously discussed, and 
presented in Chapter 3, this research summarized major calamities and conflicts from 
volumes of documents and files for China Weekly Review in 1929-1933 and recorded 
every momentous event in the form of time and its duration, location or the scope, people 
involved, causes, process and the consequences. Those precious historical materials fill 
                                                 
91 Population is missing here since population is positively correlated with size of farm by literature review. And 
population itself is not an input factor. In production theory, the input factor expressing the meaning of population and 
its density is, man labor—man-equivalent in this thesis which is already set as a candidate control variable: 
“All_farms_manequiv_per_farm”. 
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up the void behind three groups of dummy variables to reinstate the whole dynamic story 
of agricultural productivity and even rural life in China at that time. Thus readers can 
touch the Pearl S. Buck
92 ’s world from another perspective of economic and 
anthropologic analysis. 
In conclusion, modern econometric techniques using historical data and events are 
used in this study. The results from the econometric approach outlined in this chapter are 
presented in detail in the next chapter. 
 
 
  
                                                 
92 Author of The Good Earth. She was the first American woman laureated Nobel Prize for Literature. Her first 
husband was John Lossing Buck. They met each other during the field work for Chinese Farm Economy. 
 100 
 
Chapter 5: MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
This chapter provides the econometric results as described in Chapter 4. Because of 
the number of regressions run (using STATA), a brief outline of the chapter is provided 
here. The relationships are examined between the 12 production control variables against 
each of the 3 dependent variables (average yield, average to normal yield and average to 
best yield). These regressions provide the most complete determination of inputs and 
farm conditions on agricultural productivity. As indicated in Chapter 4 when all 12 
variables are used there are only 121 localities. Thus the approach (including step-wise 
regression) to reduce the number of candidate control variables to increase the number of 
localities is proffered and the tradeoff between reducing production variables and 
increasing localities to 151 discussed. Once the control variables are determined those 
results are discussed in detail. Finally the results from a model which eliminates all 
control variables but increases the number of localities to 201 is presented. 
Because of the extensive number of tables generated from the econometric models, 
all results are listed in the statistical appendix to this chapter. Main body of the chapter 
refers to each Table, its results description and comparison. These extensive results are 
provided in full recognition that econometrics is at times more of an art than science and 
it is not unusual for researchers to sacrifice R
2
 and overall efficiency in favor of a higher 
purpose. It is a worthwhile tradeoff to sacrifice efficiency of production control variables 
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in order to gain efficiency in terms of localities or degree of freedom given the objectives 
of the study. However, because the tradeoff in efficiency is in some instances quite large, 
the complete set of regressions are exhibited for robustness and to illustrate the 
progression of the tradeoffs as the number of localities increase. 
The unrestricted model is specified by 
                            
  
  
   
      
 
 
   
      
 
  
   
      
 
  
   
   
which identifies 4 groups of variables including 12 candidate control variables, 7 
agricultural area variables, 21 provincial variables, 36 time variables (to capture the 
distinct periods in which surveys were taken). There are three dependent variables 
capturing the actual average yield by location, the average yield to normal yield ratio and 
the average yield to best yield ratio. The modeling approach follows to some extent the 
literature on whole farm production functions
93
 where the input variables are 
determinants of output with an assumed linear response, and the three groups of dummy 
variables capturing the nascent effects of variance unexplained by the production 
variables. It is presumed that the production relationships are linear and additive and 
common across all villages, but does not assume that the production elasticities are 
common across villages. Productivity differences across space (villages) are captured by 
                                                 
93 Turvey, C. G. and DeBoer, J. L. 1988. Farm-to-Farm Productivity Differences and Whole-Farm Production 
Functions. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 36: 295-312. 
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the dummy variables of which agricultural area and provinces are fixed effects, while 
survey time-frame and calamities or conflicts are random effects. 
These fixed and random effects are additively separable which also allows for a 
convenient interpretation of the variables using Analysis of Covariance
94
 in multiple 
dimensions. These are joint effects, for example the combined (covariate) effect on 
productivity from province AND location or the joint (covariate) effect of province AND 
calamities or conflict etc. 
To avoid multicollinearity certain variables were dropped from the regressions as 
appropriate because so many dummy variables are used in this study. In terms of the time 
variable, this research set the last period, from Nov. in 1932 to Oct. in 1933 
(yr1932_11_1933_10), as the reference time, Hunan as the reference province, and the 
Rice-tea Area as the reference agricultural area. 
5.1 Selection of Control Variables 
As a first step equation (1) is run without the catastrophe variables to investigate the 
impact of inputs on agricultural productivity. These are presented in Figure 1. 
                                                 
94 Adopted in Turvey, C. G. and DeBoer, J. L. 1988. Farm-to-Farm Productivity Differences and Whole-Farm 
Production Functions. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 36: 295-312. 
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Figure 5.1 Regression Results with Robust Standard Error for Unrestricted 
Model with 12 Production Variables 
To justify control variables, running unrestricted regression with all candidate 
variables but the dummy ones comes out with that only “pct_crop_area_irri” is 
significant at 4.2% level, crops sold immediately after harvest is significant at the 5.7% 
level and the man equivalent labor variable and double cropping variable are significant 
at slightly above 10% (11.9% and 12.6% respectively). The remaining variables are not 
significant at comfortable levels of p > 22%. Interpretation is other things being equal, of 
all households surveyed, average yield would rise 0.16 percent relative to normal yield of 
1929 to 1933 when percent of crop area irrigated for all crops increases one unit 
compared with the corresponding change for Hunan in Rice-tea area during Nov. 1932 to 
                total_l_cost_yl    -.0097709   .0816719    -0.12   0.905     -.172881    .1533393
     total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing    -.0486366   .1028868    -0.47   0.638    -.2541158    .1568426
                   all_farms_la    -6.990085   11.25181    -0.62   0.537     -29.4615    15.48133
            all_farm_fertilizer     .0001935    .000249     0.78   0.440    -.0003037    .0006907
avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km     3.076204   3.808182     0.81   0.422    -4.529261    10.68167
           num_parcels_per_farm     .2130357   .2433432     0.88   0.385    -.2729542    .6990255
    size_crop_hectare_area_mean    -3.480856   3.323585    -1.05   0.299    -10.11851    3.156802
              pct_cult_landarea     .0980431   .0795838     1.23   0.222    -.0608969     .256983
   all_farms_ind_doublecropping     .0845431   .0545034     1.55   0.126    -.0243077    .1933939
    all_farms_manequiv_per_farm     7.963603   5.045078     1.58   0.119    -2.112113    18.03932
 sold_immediately_after_harvest     .1389866   .0717522     1.94   0.057    -.0043124    .2822857
             pct_crop_area_irri     .1626018   .0784671     2.07   0.042     .0058922    .3193114
                                                                                                 
            ratio_avg_to_normal        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                Robust
                                                                                                 
                                                       Root MSE      =  10.645
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7185
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 37,    65) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     121
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Oct. 1933. Irrigation as the foremost Current Artificial Temporal
95
 should be the chief 
approach farmers relying on to contend against drought. Its positive effect on relative 
average yield change, however, is barely satisfactory as expected. On one hand, irrigation 
facilities were handmade. Its scarcity limited the scale and extent of irrigation. On the 
other hand, taxation of irrigated land ascended due to the finite existing irrigation even in 
years exactly after drought. Opportunity cost of irrigation thus increased and leaded to 
abandonment of irrigated land. This is why the coefficient turns out to be so small though 
irrigation is the most significant control variable across most of the regressions. 
For the second variable, of all households surveyed, average yield would rise 0.14 
percent relative to normal yield when percent of farm products sold immediately after 
harvest increases one unit ceteris paribus. It points out yield would be enhanced if 
farmers got encouraged from the fact that crop could be sold as long as being harvested. 
For the third variable, of all households surveyed between 1929 and 1933 average yield 
would rise 7.96 percent relative to normal when man-equivalent per farm for all farms 
increases one unit. The biggest number of coefficient in absolute value verifies the 
noteworthy positive effect that human labor input brought to relative average yield 
increase for intensive farming when machinery production was not available. For the 
fourth, given specific location of a village, the province and agricultural area it belongs to 
                                                 
95 Reference Chapter 2:33. 
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is fixed as known as well as its index of double cropping. In other words, the designated 
locality would not be the original one if the double cropping index alters. Therefore it has 
little explanatory power for the relative average yield change besides its trivial 0.08 
percent positive effect. For the fifth, undeveloped modern farming technology restricted 
the positive effect of reclaiming wasteland on to relative average yield increase. And 
information of land quality herein got lost more or less.  
For the sixth significant production variable, of all households surveyed during 1929 
to 1933, average yield would reduce 3.48 percent relative to normal yield when size of 
farm as measured by mean of crop hectare area increases one unit ceteris paribus. Size of 
farm did not determine yields in that mall farm ordinarily could not hold as much 
unproductive land as large farm did. Hence yields on small farms in several localities 
were even greater than on large farms, and the optimized farm size would vary in terms 
of family size, types of crops grown, and soil productivity. Moreover, for farms suffered 
from catastrophes such as the 1929 drought, 1931 flood or Japanese invasion, the larger 
the size, the greater the loss. For the seventh, given farm size and land quality, the more 
number of parcels a farm owned, the greater average yield that farm would acquire. For 
the eighth variable— “avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km”, the outcome violates common 
sense because average yield would rise 3.08 percent relative to normal when average 
distance of farthest parcels in kilometers increases one unit. But it might exactly reflect 
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the historical truth: spacial diversification. If parcels were scattered with some on high 
land while others on low land, then the risk could be dispersed under the attack of locusts, 
wars, or even flood from the perspective of risk management. For the ninth, animal 
manure and night soil as daily fertilizer had negligible positive effect for that industrial 
production of effective fertilizers was unrealized in that era.  
For the tenth variable indicating the marginal substitution between animal labor and 
man labor, the bigger the number, the more man labor input was required to improve 
relative average yield given that per unit of animal labor was fixed then. If man labor 
increase could not catch up with the marginal substitution rate, relative average yield 
would decrease thereby. For the eleventh— “total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing”, greater 
transaction cost of human labor in marketing would slightly lower farmers’ enthusiasm of 
raising yield. For the last, relative average yield would increase if more labor was 
invested into farming. Yet an increase of total labor cost does not necessarily imply an 
increase in labor because of the wage fluctuation. When calamities such as drought or 
flood came, relative yield probably decrease quite a bit instead of increase even though 
more labor was exerted at greater cost to save crops. 
The problem with results in Figure 5.1 is that they hold over only 121 villages 
because of missing values. To increase the number of villages, step-wise regression is 
implemented to reduce the set of variables in the hope of increasing degree of freedom at 
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village level observations. The final control variables is provided in Figure 5.2, which 
comes out at reduced R
2
 of 0.62 compared to 0.72 in the full set of production variables 
in Figure 5.1. However by doing so the degree of freedom boosted to 151. Again, while 
the production coefficients are themselves meaningful, ultimately it is the fixed and 
random effects across as many villages as possible as being sought. The three variables 
displayed in Figure 5.2 are used in the remainder of the analysis except for a special case 
where they are removed entirely. 
 
Figure 5.2 Regression Results with Robust Standard error from Step-wise 
Regression for Ratio of Average to Normal Yields 
                            
 
 
   
      
 
 
   
      
 
  
   
      
  
  
   
  
Formula (2) specifies the regression for Figure 5.2. It has every term the same with 
formula (1) except that   
  denotes for the three Control Variables. 
     total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing      .154819   .0672988     2.30   0.024     .0211957    .2884423
avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km     2.628855   2.827861     0.93   0.355     -2.98593     8.24364
             pct_crop_area_irri     .1038958   .0739631     1.40   0.163    -.0429597    .2507513
                                                                                                 
            ratio_avg_to_normal        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                Robust
                                                                                                 
                                                       Root MSE      =  11.023
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6236
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 32,    94) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     151
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5.2 Regression Results 
Table A-1 to Table A-3 in Appendix posts results of regression with robust standard 
error for the unrestricted model without catastrophes. A decisive observation of these 
regressions is that the agricultural area fixed effects variables are largely insignificant in 
comparison to the provincial and time variables. This is different from what Buck had 
stated that the measures of productivity should be compared across agricultural areas and 
not necessarily provinces. Our results show that in fact the provincial effects are much 
more significant, probably tie to internal politics, culture, taxation etc.  
Then rerun the unrestricted regression with three control variables, and the 
combination of any two groups of agricultural areas, provinces, or time span as 
independent variables. These are presented across Tables A-4 to A-6. Formula (2) 
summarizes the first set regressions across Table A-4 to A-6 for the three dependent 
variables respectively with m = 1 as the ratio of average to normal; m = 2 as the ratio of 
average to best; and m = 3 as index of average yield. Similarly, formula (3) specifies the 
second set regressions across Table A-4 to A-6 with control variables, agricultural areas, 
provinces as independent variables; formula (4) with control variables, provinces and 
time spans; formula (5) with control variables, agricultural areas and time spans. 
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In Table A-4, total man work days per farm need in marketing products, appearing 
as “Market” for short to measure transaction cost of man labor in marketing, is single 
significant at 0.05 level among the three control variables across Table A-4 to Table A-6. 
Coefficient of “Market” in Table A-4 and Table A-5 can be interpreted as: other things 
being equal, one percent more transaction cost of man labor in marketing would bring 
0.16 percent higher yield than normal yield on average, or 0.17 percent higher yield than 
best yield ever in 1929-1933, compared with the corresponding change of ratio in Hunan, 
Nov. 1932 to Oct. 1933. One percent more energy, time and the charge or fee a farmer 
invested in marketing as input, for instance transporting crops or other farm products to 
larger farm markets farther than nearby small markets by cart or carriage in person or 
hiring someone to do so, would bring him 0.16 percent increase on average yield 
compared with normal yield, or 0.17 percent rise on average yield compared with best 
yield. Earnings from larger markets trade might cover transaction cost, and encouraged 
farmers to reinvest a little more income onto farming and hence boosted the imminent 
average yield despite farmers could abandon land to evade warfare. 
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For the second group of independent variables— agricultural areas, take “DCR” 
(Double-cropping Rice Areas) in the second set of regressions for example, it is 
significant with zero p value and agricultural areas are not included in the third set of 
regressions. Of all households surveyed in double cropping rice area, ceteris paribus, 
average yield would increase 16.03 percent than normal yield. The beneficial geographic 
physical prerequisite
96
 possessed by double cropping area is that heat and saturation are 
concurrent and last longer than in the Wheat Region; thus the double cropping system 
formed as advantageous historical inherited convention to keep good harvest. In addition, 
double cropping area comprised several southeast provinces such as Fukien, Kwangsi, 
Kiangsi, Kwangtung, which did not suffer that fatally from major calamity or conflict 
during 1929 to 1933 compared with other agricultural areas. It could be why the 
superiority of average yield relative to normal yield in double cropping area was obvious. 
For the third group of independent variables— provinces, take Szechwan in second 
set of regressions with control variables, agricultural areas and provinces as independent 
variables for instance, it is significant with 0.02 for p value and provinces are not 
generally significant in third set of regressions. Of all households surveyed in Szechwan, 
ceteris paribus, average yield would be 10.95 percent higher than normal yield. Located 
within Szechwan basin, Szechwan province consists of the main portion of Szechwan 
                                                 
96 Reference Chapter 2:24. 
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Rice Area. Plentiful minerals, including mines of coal, iron, natural gas, petroleum, salt, 
phosphorite, strontium, mirabilite etc, is contained in Szechwan basin which is also 
covered with large area of purple-brown forest soil— the richest in nutrients for planting. 
Along with the warm constant temperature and humid climate protected by Tibetan 
Plateau, Yunnan-Kweichow Plateau, and series of mountains around, Szechwan basin is 
called “land of abundance” because it was away from any severe calamity or conflict 
recorded in history and holds copious natural resources. Province of Szechwan 
fortunately escaped from any devastating event mentioned in China Weekly Review 
during 1929 to 1933 in the perspective of current artificial temporal, which accounts for 
its relative high average yield. 
For the fourth group of independent variables— time span investigated, take 
“2901-3001” (Jan. 1929 to Jan. 1930) in third set of regressions for example, it is 
significant with zero p value. Of all households surveyed during Jan. 1929 to Jan 1930, 
other things being equal, average yield would be 38.86 percent lower than normal yield 
on average. China Weekly Review provides evidence for this phenomenon. A great 
famine arising in Shensi province in Dec. of 1928, resulted from the drought caused by 
rivers Wei and Kin drying out with reports of plague and locusts. 91 districts in at least 9 
provinces got affected with reports of young girls being sold for marriage at a price of 
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$4-5. Brigandage pervaded thereafter.
97
 Then in north China rains caused the Yungting 
River to overflow, inundating 10 villages. This occurred on August 5
th
 of 1929 when 
nearly 1,000 feet of banking collapsed. Nearly 200 sq miles of land was flooded, with 
many persons drowned as well as thousands of cattle and all crops lost. Flooding 
eventually reached Peiping and Tientsin, Hopeh province. A section of the 
Peiping-Mukden (Shenyang) railroad line was washed away. By August 7
th
 the Grand 
Canal was overflowing. Floods had affected nearly 500,000 people who in great starving 
numbers were living on the sides or tops of hills, which appeared as islands. The rains 
and floods were powerful enough to remove on its own the silt bed that was previously 
blocking shipping up stream to Tienstin.
98
 Main drought, flood and famine as calamities 
spelled 1929 such an eventful year. Conflicts such as civil war with Feng Yu-hsiang 
towards a unified China, with Japanese intrusion in Shantung, Canton civil war were 
resolved at the end of 1929. Meanwhile Sino-Russian war averted and famine were on 
the mends.
99
 
By the same token, readers can easily capture whatever macroscopic statistical and 
econometrical message needed to understand the change of average yield relative to 
normal or best yield on provincial level from 1929 to 1933. Results of four sets 
                                                 
97 Editorial. China Weekly Review vol. 47. 
98 Editorial. August 3rd, 1929. Ten Villages Flooded in Chihli. China Weekly Review vol. 47: 446; Editorial. August 
17th, 1929. North China Areas Devastated by Floods. China Weekly Review vol. 47: 529. 
99 Outline of China Weekly Review was organized by Professor Calum G. Turvey. 
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regressions are condensed in Table A-4 to Table A-6 to demonstrate outcomes of different 
combination for independent variables— including Control variables, Agricultural Areas, 
Provinces, and Time Span. Coefficient and p value for each group of independent 
variables are presented. A chief problem is that many coefficients are not significant. 
Though the third set regression behaves best on significance, agricultural areas are absent. 
This is probably because specific province signifies more detail information of location 
than agricultural area does since in most cases, province is smaller than agricultural area 
in size and is often contained within an agricultural area on scale. 
Given normal yield and best yield for each locality is fixed up to 1933, the more the 
ratio of average yield to normal yield or best yield increases, the more the average yield 
within the year investigated would increase, the better relative yield was acquired, and 
vice versa. Average yield itself as dependent variable does not reveal as much 
information as the other two ratios for it is an actual index number. Defect of best yield 
being the reference substance is that extreme yield does not depicts the consistent 
condition farmers usually confront. Therefore, ratio of average yield to normal yield 
should be the core dependent variable among the three. 
In short, Table A-4 is important, especially results of the third set regression. Table 
A-5 and A-6 can be theoretically skipped. 
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5.3 Calamities and Conflict in Rural China 
Tables A-7 to A-10 in Appendix are the crucial ones for measuring the total effect of 
calamities and conflicts onto yields. By listing the coefficients of time span in the first 
column and coefficients of each province in the first row, and computing the sum of two 
numbers in whatever combination of both categories, in Table A-7 for example, readers 
can deem the sum as “covariance” of both categories. Readers can not only track the 
effect of catastrophe on average yield relative to normal yield of villages in Kansu 
province surveyed in period of Jan. 1931 to Dec. 1932, which are bolded and marked by 
a box as real recorded fact
100
, but can also surmise what the compound effect would be if 
a village in Kansu was investigated in any other period of time. As well as how omitted 
values are dealt with, fake numbers of covariance that do not truly exist are kept for 
consistency. Owing to such tables created by modern econometrics, history can be 
assumed at this point. 
Tables A-7 to A-10 provide regression results without the three control variables. By 
removing production variables, another 50 degree of freedom is earned at the cost of a 
tiny loss of R
2
 that is less than 0.01. The overwhelming preoccupation is to gain more 
localities as observations. Such trade off precisely reflects the art of econometrics: to 
                                                 
100 Reference Table A-13 in Appendix Part I for the corresponding period a locality is surveyed. 
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have covariance, information would go somewhere instead. Some is integrated into 
provinces and time spans, some goes into the intercept and even the error term. 
In Table A-7— Coefficient and Covariance of Time Span and Provinces for Ratio of 
Average to Normal, the first row states the coefficient of province in the restricted 
regression with provinces and time span, setting ratio of average to normal as dependent 
variable. For example, other things being equal, in Shansi (it is significant with p value of 
0.044) of all households surveyed, average yield would be 15.75 percent lower than 
normal yield recorded of 1929 to 1933. What should be noted is that the average yield 
refers to the average yield for the year to which the data pertain. Thus to label the time 
span investigated for each province in a box is necessary. The first column states the 
coefficient of time span investigated. Take the “3010-3110” (Oct. 1930 to Oct. 1931) for 
instance because it is significant with p value of 0.001. Of all households surveyed during 
this period, average yield would be 27.28 percent lower than normal yield ceteris paribus. 
Therefore the overall effect of province and time span would be minus 43.03 as 
covariance, which means of all households surveyed in Shansi province during Oct. 1930 
to Oct. 1931, average yield would be 43.03 percent lower than normal yield ceteris 
paribus. In this way analysis of covariance captures the strong relationship between 
province and time. 
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Formula (6) summarizes the regressions for Table A-7 and Table A-9 with provinces 
and time spans as independent variables. When h = 1, it refers to Table A-7 with the ratio 
of average to normal as dependent variable; when h = 2, Table A-9 with the ratio of 
average to best. 
For consistency and convenience, five provinces would be chosen as interpretation 
targets across Table A-7 to A-10 on behalf of five relative yield change level: Szechwan 
stands for the extraordinary above average; Anhwei stands for the moderate above 
average; Kwangsi represents the average; Shensi stands for the moderate below average; 
and Chekiang stands for the extraordinary below average. Eight agricultural areas thus 
indirectly get involved for each target province belongs to one or more agricultural areas. 
In Table A-7, other things being equal, in Szechwan of all households surveyed, 
average yield would be 3.87 percent higher than normal yield. Likewise, the time span 
coefficient shows positive effect of 22.3 percent on average yield relative to normal. 
Covariance reaches the extreme maximum of 26.17 as compound effect when it comes to 
“3107-3206”, implying that in Szechwan of all households surveyed during Jul. 1931 to 
Jun. 1932, average yield would be 26.17 percent higher than normal. In this case, 
however, Szechwan wins the rank for relative average yield in a way thoroughly different 
from its natural geographical advantage as “land of abundance” mentioned previously: 
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Szechwan suffered less disastrously compared with other provinces affected by 1931 
Yangtze flood. By August 26
th
 in 1931, the Yangtze River at Hankow was at 53.5 feet, 
even 3 feet greater than the recorded greatest flood of the year 1870 to 1871. In fact last 
time water in the Yangtze River at such level was in the 15
th
 century, Ming Dynasty. 
Much of central China was flooded with 50 to 60 million people affected. 45 of 68 
districts in Hupeh were flooded. 8,000 were known to have been drowned and 
10,000,000 were rendered destitute. The destitute in Hunan, Kiangsi and Anhwei was 
estimated at more than 25 million. On August 22
nd
 in Hupeh, 35,000 sqr miles were under 
water with 5 million refugees. Flood waters in Hunan covered 22,000 sqr miles with 2 
million refugees. Deaths from starvation and disease in Wuhan (in Hupeh) alone 
exceeded 1,000 per day and corpses floated in the streets along with cats, dogs and 
livestock. People were living on the 2
nd
 floor of houses that were still standing. 24 
districts in Shantung were hit. In areas that were not flooded, locusts had consumed all 
crops leaving farmers destitute in famine conditions. In total, about 10,000 of the 
inhabitants along the Yangtze River were believed to be washed away in 1931. Szechwan 
Chengtu and Chungching were at most in not as bad a shape as Wuhan and Hankow.101  
For Anhwei province in Table A-7, of all households surveyed, average yield would 
be 9.83 percent lower than normal yield ceteris paribus. Time span coefficient displays 
                                                 
101 Editorial. August 29th 1931. Flood-Famine Situation Most Serious China Disaster since Fifteenth Century. 
China Weekly Review vol. 60: 495-499. 
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positive effect of 32.12 percent. Covariance hence comes to 22.29 as compound effect 
when it locates in “3205-3305”, indicating that in Anhwei of all households surveyed in 
May 1932 to May 1933, average yield would be 22.29 percent higher than normal. After 
1931 flood, crop production began to resume. The only calamity occurred was a minor 
drought in northern Anhwei leading to another famine.102 By Nov. 1931, communists 
expanded their revolutionary base area to southeast Anhwei very rapidly that Chiang 
Kai-shek had to finance another military drive, steadily rose to about 150,000 troops and 
perhaps 100,000 guns, against the communist armies. Former minister of finance T.V. 
Soong resigned as a political-military-economic solution intended to serve the destitute 
and discourage them from simply joining the Red Army to obtain food. Bandits arose in 
two forms: many bandit gangs started with food raids because of calamities and then 
progressed to territorialism; for the most part bandit gangs were simply looking for food. 
Rise in the ranks of the Red army came from peasants in Fukien, Kiangsi, Hunan, 
Anhwei and Hupeh provinces most affected by recent calamities of war and flooding 
then.103 Communists recruited forces in rural areas by dedicatedly guiding and leading 
farmers to resume farming and production, and to resist suppression of communism 
launched by KMT (Kuo Min Tang). Though in late 1932, KMT declared that all Red 
                                                 
102 Editorial. August 27th, 1932. Floods in Harbin Leave Population Destitute. China Weekly Review vol. 61: 491. 
103 Whang, P. K. July 2nd, 1932. Farmer Distress and Bandit Suppression. China Weekly Review vol. 61: 172. 
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Army forces were removed from Anhwei,104 yet eight months later, it was found in 
Anhwei that about 30,000 communist forces were entrenched along the Honan-Hupeh 
and Anhwei border105 since communist resisting suppression forces had routed the Red 
Army in Anhwei with the remnant to Honan for secret escape. Reasonable inference is 
that the strategy Communists designed to establish military confrontation power against 
KMT by attracting refugees, destitute farmers, bandit gangs who struggled hard for food 
to be organized as decent army, objectively resulted in concentrating on promoting 
farming and production. Manmade conflicts improved the average yield relative to 
normal yields. 
For Kwangsi province in Table A-7, of all households surveyed, average yield would 
be 4.82 percent lower than normal yield ceteris paribus. Time span coefficient exerts 
positive effect of 10.08 percent. Covariance hence results in 5.26 as compound effect 
when it comes to “3201-3212”, implying that in Kwangsi of all households investigated 
in Jan. to Dec. in 1932, average yield would be 5.26 percent higher than normal. At that 
time, south Honan was affected by communist forces at 3 million reported by the Civil 
Ministry of Honan Province. A 30-year old commander of the main communist force 
used the same flags and orders as the regular army. Therefore as expected, thousands of 
                                                 
104 Editorial. September 10th, 1932. Communists Executed at Tsinan. China Weekly Review vol. 62: 58. 
105 Editorial. May 20th, 1933. Offensive Against Kiangsi Communists Planned. China Weekly Review vol. 64: 453. 
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peasants in east Honan joined his forces in seek of food due to famine conditions.106 
Bandit suppression forces were active in Hunan, Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Kwangsi and 
Fukien at the time. Kwangsi is located adjacent to Hunan on the southwest provincially 
on map of China. Close latitudes of both provinces in range indicates the similarity of 
geopolitical and economic conditions. It adequately illustrates almost the same change 
level of average yield relative to normal that Kwangsi and Hunan share. Nevertheless the 
disparate agricultural area each province belonged to brings about slight difference on 
relative yield in that southeast of Kwangsi in Double-cropping rice area was with better 
natural geographical condition for farming than in Rice-tea area which northwest of 
Kwangsi and the entire Hunan also attached to. According to records in China Weekly 
Review for other periods within 1929 to 1933, generally Kwangsi suffered less calamities 
and conflicts than Hunan did. The leader of New China, Mao Cheh-tung was born and 
grew up in Hunan. As headstream of communists, Hunan played the role of central 
revolutionary base area quite often, which made Kwangsi relatively politically tranquil 
and enjoy better yields on average given Hunan as the reference substance. 
For Shensi of all households surveyed, average yield would be 21.51 percent lower 
than normal yield ceteris paribus. Time span coefficient demonstrates positive effect of 
9.21 percent. Covariance reduces to minus 12.30 at “3001-3012”, indicating that in 
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Shensi of all households investigated in Jan. to Dec. 1930, average yield would be 12.30 
percent lower than the normal. This can be mostly elucidated by a report from China 
International Famine Relief Commission: wide-spread drought in Shensi was requiring 
burial squads to make two rounds per day in Sian.107 The minor conflict factor that 
interrupted agricultural production could be that Chiang’s troops were mobilizing in 
Honan to route Feng’s troops back to Honan-Shensi border, to resist Chiang Kai-shek 
being ousted by the opposition government established in Peiping and being replaced by 
Marshal Yen His-shan as appointed chairman of the “Nationalist Government of China” 
on September 9
th
 of 1930. Marshall Feng Yu-hsiang convened his troops against Chiang’s 
in order to take charge of all military affairs and realign government towards unification 
of north and south.108 
For Chekiang province of all households surveyed, average yield would be 5.13 
percent lower than normal yield ceteris paribus. Time span coefficient offers negative 
effect of 27.28 percent. Covariance suddenly dropped to minus 32.41 at “3010-3110”, 
implying that in Chekiang of all households investigated in Oct. 1930 to Oct. 1931, 
average yield would be 32.41 percent lower than the normal. Evidently Chekiang got 
affected severely to the extreme: by the beginning of August the Chientang River in 
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Chekiang was on the verge of overflowing due to heavy rains and many districts, notably 
Kahsing were inundated with flood waters.109 Lying at the estuary of Yangtze River, 
northeast Chekiang on the low flat plain definitely would be the worst afflicted district in 
1931 flood. As one of the major grain producing areas adopting intensive cultivation, 
Chekiang stretched across Yangtze-rice wheat area and Rice-tea area which could result 
in great loss when a tiny change in climate occurred. Chekiang also witnessed the major 
battlefront between republican forces and communists initiated in mountainous terrain of 
Kiangsi in mid July of 1931. The government force alone included 30 divisions, a troop 
strength of some 300,000 soldiers against 42,000 Red Army troops with 18,000 rifles. 
What was once considered a bandit force of extremist was now a significant force 
moving in and out of territories creating soviets along the way with purges of 
conventional leadership and the reallocation of land and wealth. By the end of 1930 many 
hsiens in Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan were fully Sovietized. Communist forces also had a 
presence in Anhwei, Szechuan, Fukien, Chekiang, Honan and Shantung. Though one 
major final aim of communists’ revolution was to emancipate productive forces of the 
peasant through improving farm reconstruction and irrigation, enhancing prevention of 
floods and droughts, the support for emigration to reduce farm population density, the 
establishment of Farmer’s Banks and cooperative societies to provide credit on easy 
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terms, to unify currency, weights and measures, but the process itself impeded 
agricultural production at the beginning by recruiting farmers into armies that removed 
quite a lot of young able-bodied farmers away from farming.110 
In Table A-9— Coefficients and Covariance of Time Span and Provinces for Ratio 
of Average to Best, the first row states the coefficient of province in the restricted 
regression with provinces and time span, setting ratio of average to best as dependent 
variable. For example, other things being equal, in Shansi (it is significant with p value of 
0.001) of all households surveyed, average yield would be 30.06 percent lower than best 
yield recorded of 1929 to 1933. And the first column states coefficient of time span 
investigated. Take the “3205-3305” (May 1932 to May 1933) for instance because it is 
significant with zero p value. Of all households surveyed during this period, average 
yield would be 39.08 percent higher than best yield ceteris paribus. Thus the overall 
effect of province and time span would be 9.02 as covariance, which means of all 
households surveyed in Shansi province during May 1932 to May 1933, average yield 
would be 9.02 percent higher than best yield ceteris paribus. 
Still the five provinces selected in Table A-7 will be discussed in Table A-9. 
Other things being equal, in Szechwan of all households surveyed, average yield 
would be 5.90 percent lower than best yield. Likewise, the time span coefficient shows 
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positive effect of 27.87 percent on average yield relative to the best. Covariance reaches 
maximum of 21.97 as compound effect when it comes to “3107-3206”, implying that in 
Szechwan of all households surveyed during Jul. 1931 to Jun. 1932, average yield would 
be 21.97 percent higher than best. The outcome exactly corroborates the corresponding 
result in Table A-7, which means of all the households surveyed in Szechwan, the 
increase of average yield reached its maximum during Jul. 1931 to Jun. 1932 relative to 
normal yield as well as relative to the best yield of 1929 to 1933. A possible explanation 
is Szechwan suffered less gravely compared with other provinces affected by 1931 
Yangtze flood.  
For Anhwei of all households surveyed, average yield would be 23.26 percent lower 
than best yield ceteris paribus. Time span coefficient displays positive effect of 39.08 
percent. Covariance hence comes to 15.82 as compound effect for “3205-3305”, 
indicating that in Anhwei of all households surveyed in May 1932 to May 1933, average 
yield would be 15.82 percent higher than best. Again, maximum of covariance rests on 
the same period investigated compared with in Table A-7. As stated previously, an 
interpretation would be: after 1931 flood, crop production began to resume. Manmade 
conflicts compositely enhanced average yield relative to best yield. 
For Kwangsi of all households surveyed, average yield would be 15.54 percent 
lower than best yield ceteris paribus. Time span coefficient exerts positive effect of 15.55 
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percent. Covariance hence results in 0.02 as compound effect at “3201-3212”, implying 
that in Kwangsi of all households investigated in Jan. to Dec. 1932, average yield would 
be 0.02 percent higher than best. Kwangsi is next to Hunan on the southwest. Part of 
Kwangsi shares the same agricultural area— Rice-tea area with Hunan except that 
southeast of Kwangsi belonged to Double-cropping rice area which generates better 
yields than in Rice-tea area. Also, Kwangsi endured less calamities and conflicts to the 
extent than Hunan did. Setting Hunan as reference substance, Kwangsi seems relatively 
politically tranquil with better yields on average. That is why Kwangsi always appears 
similar with and even a bit better than Hunan on both average yield increase relative to 
normal and best. 
For Shensi of all households surveyed, average yield would be 27.74 percent lower 
than best yield. Time span coefficient demonstrates positive effect of 13.49 percent. 
Covariance reduces to minus 14.25 as compound effect when it comes to “3001-3012”, 
indicating that in Shensi of all households investigated in Jan. to Dec. 1930, average yield 
would be 14.25 percent lower than the best. A famine as calamity and warlord troops’ 
mobilizing on geopolitical border of Shensi as a minor factor for conflict accounts for the 
moderate negative compound effect on relative average yield change both to normal and 
best yield. 
For Chekiang of all households surveyed, average yield would be 15.61 percent 
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lower than best yield. Negative effect of time span is 15.77 percent as coefficient. 
Covariance dropped down to minus 31.38 as compound effect for “3010-3110”, implying 
that in Chekiang of all households investigated in Oct. 1930 to Oct. 1931, average yield 
would be 31.38 percent lower than the best. Predominantly Chekiang got immediately 
affected devastatingly by 1931 flood to the peak in that northeast Chekiang was on the 
low flat plain lying at the estuary of Yangtze River. Besides, as densely populated grain 
producing province, Chekiang stretched across two agricultural areas of Yangtze-rice 
wheat area and Rice-tea area which could result in great loss when a tiny change in 
climate took place. Moreover, Chekiang got impaired by a major battlefront between 
republican forces and communists initiated in July of 1931. Therefore Chekiang is on 
behalf of the extreme negative compound effect on relative average yield change both to 
normal and best yield. 
In conclusion, Table A-7 and Table A-9 converge to concordant outcomes for the 
representative five provinces. 
Next a quick view is given for Table A-8 and Table A-10 since time span variables in 
these tables are not as significant as in Table A-7 or Table A-9.  
In Table A-8— Coefficient and Covariance of Time Span and Agricultural Areas for 
Ratio of Average to Normal, the first row states the coefficient of agricultural area in the 
restricted regression with agricultural areas and time span, setting ratio of average to 
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normal as dependent variable. For example, other things being equal, in winter wheat 
millet area (it is significant with p value of 0.007) of all households surveyed, average 
yield would be 14.93 percent lower than normal yield recorded of 1929 to 1933. Shensi 
province partially within winter wheat millet area proves its representativeness for the 
moderate below average level on relative yield change. The first column states coefficient 
of time span investigated. Take the “3010-3110” (Oct. 1930 to Oct. 1931) for instance 
because it is significant with zero p value. Of all households surveyed during this period, 
average yield would be 24.15 percent lower than normal yield ceteris paribus, which is 
the minimum of all numbers in this column. Thus the overall effect of agricultural areas 
and this time span would be in a range of minus 20 to 40 as covariance, which means of 
all households surveyed in whichever agricultural area during Oct. 1930 to Oct. 1931, 
average yield would be 20 to 40 percent lower than normal yield. Thus it can be seen the 
1931 flood deserves to be claimed as major flood that influenced every agricultural area. 
The maximum of 30.55 which is significant with zero p value, emerges at the row 
“3205-3305” (May 1932 to May 1933) with the overall effect of agricultural areas and 
this time span in range of 15 to 31 as covariance, implying of all households surveyed in 
whichever agricultural area during May 1932 to May 1933, average yield would be 15 to 
31 percent higher than normal yield ceteris paribus. Crop production resumed after 1931 
performs its salience as is outlined in China Weekly Review. Such analysis of covariance 
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captures the relationship between agricultural area and time. 
While in Table A-10— Coefficient and Covariance of Time Span and Agricultural 
Areas for Ratio of Average to Best, the first row states the coefficient of agricultural area 
in the restricted regression with agricultural areas and time span, setting ratio of average 
to best as dependent variable. For example, other things being equal, in winter wheat 
millet area (it is significant with zero p value) of all households surveyed, average yield 
would be 19.15 percent lower than best yield recorded of 1929 to 1933 as minimum in 
this row. Shensi province partially within winter wheat millet area attests the verdict. The 
first column states coefficient of time span investigated. Take the “2901-3001” (Jan. 1929 
to Jan. 1930) for instance because it is significant with p value of 0.004. Of all 
households surveyed during this period, average yield would be 19.96 percent lower than 
best yield, which is the minimum of all numbers in this column. Thereby the overall 
effect of agricultural areas and this time span would be in a range of minus 17 to 40 as 
covariance, which means of all households surveyed in whichever agricultural area 
during Jan. 1929 to Jan. 1930, average yield would be 17 to 40 percent lower than best 
yield. Hence the 1929 drought should be alleged as major drought incurring widespread 
catastrophe in every agricultural area. The maximum of 29.66, significant with zero p 
value, appears at the row “3205-3305” (May 1932 to May 1933) again with the overall 
effect of agricultural areas and this time span in range of 10 to 32 as covariance, 
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indicating of all households surveyed in whichever agricultural area during May 1932 to 
May 1933, average yield would be 10 to 32 percent higher than best yield ceteris paribus.  
                               
 
 
   
      
  
  
   
  
Formula (7) summarizes the regressions for Table A-8 and Table A-10 with 
agricultural areas and time spans as independent variables. When h = 1, it refers to Table 
A-8 with the ratio of average to normal as dependent variable; when h = 2, Table A-10 
with the ratio of average to best. 
Table A-8 and A-10 are respectively another expression of Table A-7 and A-9.  
Information would be more rough and coarse for readers to acquire in Table A-8 or A-10 
than in Table A-7 or A-9 because agricultural areas are larger in scale covered but less 
specific in tracking some locality compared with provinces. Meanwhile coefficients of 
time span perform better significance after agricultural areas are replaced with provinces 
in regressions. It can be inferred that more specific division of location would give rise to 
better significance of time span coefficients. 
5.4 Removing the Manchurian Effect 
The inclusion of the Japanese Manchuria conflict started in September 1931 through 
1933. While there is a good argument for including the Japanese annexation of 
Manchuria because of the large effect it had on China’s economy, as a random effect 
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however, it is too broad and might be picking up noise from provinces or other time 
effects. As a robustness check this variable is removed. Table A-11 and Table A-12 are 
coefficient and covariance summary for the regressions of calamities and conflicts with 
ratio of average yield to normal yield or best yield set as dependent variable. After 
dummy variables of calamities and conflicts being put in to replace time span variables, 
many more provinces immediately become significant. Thus significance switches from 
time dummy variables to province dummy variables. Provinces convey sufficient 
information on analyzing influence of those calamity and conflict events. Among all the 
dummy variables of calamities and conflicts, “major_flood” (the 1931 flood overriding 
almost the whole Yangtze River) is the sole significant one. “major_drought”, 
“major_drought_plus_1”, “major_flood_plus_1” are quite closer to significant than 
variables of conflicts. Basically, nature catastrophes had much broader and more 
devastating impact on change of average yield relative to either normal or best yield than 
manmade conflicts did in the era of 1929 to 1933, no matter from the perspective of 
absolute value of coefficients or p value of significance. 
For Table A-11 and A-12 in Appendix, the first row exhibits the coefficient of 
province while first column the coefficient of calamities and conflicts. In Table A-11, take 
Kwangsi for example because it is unique significant among the five provinces selected 
as representatives of different relative yield change level in discussion about Table A-7 to 
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A-10. Of all the households surveyed in Kwangsi during 1929 to 1933, average yield 
would be 10.63 percent lower relative to normal yield due to the presence of communists 
for revolution and relevant suppression battles to annihilate communists initiated by 
KMT ceteris paribus. Szechwan, standing for extraordinary above average level, survived 
after all major calamities and conflicts on average compared with Hunan. Major flood in 
1931 swiped Shensi, Suiyuan, Honan, and Shantung along the Yellow River, Anhwei, 
Kiangsu, Hupeh, Kiangsi, Kweichow, and Yunnan flowed through by Yangtze River. 
When tracking the effect of major drought or flood, aftermath of post major drought or 
flood in a year should also be taken into account. All above analysis confirms the 
corresponding historic outline in China Weekly Review mentioned for the five 
representative provinces. The same logic is suitable and easily applied to Table A-12. 
                                 
 
  
   
      
   
 
   
     
   
 
   
  
Formula (8) specifies the regressions for Table A-11 and Table A-12 with provinces, 
calamities and conflicts as independent variables. When c = 1, it refers to Table A-11 with 
the ratio of average to normal as dependent variable; when c = 2, Table A-12 with the 
ratio of average to best. 
Both Tables A-11 and A-12 can measure the relative effect of disparate catastrophe 
factors compared with Hunan undergoing Japanese intrusion and assign the effect onto 
each province, as evaluating weight of different catastrophe factors for every province. In 
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Anhwei for moderate above average level, major drought brought negative effect on 
relative yield up to minus 21.77, for major flood, it is minus 16.29, communism minus 
11.23, and communist suppression minus 12.58. In Shensi for moderate below average 
level, the negative effect of major drought reaches minus 26.43, major flood minus 20.42, 
while civil war merely minus 10.99. At last in Chekiang for extraordinary below average 
level, negative effect of major drought is minus 29.11 however, minus 10.02 for 
communism. If a line is inserted to split calamities and conflicts into two halves as 
presented in both tables, readers would have no difficulties to find that for all the negative 
effect of catastrophes, the least absolute value for calamites would be greater than the 
supreme absolute value for conflicts. Kiangsi is an exception in that Red Army chose 
Ruijin as center for revolutionary base area in 1930 and in Nov. 1931 communists set up 
the Soviet Republic of China. Peasants and workers were profoundly encouraged by 
communists to resume farming and production for embracing a new world dominated by 
themselves that all land and wealth could be reallocated according to their labor 
achievement. By then such ideal administrative program had not been generalized and 
accepted as well in other provinces as in Kiangsi, therefore covariance for communism 
and communist suppression are still negative for all other provinces. In a word, nature 
calamities had greater power than manmade conflicts had during 1929 to 1933 on 
impairing relative average yield regardless of significance or absolute value of the effect. 
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Kiangsi was an exception to have the effect of communists’ activities being positive due 
to its internalization of communism as the first province. 
Northern war had the least influence than other seven catastrophes since it happened 
in 1926 to 1928, too early to be considerable. So it is for the civil war, few provinces 
seldom got vandalized. Time and energy of peasants in 1929 to 1933 focused primarily 
on how to response the overwhelming nature calamities, as in the Good Earth, Wang 
Lung’s family fled from hometown in Anhwei as refugees after all possible food, even his 
loyal friend—the ox, being exhausted. Warlords faded away. Japanese stealthily crept 
over most of China. Reports about communists as ordinary bandits at first gradually 
expanded in length and importance in China Weekly Review. 
5.5 Summary 
For every table in this chapter, Hunan province, Rice-tea area, the last time span of 
Nov. 1932 to Oct. 1933, and Japanese or Manchuria intrusion are removed as reference 
substance, therefore the contrast between the target described and this reference 
substance can be ignored at will for results analysis. 
To justify control variables, coefficient of 12 production variables without any 
dummy variables in the unrestricted model are posted, reported and interpreted by the 
rank of significance. By dropping “pct_cult_landarea” on purpose, degree of freedom rise 
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by 30 at the cost of a negligible loss for R
2
. Step-wise selection with ratio of average to 
normal yield as dependent variable output irrigation, average distance of the farthest 
parcel, and transaction cost of man labor in marketing as control variables for the next 12 
regressions. 
In Tables A-4 to A-6 in Appendix, each of the four groups of independent variables 
is interpreted by choosing one example that is representative on behalf of every group. 
Four sets of regressions are run and summarized in these three tables to demonstrate 
outcomes of different combination for independent variables— including Control 
variables, Agricultural Areas, Provinces, and Time Span. Coefficient and p value for each 
group of independent variables are provided. Chief problem is that many coefficients are 
not significant. Though the third set regression behaves best on significance, agricultural 
areas are absent. 
Also, average yield itself as dependent variable is not a proper choice since 
information of relative yield is missing. Neither is the ratio of average to best yield. 
Extreme yield does not reflect the typical condition farmers usually confront. Therefore, 
ratio of average yield to normal yield comes out to be the kernel dependent variable 
among the three. 
Hence Table A-4 is important, especially for results of the third set regression. Table 
A-5 and A-6 can be theoretically ignored. 
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Table A-7 to A-10 in Appendix are critical for measuring the total effect of 
calamities and conflicts onto yields. Compound effect as covariance of relative average 
yield change for province and time span investigated can be tracked in terms of numbers 
marked in boxes. Fake numbers of covariance are kept for consistency. 
Five provinces are selected as interpretation targets across Table A-7 to A-12 on 
behalf of five average yield change level: Szechwan stands for the extraordinary above 
average; Anhwei stands for the moderate above average; Kwangsi represents the average; 
Shensi stands for the moderate below average; and Chekiang stands for the extraordinary 
below average. 
Whether covariance of relative average yield change for each of the five 
representative provinces is caused by natural calamities or human conflicts, is verified by 
searching and gathering written evidence within volumes of China Weekly Review for 
1929-1933. Explanations for the average yield change relative to normal in Table A-7 and 
the average yield change relative to best in Table A-9 converge to concordant results for 
the representative five provinces. 
Table A-8 and Table A-10 in pair is another expression of Table A-7 and Table A-9 
separately. Information is more crude and sketchy to obtain in Table A-8 or A-10 than in 
Table A-7 or A-9 because agricultural areas are larger in scale but less specific compared 
with provinces. Coefficients of time span display better significance after agricultural 
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areas being replaced by provinces in regressions. More specific division of location 
would give rise to better significance of time span coefficients. 
Table A-11 and Table A-12 in Appendix are covariance summary for the regressions 
of calamities and conflicts with ratio of average yield to normal yield or best yield set as 
dependent variable. After events variables being put in to replace time span variables, 
significance instantly switches from dummy variables of time to of province. Basically, 
nature calamities had much broader and ravaging influence on the change of average 
yield relative to either normal or best yield than human conflicts did in the era of 1929 to 
1933, no matter from the perspective of absolute value of coefficients or p value of 
significance. 
Quintessence of Table A-11 and A-12 shows relative effect of disparate catastrophe 
factors that can be compared on provincial level, as measuring weight of different 
catastrophe factors for every province. Nature calamities were more powerful than human 
conflicts during 1929 to 1933 on undermining relative average yield regardless of 
significance or absolute value of covariance. 
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Chapter 6: CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the consequences of calamities and 
conflicts on agricultural productivity as measured by Buck's data, 1929 to 1933. More 
specifically the objectives are to explore the relation between specific events of calamity 
or conflict and agricultural productivity; to check the extent to which agricultural 
productivity depended on the time surveyed or on the location of provincial level; to 
study the impact of natural calamity and manmade conflicts on agricultural productivity; 
and to compare the effect of both categories of catastrophes. 
In the era of 1929 to 1933, China faced a host of calamities and conflicts. Even in 
areas not vested in civil war, anti-communist campaigns or communist insurgency, roving 
warlords left over laid the havoc to rural regions: to maintain the warlord army, farmers 
were taxed senseless. But different from what is mentioned in Introduction that the 
remnants of warlord period induced disaster on farm income and consumption, poverty in 
China was chiefly driven by natural calamities according to our data results. Without 
technological adaption such as irrigation, genetic modification to mitigate the impact of 
climate transilience, nature calamities in 1929 to 1933 were not trivial norm when to 
resolve the yield change.  
Contrary to Buck in Literature Review, agricultural regions and areas are not that 
effective as units for understanding agriculture than political units of provinces in our 
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findings. Though the boundaries of agricultural areas may capture some homogeneous 
economic or physical conditions, they lose more information about specification of every 
locality such as tax rate, the language coverage, and esoteric sales channel to lessen 
transaction cost, etc. 
Water, too much (flood) or too little (drought), was the greatest element affecting 
farming in China. And flood or drought was the main reason for famines. According to 
Buck, highest number of famines occurred in the Szechwan Rice and the Winter 
Wheat-millet Areas. Famines were more severe in the Wheat Region than in the Rice 
Region, in the Spring Wheat and Winter Wheat-millet Areas than in the Winter 
Wheat-gaoliang Area, and in the Szechwan Rice Area than in other areas of the Rice 
Region.
111
 Risk in farming was much greater in Wheat Region than in Rice Region due 
to the low and variable precipitation which limited crop yields in spite of the inherently 
richer soils. However, partially agrees with that Winter Wheat-millet Area acquires the 
most negative effect on average yield change from catastrophes, Szechwan Rice Area is 
the unique one showing positive effect on relative yield change to either normal or best 
yield. Though it is true that the compound negative effect was more noteworthy in Wheat 
Region than in the Rice Region, in the Spring Wheat and Winter Wheat-millet Areas than 
in the Winter Wheat-gaoliang Area, to the opposite, Szechwan Rice Area performs the 
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best among all the five Rice Areas.  
An explanation for this could be that famine does not appear as a separate variable 
in our regressions, it is included in the variable “major flood/drought plus 1” which 
depicts the aftermath of major calamities such as famine. And Buck did not define the 
word “severe” clearly. There could be most famines in number in Szechwan but least 
negative effect on average yield change. Moreover, other variables of conflicts such as 
communists’ policies for resuming agricultural production to resist against the 
suppression from KMT may promote relative yield to an extent that the positive effect 
can offset the negative brought by famines and finally results in the positive as composite 
effect. Chapter of “Model Development and Econometric Results” discusses a little about 
the above disputes for Table A-8 and Table A-10 (in Appendix) which present even the 
best significance result among all the combinations of different groups for independent 
variables with agricultural areas, are both not significant in general. 
All factors that affected agricultural productivity are sorted into three groups by the 
author of this thesis: Geographic Physical Prerequisite, includes climate, topography and 
soil; Historical Inherited Convention, includes the type of the land use (excess 
reclamation, fragmentation), the tenancy relationship, racial custom (ready cash for 
conspicuous delicacies on momentous occasions, dense population), and the prior sales 
channel; and Current Artificial Temporal, includes irrigation system, animals as labor and 
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offering livestock waste as fertilizer, size of farm, and trends of price. Calamity, such as 
flood, drought, famine, wind, frost, hail and even insects, can be triggered by any factor 
in either group or in combined groups and it is supreme in this thesis since China was 
exposed to frequent catastrophes so severe that those calamities undoubtedly exerted an 
important effect on reproductive performance. Some factors are across-group: 
Transaction cost was shaped through both Geographic Physical Prerequisite and 
Historical Inherited Convention. Great distances across the whole China with primitive 
methods for transportation, such as carrying goods by a pole over the shoulder, or by cart 
and junk, made access to markets a fundamental factor in determining the type of 
production. Though rail and steamboat transportation was increasing, predominant 
methods were still the laborious and inefficient ones. People in Rice Region had become 
so habitualized to rice that they continued to make it the chief staple of their diet, even 
when it was more expensive than wheat. This is the case how Current Artificial Temporal 
converted to Historical Inherited Convention when the experience is restricted without 
innovation. 
What should be criticized is Buck never placed any of the statistical data in context. 
China between 1929 and 1933 was in tumult with a variety of natural calamities and 
manmade conflicts and each of these could qualify the data. To add complexity many of 
the village names no longer appear in current maps or have been changed so that it is not 
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possible to readily pinpoint precisely where a particular village was located. Also, not 
every particular village was provided the time it was exactly surveyed. For the locality 
lying in a war zone, it might have been surveyed before, after, or during the war if the 
village was not that close to the front line. Thus the randomized survey protocol was not 
thoroughly practical and the homogeneity principle of the ceteris paribus assumption for 
the outcomes would be doubtful, and results must be interpreted in the context of the 
historical developments at the time. 
The summary of context is entirely reliant on the contemporaneous news reported in 
the weekly volumes of China Weekly Review (CWR). It provides continuity of depth on 
any particular issue drawing from its own reporters and editors as well as other 
contributions from Chinese and English (and Japanese) language dailies and weeklies. It 
also picks up regional news sources as well as items of national importance. It is yet 
unlikely that the news made available is entirely complete. Based on the fact that any 
action rose to serious threshold in all likelihood was recorded, it is believed major 
calamities and conflicts facing rural China are all caught between 1929 and 1933. 
For calamities and conflicts, the main events were the 1929 drought and famine, the 
1931 flood, communist insurgency and warfare with the KMT, banditry and civil war, 
and the Japanese intrusion. Not that surprisingly, no significant results for conflicts on 
appreciating agricultural productivity could be from Buck because he did not select 
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hsiens in active bandit or warfare zones. 
As prerequisite of all models developed and tables formed, four dummy variables 
including Hunan province, Rice-tea Area, last time span of Nov. 1932 to Oct. 1933, and 
Japanese invasions and annexations of Manchuria, are removed as reference substance. 
All the regression results of coefficient and covariance are relative to above reference 
substance thus any contrast between the outcomes presented can be proceed without 
mentioning the reference substance at all. 
The ratio of average to normal yield conveys more desirable information about 
typical yield level than the ratio to the extreme yield of best or the index of average yield 
itself. Thus the three control variables involved in the main twelve regressions are 
screened out according to step-wise selection for the ratio of average to normal yield. 
Given normal yield or best yield of 1929 to 1933 as fixed number, average yield change 
relative to normal or best yield turns out to be substitutable with average yield change in 
discussion. 
In the process to justify control variables, only percent of crop area irrigated is 
significant at 0.05 level almost all the way through. Irrigation as the prime Current 
Artificial Temporal should be the main method farmers counting on to contend against 
drought. Its positive effect on promoting relative yield increase on average, however, is 
not evident as expected. Reason for this is irrigation facilities were handmade. Farmers 
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dig wells and canals themselves. Limited scale of irrigation confined the efficiency 
supposed to be remarkable to a large extent. Furthermore, taxation of irrigated land 
ascended due to the finite existing irrigation even in years exactly after drought. 
Opportunity cost of irrigation hence increased, leading to abandonment of irrigated land. 
For the second candidate control variable, percent of farm products sold 
immediately after harvest, ranked by significance in the unrestricted regression with 
whole pack of 12 production variables except for the dummy ones, the infinitesimal 
positive effect on relative yield rise points out that farmers could not afford to store grain 
for future sale due to a host of senseless heavy taxes needed to be paid in cash when 
pressed at harvest without general access to credit available. Though sometimes price was 
high enough to enable the person hold grains for profit regardless of the storage risk of 
insects, rodents, dampness, fire and theft, abundance lowered such price when all farmers 
sold agricultural products simultaneously, so that any possible benefit for storing post 
harvest was transferred to the marketers and wholesalers. 
In times of scarcity, due perhaps to drought, farmers without crop for selling, could 
not afford steep rise in prices that accompanied famine. Even if there was surplus worth 
selling, often the commodities could not be moved. Local price spread of rice might be 
$17/picul between Sian (Xi’an) and south Shensi. But transaction cost such as exactions 
along the way by “special” tax collections, extortion by agents and city gate keepers, 
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bandits, and lack of communication with potential buyers would make the venture 
perilous and even unprofitable for the merchants who assumed to profit by transporting 
rice from south to north. This expounds the slight negative effect on relative yield 
increase incurred by a control variable, total man work days per farm need in marketing 
products, signifying transaction cost of human labor. 
The last control variable— average distance of farthest parcels in kilometers 
moderately increased average yield relative to normal. To satisfy the interest of most 
farmers pursuing good land quality under the restriction that only half the total land 
resided in the first class, land fragmentation was prevalent. Though it had disadvantages 
of increasing the number of boundary disputes, consuming time to reach the plots (nearly 
six pieces, or parcels, per farm averaging a little less than an acre in size), increasing the 
difficulties of irrigation, restricting the size of fields for machinery farming (also dense 
population makes labor cheap and machinery operation uneconomical), and making 
integrated crop protection difficult. But this might precisely tell a story of spatial 
diversification for farmland, resorted to which farmers unwittingly realized risk 
management. It was vital to have land of differing qualities in a country of small farms 
where a complete crop failure would be disastrous. If parcels scattered on high land and 
low land as well, risk would thereby be dispersed under the attack of locusts, wars, or 
even flood. 
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Other candidate control variables except for the dummy ones manifest the 
production theory of positive correlation between the change of input and of output. For 
instance, human labor invested performed outstandingly on improving average yield. 
Absent industrious farming technology restricted the positive effect of reclaiming 
wasteland. The optimized farm size would vary in terms of family size, types of crops 
grown, and soil productivity. Given information of land quality missing, total effect of 
farm size was negative in that for farms wrecked by catastrophes such as 1929 drought, 
1931 flood or Japanese invasion, the larger the size, the greater the loss. Number of 
parcels per farm played a cameo role on obtaining better yield. So it was for double 
cropping index, indicating type of crops grown and times of harvest within a year. 
Fertilizer and cost of man labor were nearly neutral because animal manure and night soil 
as daily fertilizer was inefficient and increase of man labor cost would not necessarily 
raise yield in case of calamities even though more labor was exerted at greater cost to 
save crops. Obvious negative effect of marginal substitution between animal labor and 
man labor implies if input of man labor could not reach the total amount required 
measuring in animal labor, average yield would thereby decrease. 
In summary of four sets regressions for average yield, ratio of average to normal and 
best yield, the third set of regression with three selected control variables, provinces, and 
time span as independent variables exhibits the best significance results among the twelve 
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regressions. Transaction cost of man labor in marketing is the single significant among 
the three control variables across Table A-4 to A-6. Transporting crops or other farm 
products to big cities or larger farm markets by carts or carriage would bring the farmer 
subtle rise on yield due to exactions and extortions in form of taxes along the way. 
Positive effect on yield rise is apparent in Double-cropping Rice Area due to the 
advantageous geographic physical prerequisite it possesses: rain and heat are concurrent 
to bring cropping twice per year and provinces inclusive did not gravely suffer from any 
serious calamity or conflict during 1929 to 1933 compared with other agricultural areas. 
Surrounded by plateaus, Szechwan is called “land of abundance” with best performance 
on average yield increase because it was away from any devastating event and is covered 
with large area of most nutritious soil for planting. Year of 1929 with great famine arising 
after the major drought in late 1928, 1931 with major flood in regions of both Yellow 
River and Yangtze River, 1932 with communists revolted, being suppressed, and 
Japanese invasion expanded, but agricultural production resumed, were the main periods 
both influential and significant. 
To mend the problem that many coefficients are not significant, results of 
regressions with simply dummy variables of time span and provinces are provided in 
Table A-7 and A-9 in Appendix as the critical condensation for catastrophe analysis. 
Control variables are removed to release quite a lot degree of freedom at little cost of R
2
. 
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Provinces are kept to replace agricultural areas in terms of its comparative advantage on 
specific location. Except the bolded ones labeled in boxes capturing the compound effect 
of province and time span investigated on yield change, other numbers as covariance are 
predicted fake value automatically generated by econometric software. 
Five provinces are chosen as interpretation targets across Table A-7 to A-12 on 
behalf of five relative yield change level: Szechwan stands for the extraordinary above 
average; Anhwei stands for the moderate above average; Kwangsi represents the 
average; Shensi stands for the moderate below average; Chekiang stands for the 
extraordinary below average. 
Szechwan got less disastrously impacted compared with other provinces affected by 
1931 Yangtze flood. In Anhwei, a minor drought in northern part incurred another famine. 
But the dominant positive effect stems from resume of agricultural production after the 
1931 flood. The tactic Communists elaborated to build army against KMT by attracting 
the destitute struggling desperately for living, actually resulted in concentrating on 
promoting yield as positive effect. Kwangsi was almost in the same situation with Hunan 
politically and economically since the two provinces are adjacent to each other. South 
Honan and other nearby four provinces including Kwangsi was affected by recruit of 
communist forces and the anti-suppression fights on a large scale. It is the different 
agricultural area from Hunan that Kwangsi belonged to brought about the diminutive 
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relative superiority on yield increase. For Shensi a minor but wide-spread drought starved 
many adult labor men to death. Conflict factor that interrupted agricultural production 
was the civil war between warlords on the border of Shensi. Relative yield dropped 
strikingly in Chekiang because it suffered severely to the extreme from the 1931 flood as 
low land estuary of Yangtze River and major grain producing area adopting intensive 
cultivation. A major battlefront between republican forces and communists exacerbated 
the negative impact. Results of average yield change relative to normal are in line with 
the change relative to best for the representative five provinces. 
Of all agricultural areas listed, winter wheat millet area, which Shensi partially 
within, was basically the worst on yield improvement while Szechwan rice area was the 
best though the latter is not significant. Oct. 1930 to Oct. 1931 is the period with the most 
negative effect. Overall effect of agricultural areas investigated in this time span would 
be in a range of minus 20 to 40. Hence the 1931 flood deserves to be claimed as major 
flood that damaged every agricultural area. The greatest positive effect emerges in the 
period of May 1932 to May 1933 with covariance between 15 and 31. Crop production 
resumed after 1931 performs its salience as is outlined in China Weekly Review. Single 
difference between extremums of significant observations for average yield relative to 
normal and to best is the most negative compound effect appears in Jan. 1929 to Jan. 
1930 when it comes to Table A-10. Therefore the 1929 famine after drought in late 1928 
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should be alleged as major drought. Table A-8 and A-10 are respectively another 
expression of Table A-7 and A-9. Besides, the more specifically the division of location is, 
the better significance that coefficients of time span would present. 
After dummy variables of calamities and conflicts being put in to substitute time 
span variables, many more provinces immediately became significant. The switch of 
significance from time variables to province variables reveals that those calamity and 
conflict events can be analyzed rather sufficiently on provincial level. The 1931 major 
flood is the sole significant one among all event dummy variables. The variables referring 
to the 1929 major drought and its aftermath, the repercussion of 1931 flood are fairly 
closer to significant than variables of conflicts. Essentially nature catastrophes had much 
broader and more devastating impact on the change of yields relative to either normal or 
best yield than human conflicts did in the era of 1929 to 1933. 
Analysis of covariance in Table A-11 and A-12 for the five representative provinces 
confirms the corresponding historic epitome in China Weekly Review and the outcomes 
mentioned in analysis for Table A-7 to A-10. Quintessence of Table A-11 and A-12 is 
both tables can measure the relative effect of each catastrophe factors compared with 
Hunan undergoing Japanese intrusion and assign the event effect onto each province, thus 
the influence of different catastrophe factors can be compared for every province. If a line 
is inserted to split calamities and conflicts into two halves as presented in both tables, of 
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all the negative effect of catastrophes, the least absolute value for calamites would be 
greater than the supreme absolute value for conflicts. In a word, nature calamities 
mastered relative yield with greater domination than human conflicts did during 1929 to 
1933 on average. Kiangsi was an exception to have the effect of communists’ activities 
being positive due to its internalization of communism as the first center for revolution. 
Northern war had the least impact than other seven catastrophes since it happened in 
1926 to 1928, too early to be considerable. So it is for the civil war between warlords, 
few provinces seldom got vandalized. Time and energy of farmers in 1929 to 1933 
concentrated chiefly on how to response the overwhelming nature calamities, as in the 
Good Earth, Wang Lung’s family fled from hometown in Anhwei as refugees after all 
possible food
112
, even his loyal friend— the ox, being exhausted. Japanese stealthily crept 
over most of China. Reports about communists as ordinary bandits at the beginning 
gradually expanded in length and importance in China Weekly Review. 
Potential defects root in that “ceteris paribus” could not be realized in reality. 
Condition of the era in 1929 to 1933 can be deemed as a natural experiment in which 
                                                 
112 Wang Lung, sitting at the threshold of his door, said to himself that now surely something must be done. They 
could not remain here in this empty house and die… 
Ching thrust his face nearer. “In the village they are eating human flesh,” he whispered. “It is said your uncle and 
his wife are eating. How else are they living and with strength enough to walk about—they, who, it is known, have 
never had anything?” 
Wang Lung drew back from the death-like head which Ching had thrust forward as he spoke. With the man’s eyes 
close like this, he was horrible. Wang Lung was suddenly afraid with a fear he did not understand. He rose quickly as 
though to cast off some entangling danger. 
“We will leave this place,” he said loudly. “We will go south!”  
Buck, P. S. 1931.The Good Earth: 79. 
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modern industrial farming facilities and machinery farming or harvest were not available 
at all in general for the rural China. It can be examined without modern risk management 
such as irrigation, protection against insects, floods, hails, winds… or even hedging tools, 
what effects of calamities and conflicts on agricultural productivity might be. 
Nevertheless, the requirement of “other things being equal”— only one catastrophe is 
allowed for a special locality during a designated period of time is impractical. In some 
areas none of those events occurred while in others all of the events occurred. Not to 
mention the ceteris paribus for control variables as input factors for yield.  
Also, even though Buck’s team conducted a far-reaching survey across most 
provinces in China, Buck would not send his students to unsafe locations such as 
battlefield and disaster areas. Hence the selectivity problem still cannot be thoroughly 
avoided for villages investigated. 
What is more, for every regression with robust standard error, constant is retained 
because zero mean of residuals is guaranteed thereby. With deletion of constant, 
regression line would be forced to go through the origin, implying that all of the 
independent and the dependent variables must equal zero at that point. If the fitted line 
does not intrinsically pass the origin, corresponding regression coefficients and 
predictions would be biased in the case of constant being omitted. However, in the 
interpretation for summary tables, the constant is not added back to acquire coefficient or 
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covariance for that any lost information excluded in independent variables has a chance 
to go into either constant or error, which is not clear up to now. Further, many constants 
are definitely too big to be added on coefficient or covariance without changing its sign. 
And the sign is vital to determine whether the compound effect was positive or negative. 
Last but not least, the method of linear regressions with robust standard error and 
analysis of covariance have been queried for being too simple. Due to the tumultuous 
years in Chinese history, the data of yield and catastrophes in 1929 to 1933 is too scarce 
and limited in numerous missing values to be directly adopted. Existing data relevant 
with catastrophes in Buck’s Statistics of Land Utilization in China is reported in total 
amount on agricultural areas’ level without specifying the time and location for each 
calamity. Data about conflicts is completely absent. Restricted by such difficulties, 
researchers have to read piles of volumes of weekly news for the five years and create 
dummy variables about catastrophes according to the events summary by themselves. 
Based on what mentioned above, linear regression is accepted in terms of the linear 
relation between input and output in production theory. Complicated econometric model 
or operation can hardly be applied onto a database filled with lots of omitted observations. 
Regression with robust standard error in addition is beneficial to eliminate 
heteroskedasticity. The covariance is generated by merely adding up two coefficients in 
row and in column for it is not possible to measure the weight of dummy variables in 
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incomparable categories such as catastrophe, location and time. 
In conclusion, this thesis examines the effects of calamities and conflicts on 
agricultural productivity in rural China during 1929 to 1933. The data, when mapped 
against the contemporaneous calamities or conflicts in that era provides a rare glimpse 
into the agricultural economics of disaster. Empirical part of this thesis is essentially 
geared to understanding how calamities and conflicts and other natural and geopolitical 
influences can collectively or individually explain the productivity measured in Buck’s 
study. 
To investigate this, our regressions use productive controls, and a series of dummy 
variables to capture the time frame, provincial or agricultural regional factors. In addition, 
a number of variables are then added to apprehend the flood, drought; communist, bandit, 
warlord, other civil military activities, Japanese militarism and other factors. Contrary to 
Buck’s focus on agricultural areas, our findings prove that the significant differences in 
productivity are tied to provincial. Typically nature catastrophes had much broader and 
more devastating impact on the change of yields relative to either normal or best yield 
than human conflicts did in the era of 1929 to 1933. 
Realistic illuminations for this thesis include a greater depth of understanding the 
economics of catastrophe. A chance is given to measure the social benefits of modern 
technologies by exploring the opportunity costs associated with the absence of 
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technological adaptation such as irrigation and genetic modification designed to mitigate 
wide agricultural productivity fluctuation incurred by climatic variability. Only a 
retrospective study of this sort can truly benchmark for such measures. 
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APPENDIX 
Part I: Statistical Appendix to Chapter 5— Code and Table A-1 to Table A-12 
Unrestricted OLS Regression for Ratio of Average to Normal: 
regress ratio_avg_to_normal pct_crop_area_irri sold_immediately_after_harvest 
all_farms_manequiv_per_farm all_farms_ind_doublecropping pct_cult_landarea 
size_crop_hectare_area_mean num_parcels_per_farm avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km all_farm_fertilizer 
all_farms_la total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing total_l_cost_yl spring_wheat winter_wheat_millet 
winter_wheat_gaoliang yangtze_rice_wheat szechwan_rice double_cropping_rice southwestern_rice 
kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw shansi_sw_wwm shensi_sw_wwm_sr suiyuan_sw tsinghai_sw 
honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt kiangsu_wwg_yrw liaoning_sw_wwg 
shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr fukien_rt_dcr szechwan_szr 
kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr kweichow_swr yunnan_swr yr1929_01_12 yr1929_01_1930_01 
yr1929_02_1930_01 yr1929_10_1930_09 yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 yr1929_12_1930_12 
yr1930_01_12 yr1930_01_1931_02 yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 yr1930_10_1931_09 
yr1930_10_1931_10 yr1930_10_1931_11 yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 yr1931_01_1932_01 
yr1931_02_1932_02 yr1931_06_1932_05 yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 yr1931_08_1932_08 
yr1931_09_1932_09 yr1931_10_1932_09 yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 yr1931_12_1932_12 
yr1932_01_12 yr1932_01_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 yr1932_03_1933_02 
yr1932_05_1933_05 yr1932_06_1933_05 yr1932_10_1933_09, r regress ratio_avg_to_normal 
pct_crop_area_irri sold_immediately_after_harvest all_farms_manequiv_per_farm 
all_farms_ind_doublecropping pct_cult_landarea size_crop_hectare_area_mean num_parcels_per_farm 
avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km all_farm_fertilizer all_farms_la total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing 
total_l_cost_yl spring_wheat winter_wheat_millet winter_wheat_gaoliang yangtze_rice_wheat 
szechwan_rice double_cropping_rice southwestern_rice kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw shansi_sw_wwm 
shensi_sw_wwm_sr suiyuan_sw tsinghai_sw honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg 
anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt kiangsu_wwg_yrw liaoning_sw_wwg shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw 
kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr fukien_rt_dcr szechwan_szr kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr kweichow_swr 
yunnan_swr yr1929_01_12 yr1929_01_1930_01 yr1929_02_1930_01 yr1929_10_1930_09 
yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 yr1929_12_1930_12 yr1930_01_12 yr1930_01_1931_02 
yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 yr1930_10_1931_09 yr1930_10_1931_10 yr1930_10_1931_11 
yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 yr1931_01_1932_01 yr1931_02_1932_02 yr1931_06_1932_05 
yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 yr1931_08_1932_08 yr1931_09_1932_09 yr1931_10_1932_09 
yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 yr1931_12_1932_12 yr1932_01_12 yr1932_01_1933_01 
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yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 yr1932_03_1933_02 yr1932_05_1933_05 yr1932_06_1933_05 
yr1932_10_1933_09, r 
 
Table A-1 Unrestricted OLS Regression for Ratio of Average to Normal 
                      yunnan_swr    -2.302998   3.357201    -0.69   0.495    -9.007792    4.401796
                   kweichow_swr            0  (omitted)
                  kwangtung_dcr            0  (omitted)
                 kwangsi_rt_dcr     8.785334   11.41159     0.77   0.444    -14.00518    31.57585
                   szechwan_szr     25.45335   17.28391     1.47   0.146    -9.065008     59.9717
                  fukien_rt_dcr            0  (omitted)
             kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr     29.77661   15.98504     1.86   0.067    -2.147721    61.70093
                      hupeh_yrw    -9.681794   12.50217    -0.77   0.441    -34.65034    15.28676
                chekiang_yrw_rt      25.3277   14.12874     1.79   0.078    -2.889333    53.54474
                   shantung_wwg     16.49493   23.47743     0.70   0.485    -30.39273    63.38259
                liaoning_sw_wwg            0  (omitted)
                kiangsu_wwg_yrw     14.15592   14.61796     0.97   0.336    -15.03816    43.34999
              anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt     20.45957   15.63886     1.31   0.195    -10.77339    51.69252
                  hopeh_wwm_wwg     30.25442   22.57018     1.34   0.185    -14.82135    75.33018
              honan_wwm_wwg_yrw     10.89909   19.90368     0.55   0.586     -28.8513    50.64948
                    tsinghai_sw            0  (omitted)
                     suiyuan_sw            0  (omitted)
               shensi_sw_wwm_sr     15.19689   26.91727     0.56   0.574    -38.56062    68.95439
                  shansi_sw_wwm     28.86927   23.80082     1.21   0.230    -18.66425    76.40279
                     ningsia_sw            0  (omitted)
                   kansu_sw_wwm     43.65887    25.6713     1.70   0.094    -7.610264    94.92801
              southwestern_rice     32.44976   18.18624     1.78   0.079    -3.870665    68.77018
           double_cropping_rice     20.79416   16.53365     1.26   0.213    -12.22581    53.81413
                  szechwan_rice            0  (omitted)
             yangtze_rice_wheat     .9531678   12.10076     0.08   0.937    -23.21372    25.12006
          winter_wheat_gaoliang     19.01869   14.74887     1.29   0.202    -10.43685    48.47422
            winter_wheat_millet     9.406598    17.2839     0.54   0.588    -25.11174    43.92494
                   spring_wheat    -7.140262   24.67526    -0.29   0.773    -56.42015    42.13963
                total_l_cost_yl    -.0097709   .0816719    -0.12   0.905     -.172881    .1533393
     total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing    -.0486366   .1028868    -0.47   0.638    -.2541158    .1568426
                   all_farms_la    -6.990085   11.25181    -0.62   0.537     -29.4615    15.48133
            all_farm_fertilizer     .0001935    .000249     0.78   0.440    -.0003037    .0006907
avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km     3.076204   3.808182     0.81   0.422    -4.529261    10.68167
           num_parcels_per_farm     .2130357   .2433432     0.88   0.385    -.2729542    .6990255
    size_crop_hectare_area_mean    -3.480856   3.323585    -1.05   0.299    -10.11851    3.156802
              pct_cult_landarea     .0980431   .0795838     1.23   0.222    -.0608969     .256983
   all_farms_ind_doublecropping     .0845431   .0545034     1.55   0.126    -.0243077    .1933939
    all_farms_manequiv_per_farm     7.963603   5.045078     1.58   0.119    -2.112113    18.03932
 sold_immediately_after_harvest     .1389866   .0717522     1.94   0.057    -.0043124    .2822857
             pct_crop_area_irri     .1626018   .0784671     2.07   0.042     .0058922    .3193114
                                                                                                 
            ratio_avg_to_normal        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                Robust
                                                                                                 
                                                       Root MSE      =  10.645
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7185
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 37,    65) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     121
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Table A-1 (Continued) 
 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
 
                                                                                                 
                          _cons     39.47469   17.30125     2.28   0.026      4.92171    74.02767
              yr1932_10_1933_09    -27.27358   10.13321    -2.69   0.009    -47.51099   -7.036166
              yr1932_06_1933_05            0  (omitted)
              yr1932_05_1933_05    -23.18271   20.19969    -1.15   0.255    -63.52428    17.15886
              yr1932_03_1933_02            0  (omitted)
              yr1932_02_1933_02    -45.85716   20.68216    -2.22   0.030    -87.16228   -4.552034
              yr1932_02_1933_01            0  (omitted)
              yr1932_01_1933_01            0  (omitted)
                   yr1932_01_12    -33.43923   18.27031    -1.83   0.072    -69.92756    3.049108
              yr1931_12_1932_12    -36.64816   20.20758    -1.81   0.074    -77.00548    3.709168
              yr1931_11_1932_11    -54.13025   22.18849    -2.44   0.017    -98.44372    -9.81678
              yr1931_11_1932_10            0  (omitted)
              yr1931_10_1932_09    -33.09663   9.870356    -3.35   0.001    -52.80909   -13.38416
              yr1931_09_1932_09    -32.28245   20.33532    -1.59   0.117    -72.89489    8.329991
              yr1931_08_1932_08    -22.19128   15.66555    -1.42   0.161    -53.47754    9.094984
              yr1931_07_1932_07            0  (omitted)
              yr1931_07_1932_06      .326201   25.67444     0.01   0.990    -50.94919    51.60159
              yr1931_06_1932_05            0  (omitted)
              yr1931_02_1932_02    -50.71756     15.368    -3.30   0.002    -81.40958   -20.02553
              yr1931_01_1932_01    -60.39954   25.48493    -2.37   0.021    -111.2965   -9.502622
                   yr1931_01_12    -26.54241     16.978    -1.56   0.123    -60.44981    7.364985
              yr1930_11_1931_10     -31.6767   18.39518    -1.72   0.090    -68.41442    5.061012
              yr1930_10_1931_11     -35.3594    18.2998    -1.93   0.058    -71.90661    1.187822
              yr1930_10_1931_10    -65.07452   20.44907    -3.18   0.002    -105.9141    -24.2349
              yr1930_10_1931_09    -15.98579   17.34488    -0.92   0.360     -50.6259    18.65432
              yr1930_02_1931_02            0  (omitted)
              yr1930_02_1931_01     3.893253    24.7132     0.16   0.875    -45.46242    53.24892
              yr1930_01_1931_02    -48.15067   25.12292    -1.92   0.060     -98.3246    2.023262
                   yr1930_01_12    -37.22498   18.87762    -1.97   0.053    -74.92619    .4762357
              yr1929_12_1930_12            0  (omitted)
              yr1929_11_1930_10            0  (omitted)
              yr1929_10_1930_10            0  (omitted)
              yr1929_10_1930_09    -24.22716   15.98056    -1.52   0.134    -56.14254    7.688226
              yr1929_02_1930_01            0  (omitted)
              yr1929_01_1930_01    -79.56145   20.20933    -3.94   0.000    -119.9223   -39.20064
                   yr1929_01_12    -27.88384   16.31354    -1.71   0.092    -60.46423    4.696552
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0188
         chi2(1)      =     5.52
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_normal
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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Stepwise Selection 
stepwise, pr(.20): regress ratio_avg_to_normal pct_crop_area_irri sold_immediately_after_harvest 
all_farms_manequiv_per_farm all_farms_ind_doublecropping size_crop_hectare_area_mean 
num_parcels_per_farm avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km all_farm_fertilizer all_farms_la 
total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing total_l_cost_yl 
 
Table A-2 Step-wise Selection of 12 Production Variables 
 
  
                                                                                                 
                          _cons     66.55888   3.504408    18.99   0.000     59.62916    73.48861
     total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing     .1133443   .0480681     2.36   0.020      .018293    .2083956
avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km      3.18518   2.007047     1.59   0.115    -.7836166    7.153977
             pct_crop_area_irri     .1180601   .0313635     3.76   0.000      .056041    .1800792
                                                                                                 
            ratio_avg_to_normal        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                                 
       Total    29198.5449   140  208.561035           Root MSE      =  13.533
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.1219
    Residual     25090.301   137  183.140883           R-squared     =  0.1407
       Model    4108.24393     3  1369.41464           Prob > F      =  0.0001
                                                       F(  3,   137) =    7.48
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     141
p = 0.2367 >= 0.2000  removing all_farms_ind_doublecropping
p = 0.3022 >= 0.2000  removing total_l_cost_yl
p = 0.2134 >= 0.2000  removing all_farm_fertilizer
p = 0.5082 >= 0.2000  removing sold_immediately_after_harvest
p = 0.6725 >= 0.2000  removing size_crop_hectare_area_mean
p = 0.8213 >= 0.2000  removing all_farms_manequiv_per_farm
p = 0.9040 >= 0.2000  removing all_farms_la
p = 0.9574 >= 0.2000  removing num_parcels_per_farm
                      begin with full model
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Unrestricted Regression with Control Variables: 
regress  ratio_avg_to_normal pct_crop_area_irri avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km 
total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing spring_wheat winter_wheat_millet winter_wheat_gaoliang 
yangtze_rice_wheat szechwan_rice double_cropping_rice southwestern_rice kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw 
shansi_sw_wwm shensi_sw_wwm_sr suiyuan_sw tsinghai_sw honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg 
anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt kiangsu_wwg_yrw liaoning_sw_wwg shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw 
kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr fukien_rt_dcr szechwan_szr kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr kweichow_swr 
yunnan_swr yr1929_01_12 yr1929_01_1930_01 yr1929_02_1930_01 yr1929_10_1930_09 
yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 yr1929_12_1930_12 yr1930_01_12 yr1930_01_1931_02 
yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 yr1930_10_1931_09 yr1930_10_1931_10 yr1930_10_1931_11 
yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 yr1931_01_1932_01 yr1931_02_1932_02 yr1931_06_1932_05 
yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 yr1931_08_1932_08 yr1931_09_1932_09 yr1931_10_1932_09 
yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 yr1931_12_1932_12 yr1932_01_12 yr1932_01_1933_01 
yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 yr1932_03_1933_02 yr1932_05_1933_05 yr1932_06_1933_05 
yr1932_10_1933_09, r 
 
Table A-3 Unrestricted OLS Regression for Ratio of Average to Normal with 3 
Control Variables 
                     tsinghai_sw     3.411888   26.29702     0.13   0.897    -48.80147    55.62524
                     suiyuan_sw            0  (omitted)
               shensi_sw_wwm_sr    -16.82819   18.97782    -0.89   0.377     -54.5091    20.85272
                  shansi_sw_wwm     -13.8038   17.59192    -0.78   0.435    -48.73296    21.12537
                     ningsia_sw            0  (omitted)
                   kansu_sw_wwm     13.36788   25.31042     0.53   0.599    -36.88654    63.62231
              southwestern_rice    -8.980364   10.48096    -0.86   0.394    -29.79056    11.82984
           double_cropping_rice     5.860416   8.871425     0.66   0.510    -11.75401    23.47484
                  szechwan_rice     -3.05227   7.810515    -0.39   0.697    -18.56023    12.45569
             yangtze_rice_wheat     .1697398    8.27384     0.02   0.984    -16.25816    16.59764
          winter_wheat_gaoliang     9.876658   13.58605     0.73   0.469    -17.09876    36.85207
            winter_wheat_millet    -2.451268   15.98957    -0.15   0.878    -34.19892    29.29639
                   spring_wheat    -21.55181   22.63285    -0.95   0.343    -66.48986    23.38624
     total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing      .154819   .0672988     2.30   0.024     .0211957    .2884423
avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km     2.628855   2.827861     0.93   0.355     -2.98593     8.24364
             pct_crop_area_irri     .1038958   .0739631     1.40   0.163    -.0429597    .2507513
                                                                                                 
            ratio_avg_to_normal        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                Robust
                                                                                                 
                                                       Root MSE      =  11.023
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6236
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 32,    94) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     151
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Table A-3 (Continued) 
 
 
                                                                                                 
                          _cons     67.75711   6.841135     9.90   0.000     54.17388    81.34035
              yr1932_10_1933_09    -2.740823   6.463217    -0.42   0.672    -15.57369    10.09205
              yr1932_06_1933_05    -3.863948   9.847764    -0.39   0.696    -23.41691    15.68902
              yr1932_05_1933_05     27.10006   9.064988     2.99   0.004     9.101312     45.0988
              yr1932_03_1933_02     .1277144   1.852553     0.07   0.945    -3.550572    3.806001
              yr1932_02_1933_02     11.29853   9.079811     1.24   0.216    -6.729651    29.32671
              yr1932_02_1933_01            0  (omitted)
              yr1932_01_1933_01     13.88881    10.5529     1.32   0.191     -7.06423    34.84185
                   yr1932_01_12     3.061033   10.00891     0.31   0.760     -16.8119    22.93397
              yr1931_12_1932_12     10.43415   7.419662     1.41   0.163    -4.297768    25.16606
              yr1931_11_1932_11    -2.999097   7.114923    -0.42   0.674    -17.12594    11.12775
              yr1931_11_1932_10            0  (omitted)
              yr1931_10_1932_09    -17.44594   5.237735    -3.33   0.001    -27.84559   -7.046299
              yr1931_09_1932_09     19.37233   7.094625     2.73   0.008      5.28579    33.45888
              yr1931_08_1932_08     14.74743   7.150061     2.06   0.042     .5508134    28.94404
              yr1931_07_1932_07            0  (omitted)
              yr1931_07_1932_06     25.54877   10.60839     2.41   0.018     4.485568    46.61197
              yr1931_06_1932_05    -17.18285   7.843761    -2.19   0.031    -32.75682   -1.608875
              yr1931_02_1932_02     -15.5318   7.458111    -2.08   0.040    -30.34006   -.7235497
              yr1931_01_1932_01    -4.094176   11.05807    -0.37   0.712    -26.05024    17.86188
                   yr1931_01_12     17.11003   7.573205     2.26   0.026     2.073258    32.14681
              yr1930_11_1931_10     16.04966   9.267344     1.73   0.087    -2.350869    34.45019
              yr1930_10_1931_11     20.10511   10.54368     1.91   0.060    -.8296044    41.03983
              yr1930_10_1931_10    -18.94724   11.97256    -1.58   0.117    -42.71904    4.824549
              yr1930_10_1931_09      27.1647   8.958759     3.03   0.003     9.376872    44.95252
              yr1930_02_1931_02     25.74834    11.2506     2.29   0.024     3.410001    48.08667
              yr1930_02_1931_01     33.65533   19.05064     1.77   0.081    -4.170171    71.48083
              yr1930_01_1931_02     17.58853   11.75388     1.50   0.138     -5.74907    40.92613
                   yr1930_01_12     5.396897   7.203219     0.75   0.456    -8.905264    19.69906
              yr1929_12_1930_12            0  (omitted)
              yr1929_11_1930_10            0  (omitted)
              yr1929_10_1930_10    -1.125482   7.717583    -0.15   0.884    -16.44892    14.19796
              yr1929_10_1930_09      17.4688   7.624653     2.29   0.024     2.329876    32.60773
              yr1929_02_1930_01    -1.266889   10.08616    -0.13   0.900    -21.29319    18.75941
              yr1929_01_1930_01    -37.92087   9.372442    -4.05   0.000    -56.53007   -19.31166
                   yr1929_01_12     8.676297   6.673775     1.30   0.197     -4.57464    21.92723
                     yunnan_swr            0  (omitted)
                   kweichow_swr     5.258929   2.578925     2.04   0.044     .1384119    10.37945
                  kwangtung_dcr    -9.244816   7.837762    -1.18   0.241    -24.80688    6.317244
                 kwangsi_rt_dcr     -9.58161   9.056042    -1.06   0.293    -27.56259    8.399374
                   szechwan_szr            0  (omitted)
                  fukien_rt_dcr    -20.20815    9.53487    -2.12   0.037    -39.13986   -1.276445
             kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr    -1.641206   11.29746    -0.15   0.885    -24.07258    20.79017
                      hupeh_yrw    -5.215512   8.776515    -0.59   0.554    -22.64149    12.21046
                chekiang_yrw_rt    -12.75284   7.928252    -1.61   0.111    -28.49457    2.988892
                   shantung_wwg    -25.80408   17.91507    -1.44   0.153    -61.37488    9.766716
                liaoning_sw_wwg            0  (omitted)
                kiangsu_wwg_yrw    -4.426737   11.28021    -0.39   0.696    -26.82385    17.97038
              anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt    -9.730781   10.24509    -0.95   0.345    -30.07265    10.61109
                  hopeh_wwm_wwg    -3.597269   17.08517    -0.21   0.834    -37.52026    30.32573
              honan_wwm_wwg_yrw    -15.62651   16.50541    -0.95   0.346    -48.39839    17.14536
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Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
Main 12 Regressions 
For Ratio of Average to Normal: 
1) Unrestricted OLS Regression with 12 Production Variables 
The same code and result is provided at the beginning of Appendix Part I. 
2) Restricted regression with Control Variables, Agricultural Areas and Provinces 
regress  ratio_avg_to_normal pct_crop_area_irri avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km 
total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing spring_wheat winter_wheat_millet winter_wheat_gaoliang 
yangtze_rice_wheat szechwan_rice double_cropping_rice southwestern_rice kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw 
shansi_sw_wwm shensi_sw_wwm_sr suiyuan_sw tsinghai_sw honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg 
anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt kiangsu_wwg_yrw liaoning_sw_wwg shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw 
kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr fukien_rt_dcr szechwan_szr kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr kweichow_swr 
yunnan_swr, r 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
3) Restricted regression with Control Variables, Provinces and Time Span 
regress  ratio_avg_to_normal pct_crop_area_irri avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km 
total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw shansi_sw_wwm shensi_sw_wwm_sr 
suiyuan_sw tsinghai_sw honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt 
kiangsu_wwg_yrw liaoning_sw_wwg shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr 
fukien_rt_dcr szechwan_szr kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr kweichow_swr yunnan_swr yr1929_01_12 
yr1929_01_1930_01 yr1929_02_1930_01 yr1929_10_1930_09 yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 
yr1929_12_1930_12 yr1930_01_12 yr1930_01_1931_02 yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 
yr1930_10_1931_09 yr1930_10_1931_10 yr1930_10_1931_11 yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2140
         chi2(1)      =     1.54
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_normal
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.6261
         chi2(1)      =     0.24
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_normal
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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yr1931_01_1932_01 yr1931_02_1932_02 yr1931_06_1932_05 yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 
yr1931_08_1932_08 yr1931_09_1932_09 yr1931_10_1932_09 yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 
yr1931_12_1932_12 yr1932_01_12 yr1932_01_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 
yr1932_03_1933_02 yr1932_05_1933_05 yr1932_06_1933_05 yr1932_10_1933_09, r 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
4) Restricted regression with Control Variables, Agricultural Areas and Time Span 
regress  ratio_avg_to_normal pct_crop_area_irri avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km 
total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing spring_wheat winter_wheat_millet winter_wheat_gaoliang 
yangtze_rice_wheat szechwan_rice double_cropping_rice southwestern_rice yr1929_01_12 
yr1929_01_1930_01 yr1929_02_1930_01 yr1929_10_1930_09 yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 
yr1929_12_1930_12 yr1930_01_12 yr1930_01_1931_02 yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 
yr1930_10_1931_09 yr1930_10_1931_10 yr1930_10_1931_11 yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 
yr1931_01_1932_01 yr1931_02_1932_02 yr1931_06_1932_05 yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 
yr1931_08_1932_08 yr1931_09_1932_09 yr1931_10_1932_09 yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 
yr1931_12_1932_12 yr1932_01_12 yr1932_01_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 
yr1932_03_1933_02 yr1932_05_1933_05 yr1932_06_1933_05 yr1932_10_1933_09, r 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
  
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0006
         chi2(1)      =    11.93
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_normal
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0945
         chi2(1)      =     2.80
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_normal
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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Table A-4 Summary of Four Sets Regressions for the Ratio of Average to 
Normal 
Coefficient 
and P test 
Name of Ind. 
Variables 
Unrestricted 
OLS 
Cont+Agri. 
Area+ Prov. 
Cont+Prov. 
+ Time Span 
Cont + Agri. Area 
+ Time Span 
Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
Control 
Variables 
Irri 0.10 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.32 0.15 0.04 
Dist 2.63 0.36 1.06 0.69 1.15 0.63 2.53 0.35 
Market 0.15 0.02 0.08 0.21 0.16 0.01 0.10 0.09 
Agri. 
Areas 
SW -21.55 0.34 -24.34 0.26   -11.00 0.23 
WWM -2.45 0.88 0.44 0.98   -1.77 0.81 
WWG 9.88 0.47 0.33 0.98   7.09 0.37 
YRW 0.17 0.98 -10.13 0.22   -0.68 0.93 
SzR -3.05 0.70 0.00    6.05 0.38 
DCR 5.86 0.51 16.03 0.00   0.92 0.86 
SwR -8.98 0.39 -1.63 0.66   -0.44 0.93 
Prov. Kansu 13.37 0.60 25.87 0.24 1.13 0.94   
Ningsia 0.00  0.00  0.00    
Shansi -13.80 0.44 4.12 0.79 -14.58 0.10   
Shensi -16.83 0.38 7.41 0.65 -23.41 0.15   
Suiyuan 0.00  0.00  0.00    
Tsinghai 3.41 0.90 28.85 0.19 -13.30 0.06   
Honan -15.63 0.35 5.28 0.72 -6.87 0.28   
Hopeh -3.60 0.83 15.03 0.32 6.38 0.54   
Anhwei -9.73 0.35 8.69 0.33 -4.89 0.48   
Kiangsu -4.43 0.70 10.64 0.26 -0.62 0.91   
Liaoning 0.00  0.00  0.00    
Shantung -25.80 0.15 5.01 0.72 -14.70 0.18   
Chekiang -12.75 0.11 -2.58 0.56 -8.00 0.22   
Hupeh -5.22 0.55 -4.56 0.62 -6.72 0.30   
Kiangsi -1.64 0.89 3.48 0.52 2.37 0.81   
Fukien -20.21 0.04 -2.43 0.61 -13.27 0.11   
Szechwan 0.00  10.95 0.02 0.35 0.95   
Kwangsi -9.58 0.29 -14.92 0.03 0.95 0.91   
Kwangtung -9.24 0.24 -8.59 0.27 1.41 0.87   
Kweichow 5.26 0.04 5.29 0.01 0.00 1.00   
Yunnan 0.00  0.00  -5.03 0.56   
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Coefficient 
and P test 
Name of Ind. 
Variables 
Unrestricted 
OLS 
Cont+Agri. 
Area+ Prov. 
Cont+Prov. 
+ Time Span 
Cont + Agri. Area 
+ Time Span 
Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
Time 
Span 
2901-2912 8.68 0.20   4.72 0.35 7.47 0.38 
2901-3001 -37.92 0.00   -38.86 0.00 -28.83 0.00 
2902-3001 -1.27 0.90   -5.95 0.39 -9.09 0.28 
2910-3009 17.47 0.02   13.61 0.04 9.26 0.07 
2910-3010 -1.13 0.88   -4.16 0.52 -1.62 0.86 
2911-3010 0.00    0.00  0.00  
2912-3012 0.00    0.00  0.00  
3001-3012 5.40 0.46   2.72 0.67 2.84 0.76 
3001-3102 17.59 0.14   15.25 0.15 2.92 0.80 
3002-3101 33.66 0.08   19.07 0.18 14.46 0.19 
3002-3102 25.75 0.02   23.30 0.01 21.17 0.01 
3010-3109 27.16 0.00   24.06 0.00 13.52 0.06 
3010-3110 -18.95 0.12   -23.02 0.01 -22.90 0.02 
3010-3111 20.11 0.06   21.02 0.09 11.40 0.22 
3011-3110 16.05 0.09   14.97 0.10 3.23 0.69 
3101-3112 17.11 0.03   14.04 0.01 13.22 0.10 
3101-3201 -4.09 0.71   -10.09 0.37 -3.82 0.61 
3102-3202 -15.53 0.04   -15.83 0.01 -20.54 0.01 
3106-3205 -17.18 0.03   -19.62 0.00 -16.87 0.07 
3107-3206 25.55 0.02   29.34 0.03 19.08 0.04 
3107-3207 0.00    0.00  0.00  
3108-3208 14.75 0.04   12.93 0.03 8.86 0.25 
3109-3209 19.37 0.01   15.92 0.01 9.58 0.06 
3110-3209 -17.45 0.00   -15.69 0.01 -17.33 0.05 
3111-3210 0.00    0.00  3.45 0.71 
3111-3211 -3.00 0.67   -6.57 0.28 -12.75 0.01 
3112-3212 10.43 0.16   7.46 0.24 1.92 0.73 
3201-3212 3.06 0.76   0.03 1.00 3.36 0.60 
3201-3301 13.89 0.19   10.68 0.21 13.24 0.05 
3202-3301 0.00    0.00  0.00  
3202-3302 11.30 0.22   9.10 0.25 -3.28 0.66 
3203-3302 0.13 0.95   0.35 0.84 4.40 0.35 
3205-3305 27.10 0.00   23.48 0.00 21.02 0.02 
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Coefficient 
and P test 
Name of Ind. 
Variables 
Unrestricted 
OLS 
Cont+Agri. 
Area+ Prov. 
Cont+Prov. 
+ Time Span 
Cont + Agri. Area 
+ Time Span 
Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
3206-3305 -3.86 0.70   -10.06 0.19 -5.34 0.55 
3210-3309 -2.74 0.67   -2.70 0.65 2.07 0.77 
Cons.  67.76 0.00 66.16 0.00 70.51 0.00 60.59 0.00 
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For Ratio of Average to Best: 
1) Unrestricted OLS Regression with Control Variables 
regress  ratio_avg_to_best pct_crop_area_irri avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km 
total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing spring_wheat winter_wheat_millet winter_wheat_gaoliang 
yangtze_rice_wheat szechwan_rice double_cropping_rice southwestern_rice kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw 
shansi_sw_wwm shensi_sw_wwm_sr suiyuan_sw tsinghai_sw honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg 
anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt kiangsu_wwg_yrw liaoning_sw_wwg shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw 
kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr fukien_rt_dcr szechwan_szr kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr kweichow_swr 
yunnan_swr yr1929_01_12 yr1929_01_1930_01 yr1929_02_1930_01 yr1929_10_1930_09 
yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 yr1929_12_1930_12 yr1930_01_12 yr1930_01_1931_02 
yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 yr1930_10_1931_09 yr1930_10_1931_10 yr1930_10_1931_11 
yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 yr1931_01_1932_01 yr1931_02_1932_02 yr1931_06_1932_05 
yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 yr1931_08_1932_08 yr1931_09_1932_09 yr1931_10_1932_09 
yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 yr1931_12_1932_12 yr1932_01_12 yr1932_01_1933_01 
yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 yr1932_03_1933_02 yr1932_05_1933_05 yr1932_06_1933_05 
yr1932_10_1933_09, r 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
2) Restricted regression with Control Variables, Agricultural Areas and Provinces 
regress  ratio_avg_to_best pct_crop_area_irri avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km 
total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing spring_wheat winter_wheat_millet winter_wheat_gaoliang 
yangtze_rice_wheat szechwan_rice double_cropping_rice southwestern_rice kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw 
shansi_sw_wwm shensi_sw_wwm_sr suiyuan_sw tsinghai_sw honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg 
anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt kiangsu_wwg_yrw liaoning_sw_wwg shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw 
kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr fukien_rt_dcr szechwan_szr kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr kweichow_swr 
yunnan_swr, r 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0531
         chi2(1)      =     3.74
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_best
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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3) Restricted regression with Control Variables, Provinces and Time Span 
regress  ratio_avg_to_best pct_crop_area_irri avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km 
total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw shansi_sw_wwm shensi_sw_wwm_sr 
suiyuan_sw tsinghai_sw honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt 
kiangsu_wwg_yrw liaoning_sw_wwg shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr 
fukien_rt_dcr szechwan_szr kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr kweichow_swr yunnan_swr yr1929_01_12 
yr1929_01_1930_01 yr1929_02_1930_01 yr1929_10_1930_09 yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 
yr1929_12_1930_12 yr1930_01_12 yr1930_01_1931_02 yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 
yr1930_10_1931_09 yr1930_10_1931_10 yr1930_10_1931_11 yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 
yr1931_01_1932_01 yr1931_02_1932_02 yr1931_06_1932_05 yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 
yr1931_08_1932_08 yr1931_09_1932_09 yr1931_10_1932_09 yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 
yr1931_12_1932_12 yr1932_01_12 yr1932_01_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 
yr1932_03_1933_02 yr1932_05_1933_05 yr1932_06_1933_05 yr1932_10_1933_09, r 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
4) Restricted regression with Control Variables, Agricultural Areas and Time Span 
regress  ratio_avg_to_best pct_crop_area_irri avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km 
total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing spring_wheat winter_wheat_millet winter_wheat_gaoliang 
yangtze_rice_wheat szechwan_rice double_cropping_rice southwestern_rice yr1929_01_12 
yr1929_01_1930_01 yr1929_02_1930_01 yr1929_10_1930_09 yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 
yr1929_12_1930_12 yr1930_01_12 yr1930_01_1931_02 yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 
yr1930_10_1931_09 yr1930_10_1931_10 yr1930_10_1931_11 yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 
yr1931_01_1932_01 yr1931_02_1932_02 yr1931_06_1932_05 yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 
yr1931_08_1932_08 yr1931_09_1932_09 yr1931_10_1932_09 yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 
yr1931_12_1932_12 yr1932_01_12 yr1932_01_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 
yr1932_03_1933_02 yr1932_05_1933_05 yr1932_06_1933_05 yr1932_10_1933_09, r 
 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0164
         chi2(1)      =     5.76
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_best
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.9714
         chi2(1)      =     0.00
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_best
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
  
         Prob > chi2  =   0.4249
         chi2(1)      =     0.64
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_best
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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Table A-5 Summary of Four Sets Regressions for the Ratio of Average to Best 
Coefficient 
and P test 
Name of Ind. 
Variables    
Unrestricted 
OLS 
Cont+Agri. 
Area+ Prov. 
Cont+Prov. 
+ Time Span 
Cont + Agri. 
Area+ Time 
Span 
Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
Control 
Variables 
Irri 0.09  0.13  0.12  0.05  0.07  0.27  0.13  0.05  
Dist 1.79  0.40  0.84  0.71  0.56  0.76  1.41  0.55  
Market 0.17  0.01  0.11  0.06  0.17  0.00  0.11  0.03  
Agri. 
Areas 
SW -23.47  0.26  -32.21  0.09    -19.41  0.02  
WWM -5.37  0.73  -8.28  0.57    -10.12  0.13  
WWG 5.49  0.69  -8.20  0.55    -4.27  0.55  
YRW  -2.51  0.76  -14.41  0.06    -6.65  0.29  
SzR  -13.96  0.13  0.00     1.81  0.80  
DCR  -10.19  0.21  4.45  0.06    -2.27  0.61  
SwR -23.86  0.03  -8.18  0.03    -4.21  0.26  
Prov. Kansu -5.72  0.80  18.28  0.31  -20.15  0.10    
Ningsia 0.00   0.00   0.00     
Shansi -25.52  0.18  0.96  0.95  -29.02  0.00    
Shensi -22.24  0.28  10.24  0.50  -31.08  0.07    
Suiyuan 0.00   0.00   0.00     
Tsinghai -9.61  0.70  25.03  0.19  -28.50  0.00    
Honan -28.92  0.11  1.56  0.91  -24.10  0.00    
Hopeh -17.88  0.33  9.93  0.48  -11.78  0.23    
Anhwei -24.42  0.02  3.29  0.71  -21.69  0.01    
Kiangsu -13.59  0.28  7.96  0.39  -12.42  0.08    
Liaoning 0.00   0.00   0.00     
Shantung -37.63  0.05  1.25  0.92  -30.51  0.01    
Chekiang -16.06  0.07  -3.32  0.45  -11.95  0.10    
Hupeh -9.05  0.31  -1.95  0.81  -13.00  0.02    
Kiangsi -16.26  0.15  -2.25  0.62  -11.81  0.21    
Fukien -21.87  0.02  -1.60  0.73  -21.06  0.01    
Szechwan 0.00   3.42  0.54  -10.38  0.17    
Kwangsi -6.86  0.56  -7.76  0.37  -12.06  0.27    
Kwangtung -9.98  0.24  -6.07  0.38  -14.36  0.10    
Kweichow 2.32  0.40  2.48  0.26  -17.30  0.06    
Yunnan 0.00   0.00   -19.44  0.03    
Time  2901-2912 11.99  0.13    7.77  0.23  5.09  0.60  
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Coefficient 
and P test 
Name of Ind. 
Variables    
Unrestricted 
OLS 
Cont+Agri. 
Area+ Prov. 
Cont+Prov. 
+ Time Span 
Cont + Agri. 
Area+ Time 
Span 
Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
Span 2901-3001 -25.35  0.01    -26.70  0.00  -23.07  0.01  
2902-3001 -7.44  0.51    -14.26  0.06  -14.21  0.11  
2910-3009 21.53  0.01    18.04  0.01  11.26  0.09  
2910-3010 0.47  0.96    -2.87  0.71  -4.55  0.63  
2911-3010 0.00     0.00   0.00   
2912-3012 0.00     0.00   0.00   
3001-3012 10.81  0.21    7.76  0.32  3.01  0.77  
3001-3102 19.55  0.08    16.94  0.08  0.59  0.95  
3002-3101 31.60  0.10    17.24  0.28  14.26  0.20  
3002-3102 32.97  0.00    24.86  0.00  15.43  0.10  
3010-3109 31.57  0.00    28.35  0.00  13.40  0.11  
3010-3110 -11.22  0.37    -17.45  0.05  -14.39  0.15  
3010-3111 14.02  0.16    14.50  0.20  2.87  0.77  
3011-3110 21.88  0.04    20.50  0.06  5.90  0.58  
3101-3112 21.29  0.01    18.08  0.01  11.32  0.22  
3101-3201 1.29  0.90    -4.55  0.63  -5.13  0.52  
3102-3202 -6.51  0.44    -7.05  0.32  -17.39  0.04  
3106-3205 -7.42  0.40    -10.24  0.17  -11.63  0.23  
3107-3206 34.22  0.00    37.38  0.02  28.36  0.01  
3107-3207 0.00     0.00   0.00   
3108-3208 18.02  0.03    17.15  0.02  8.91  0.36  
3109-3209 15.85  0.06    12.67  0.07  4.20  0.53  
3110-3209 -10.64  0.02    -9.26  0.04  -9.95  0.27  
3111-3210 0.00     0.00   3.29  0.71  
3111-3211 1.89  0.82    -1.39  0.84  -9.73  0.14  
3112-3212 11.20  0.19    8.44  0.24  0.81  0.91  
3201-3212 12.20  0.25    8.43  0.35  1.23  0.87  
3201-3301 17.84  0.11    13.18  0.14  5.08  0.52  
3202-3301 0.00     0.00   0.00   
3202-3302 16.50  0.10    14.02  0.12  -2.42  0.78  
3203-3302 -1.07  0.63    -1.02  0.62  4.37  0.49  
3205-3305 38.73  0.00    34.21  0.00  22.70  0.02  
3206-3305 2.41  0.82    -4.14  0.63  -9.98  0.26  
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Coefficient 
and P test 
Name of Ind. 
Variables    
Unrestricted 
OLS 
Cont+Agri. 
Area+ Prov. 
Cont+Prov. 
+ Time Span 
Cont + Agri. 
Area+ Time 
Span 
Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
3210-3309 -3.66  0.65    -4.16  0.57  -0.84  0.91  
Cons.  68.05  0.00  65.33  0.00  70.38  0.00  60.69  0.00  
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For Average Yield: 
1) Unrestricted OLS Regression with Control Variables 
regress  average_yield pct_crop_area_irri avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing 
spring_wheat winter_wheat_millet winter_wheat_gaoliang yangtze_rice_wheat szechwan_rice 
double_cropping_rice southwestern_rice kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw shansi_sw_wwm 
shensi_sw_wwm_sr suiyuan_sw tsinghai_sw honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg 
anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt kiangsu_wwg_yrw liaoning_sw_wwg shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw 
kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr fukien_rt_dcr szechwan_szr kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr kweichow_swr 
yunnan_swr yr1929_01_12 yr1929_01_1930_01 yr1929_02_1930_01 yr1929_10_1930_09 
yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 yr1929_12_1930_12 yr1930_01_12 yr1930_01_1931_02 
yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 yr1930_10_1931_09 yr1930_10_1931_10 yr1930_10_1931_11 
yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 yr1931_01_1932_01 yr1931_02_1932_02 yr1931_06_1932_05 
yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 yr1931_08_1932_08 yr1931_09_1932_09 yr1931_10_1932_09 
yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 yr1931_12_1932_12 yr1932_01_12 yr1932_01_1933_01 
yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 yr1932_03_1933_02 yr1932_05_1933_05 yr1932_06_1933_05 
yr1932_10_1933_09, r 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
2) Restricted regression with Control Variables, Agricultural Areas and Provinces 
regress  average_yield pct_crop_area_irri avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing 
spring_wheat winter_wheat_millet winter_wheat_gaoliang yangtze_rice_wheat szechwan_rice 
double_cropping_rice southwestern_rice kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw shansi_sw_wwm 
shensi_sw_wwm_sr suiyuan_sw tsinghai_sw honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg 
anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt kiangsu_wwg_yrw liaoning_sw_wwg shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw 
kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr fukien_rt_dcr szechwan_szr kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr kweichow_swr 
yunnan_swr, r 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.9200
         chi2(1)      =     0.01
         Variables: fitted values of average_yield
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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3) Restricted regression with Control Variables, Provinces and Time Span 
regress  average_yield pct_crop_area_irri avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing 
kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw shansi_sw_wwm shensi_sw_wwm_sr suiyuan_sw tsinghai_sw 
honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt kiangsu_wwg_yrw liaoning_sw_wwg 
shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr fukien_rt_dcr szechwan_szr 
kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr kweichow_swr yunnan_swr yr1929_01_12 yr1929_01_1930_01 
yr1929_02_1930_01 yr1929_10_1930_09 yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 yr1929_12_1930_12 
yr1930_01_12 yr1930_01_1931_02 yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 yr1930_10_1931_09 
yr1930_10_1931_10 yr1930_10_1931_11 yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 yr1931_01_1932_01 
yr1931_02_1932_02 yr1931_06_1932_05 yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 yr1931_08_1932_08 
yr1931_09_1932_09 yr1931_10_1932_09 yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 yr1931_12_1932_12 
yr1932_01_12 yr1932_01_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 yr1932_03_1933_02 
yr1932_05_1933_05 yr1932_06_1933_05 yr1932_10_1933_09, r 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
4) Restricted regression with Control Variables, Agricultural Areas and Time Span 
regress  average_yield pct_crop_area_irri avg_dist_of_farthest_parcels_km total_mwd_pfn_in_marketing 
spring_wheat winter_wheat_millet winter_wheat_gaoliang yangtze_rice_wheat szechwan_rice 
double_cropping_rice southwestern_rice yr1929_01_12 yr1929_01_1930_01 yr1929_02_1930_01 
yr1929_10_1930_09 yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 yr1929_12_1930_12 yr1930_01_12 
yr1930_01_1931_02 yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 yr1930_10_1931_09 yr1930_10_1931_10 
yr1930_10_1931_11 yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 yr1931_01_1932_01 yr1931_02_1932_02 
yr1931_06_1932_05 yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 yr1931_08_1932_08 yr1931_09_1932_09 
yr1931_10_1932_09 yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 yr1931_12_1932_12 yr1932_01_12 
yr1932_01_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 yr1932_03_1933_02 yr1932_05_1933_05 
yr1932_06_1933_05 yr1932_10_1933_09, r 
 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0517
         chi2(1)      =     3.78
         Variables: fitted values of average_yield
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0084
         chi2(1)      =     6.94
         Variables: fitted values of average_yield
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
 
  
         Prob > chi2  =   0.5547
         chi2(1)      =     0.35
         Variables: fitted values of average_yield
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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Table A-6 Summary of Four Sets Regressions for Average Yield 
Coefficient 
and P test 
Name of Ind. 
Variables    
Unrestricted OLS Cont+Agri 
Area+ Prov. 
Cont+Prov. 
+ Time Span 
Cont + Agri 
Area+ Time 
Span 
Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
Control 
Variables 
Irri 0.08  0.42  0.15  0.06  0.04  0.72  0.14  0.11  
Dist 5.00  0.18  3.13  0.31  3.18  0.30  4.68  0.16  
Market 0.17  0.02  0.08  0.27  0.17  0.01  0.09  0.18  
Agri. 
Areas 
SW -23.73  0.45  -21.53  0.44    -14.78  0.22  
WWM 1.82  0.92  9.77  0.60    -1.06  0.91  
WWG 15.10  0.34  10.00  0.55    8.12  0.41  
YRW  1.93  0.85  -8.08  0.36    -0.20  0.98  
SzR  -8.05  0.33  0.00     -0.27  0.98  
DCR  -1.02  0.93  2.70  0.38    -4.93  0.44  
SwR -3.43  0.77  -9.36  0.09    1.67  0.78  
Prov. Kansu 18.37  0.57  18.76  0.51  6.70  0.74    
Ningsia 0.00   0.00   0.00     
Shansi -18.44  0.35  -11.99  0.51  -15.32  0.14    
Shensi -17.53  0.43  -4.04  0.84  -21.98  0.31    
Suiyuan 0.00   0.00   0.00     
Tsinghai 1.85  0.96  13.36  0.64  -16.54  0.03    
Honan -14.78  0.41  -7.59  0.66  -0.92  0.89    
Hopeh -6.95  0.71  -1.24  0.94  8.57  0.49    
Anhwei -7.27  0.54  -0.69  0.95  0.92  0.91    
Kiangsu -1.39  0.91  1.95  0.85  5.61  0.29    
Liaoning 0.00   0.00   0.00     
Shantung -32.27  0.11  -8.28  0.61  -16.38  0.21    
Chekiang -11.22  0.27  -7.14  0.28  -5.35  0.55    
Hupeh -16.19  0.13  8.05  0.39  -17.02  0.04    
Kiangsi 6.50  0.62  -2.35  0.73  12.54  0.26    
Fukien -9.31  0.40  -1.74  0.79  -2.90  0.74    
Szechwan 0.00   -1.51  0.80  -3.78  0.57    
Kwangsi -3.03  0.78  -15.90  0.09  2.88  0.79    
Kwangtung -1.73  0.84  -6.21  0.52  4.51  0.63    
Kweichow 10.37  0.00  10.81  0.00  12.37  0.21    
Yunnan 0.00   0.00   2.33  0.81    
Time  2901-2912 -4.55  0.50    -10.18  0.03  -4.26  0.63  
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Coefficient 
and P test 
Name of Ind. 
Variables    
Unrestricted OLS Cont+Agri 
Area+ Prov. 
Cont+Prov. 
+ Time Span 
Cont + Agri 
Area+ Time 
Span 
Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
Span 2901-3001 -67.39  0.00    -69.77  0.00  -55.72  0.00  
2902-3001 -18.49  0.14    -22.72  0.02  -24.00  0.01  
2910-3009 5.34  0.59    0.36  0.97  -1.53  0.71  
2910-3010 -20.30  0.02    -24.64  0.00  -17.36  0.09  
2911-3010 0.00     0.00   0.00   
2912-3012 0.00     0.00   0.00   
3001-3012 -9.71  0.22    -13.74  0.05  -9.54  0.37  
3001-3102 13.25  0.24    10.36  0.29  -2.60  0.81  
3002-3101 15.65  0.56    -3.87  0.84  -1.35  0.92  
3002-3102 3.40  0.80    -3.64  0.68  7.02  0.39  
3010-3109 10.47  0.28    6.51  0.42  -4.03  0.58  
3010-3110 -30.51  0.05    -34.52  0.01  -30.44  0.01  
3010-3111 8.18  0.47    9.66  0.50  1.25  0.91  
3011-3110 4.78  0.67    3.48  0.77  -7.72  0.47  
3101-3112 0.44  0.96    -3.20  0.57  -1.32  0.88  
3101-3201 -7.10  0.68    -15.06  0.40  -2.70  0.72  
3102-3202 -39.60  0.00    -40.81  0.00  -38.63  0.00  
3106-3205 -43.05  0.00    -46.77  0.00  -38.87  0.00  
3107-3206 8.58  0.52    13.39  0.46  7.14  0.47  
3107-3207 0.00     0.00   0.00   
3108-3208 -0.89  0.90    -3.30  0.58  -1.28  0.84  
3109-3209 17.37  0.05    13.10  0.12  8.29  0.04  
3110-3209 8.06  0.23    10.72  0.13  -1.89  0.85  
3111-3210 0.00     0.00   -5.35  0.62  
3111-3211 -17.26  0.06    -21.67  0.01  -26.29  0.00  
3112-3212 -7.32  0.44    -11.17  0.21  -14.52  0.00  
3201-3212 -16.42  0.17    -21.40  0.04  -9.86  0.12  
3201-3301 6.29  0.61    0.91  0.93  11.60  0.09  
3202-3301 0.00     0.00   0.00   
3202-3302 -1.99  0.84    -4.75  0.58  -17.64  0.02  
3203-3302 -14.87  0.00    -14.77  0.00  -11.04  0.00  
3205-3305 4.56  0.70    -0.38  0.97  1.29  0.90  
3206-3305 -17.59  0.17    -26.36  0.01  -14.61  0.17  
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Coefficient 
and P test 
Name of Ind. 
Variables    
Unrestricted OLS Cont+Agri 
Area+ Prov. 
Cont+Prov. 
+ Time Span 
Cont + Agri 
Area+ Time 
Span 
Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
3210-3309 -16.20  0.01    -16.65  0.00  -7.07  0.34  
Cons.  99.11  0.00  89.00  0.00  103.12  0.00  91.39  0.00  
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Four Regressions with Time Span 
For Ratio of Average to Normal: 
1) Restricted Regression with Provinces and Time Span 
regress  ratio_avg_to_normal kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw shansi_sw_wwm shensi_sw_wwm_sr 
suiyuan_sw tsinghai_sw honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt 
kiangsu_wwg_yrw liaoning_sw_wwg shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr 
fukien_rt_dcr szechwan_szr kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr kweichow_swr yunnan_swr yr1929_01_12 
yr1929_01_1930_01 yr1929_02_1930_01 yr1929_10_1930_09 yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 
yr1929_12_1930_12 yr1930_01_12 yr1930_01_1931_02 yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 
yr1930_10_1931_09 yr1930_10_1931_10 yr1930_10_1931_11 yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 
yr1931_01_1932_01 yr1931_02_1932_02 yr1931_06_1932_05 yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 
yr1931_08_1932_08 yr1931_09_1932_09 yr1931_10_1932_09 yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 
yr1931_12_1932_12 yr1932_01_12 yr1932_01_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 
yr1932_03_1933_02 yr1932_05_1933_05 yr1932_06_1933_05 yr1932_10_1933_09, r 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
 
  
         Prob > chi2  =   0.1010
         chi2(1)      =     2.69
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_normal
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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TableA-7 Coefficient and Covariance of Time Span and Provinces for the Ratio 
of Average to Normal (1) 
Province 
        Coefficient 
 
Year, Month                  
Coefficient    
Kansu 
sw 
wwm 
Ningsia 
sw 
Shansi 
sw 
wwm 
Shensi 
sw 
wwm sr 
Suiyuan 
sw 
Tsinghai 
sw 
Honan 
wwm 
wwg 
yrw 
-4.40  6.51  -15.75  -21.51  2.44  -10.92  -10.48  
2901-2912 6.00  1.60  12.51  -9.75  -15.51  8.44  -4.92  -4.48  
2901-3001 -32.73  -37.13  -26.22  -48.48  -54.24  -30.29  -43.65  -43.21  
2902-3001 3.08  -1.33  9.58  -12.67  -18.43  5.52  -7.84  -7.40  
2910-3009 13.02  8.61  19.52  -2.73  -8.49  15.46  2.10  2.54  
2910-3010 9.58  5.18  16.09  -6.16  -11.93  12.02  -1.33  -0.90  
2911-3010 5.95  1.55  12.45  -9.80  -15.56  8.39  -4.97  -4.53  
2912-3012 26.78  22.38  33.29  11.04  5.27  29.22  15.87  16.30  
3001-3012 9.21  4.81  15.72  -6.53  -12.30  11.65  -1.70  -1.27  
3001-3102 14.75  10.35  21.25  -1.00  -6.76  17.19  3.83  4.27  
3002-3101 16.50  12.10  23.01  0.75  -5.01  18.94  5.58  6.02  
3002-3102 19.10  14.70  25.61  3.35  -2.41  21.54  8.18  8.62  
3010-3109 29.42  25.02  35.93  13.68  7.91  31.86  18.50  18.94  
3010-3110 -27.28  -31.69  -20.78  -43.03  -48.79  -24.84  -38.20  -37.76  
3010-3111 17.97  13.56  24.47  2.22  -3.54  20.41  7.05  7.49  
3011-3110 14.57  10.17  21.08  -1.17  -6.94  17.01  3.65  4.09  
3101-3112 16.06  11.66  22.56  0.31  -5.45  18.50  5.14  5.58  
3101-3201 -3.99  -8.40  2.51  -19.74  -25.51  -1.56  -14.91  -14.48  
3102-3202 -2.34  -6.75  4.16  -18.09  -23.85  0.09  -13.26  -12.83  
3106-3205 -7.32  -11.72  -0.81  -23.06  -28.83  -4.88  -18.23  -17.80  
3107-3206 22.30  17.90  28.81  6.55  0.79  24.74  11.38  11.82  
3107-3207 12.67  8.27  19.18  -3.08  -8.84  15.11  1.75  2.19  
3108-3208 14.15  9.75  20.66  -1.59  -7.36  16.59  3.23  3.67  
3109-3209 16.02  11.61  22.52  0.27  -5.49  18.46  5.10  5.54  
3110-3209 -23.28  -27.69  -16.78  -39.03  -44.79  -20.85  -34.20  -33.77  
3111-3210 -13.58  -17.99  -7.08  -29.33  -35.09  -11.15  -24.50  -24.07  
3111-3211 -6.18  -10.59  0.32  -21.93  -27.69  -3.74  -17.10  -16.66  
3112-3212 7.52  3.11  14.02  -8.23  -13.99  9.96  -3.40  -2.96  
3201-3212 10.08  5.68  16.59  -5.66  -11.43  12.52  -0.84  -0.40  
3201-3301 21.44  17.03  27.94  5.69  -0.07  23.87  10.52  10.95  
3202-3301 13.59  9.19  20.10  -2.16  -7.92  16.03  2.67  3.11  
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Province 
        Coefficient 
 
Year, Month                  
Coefficient    
Kansu 
sw 
wwm 
Ningsia 
sw 
Shansi 
sw 
wwm 
Shensi 
sw 
wwm sr 
Suiyuan 
sw 
Tsinghai 
sw 
Honan 
wwm 
wwg 
yrw 
-4.40  6.51  -15.75  -21.51  2.44  -10.92  -10.48  
3202-3302 5.85  1.45  12.35  -9.90  -15.66  8.29  -5.07  -4.63  
3203-3302 3.96  -0.44  10.47  -11.78  -17.55  6.40  -6.95  -6.52  
3205-3305 32.12  27.72  38.63  16.38  10.61  34.56  21.20  21.64  
3206-3305 -4.99  -9.40  1.51  -20.74  -26.50  -2.56  -15.91  -15.48  
3210-3309 2.42  -1.98  8.93  -13.33  -19.09  4.86  -8.50  -8.06  
 
TableA-7 Coefficient and Covariance of Time Span and Provinces for the Ratio 
of Average to Normal (2) 
Province 
       Coefficient 
 
Year, Month                  
Coefficient    
Hopeh 
wwm 
wwg 
Anhwei 
wwg 
yrw rt 
Kiangsu 
wwg yrw 
Liaoning 
sw wwg 
Shantung 
wwg 
Che 
-kiang 
yrw rt 
Hupeh 
yrw 
3.22  -9.83  -10.19  -21.93  -12.46  -5.13  3.97  
2901-2912 6.00  9.22  -3.83  -4.19  -15.92  -6.46  0.87  9.97  
2901-3001 -32.73  -29.51  -42.56  -42.92  -54.65  -45.19  -37.86  -28.76  
2902-3001 3.08  6.30  -6.76  -7.12  -18.85  -9.38  -2.05  7.05  
2910-3009 13.02  16.24  3.18  2.82  -8.91  0.56  7.89  16.99  
2910-3010 9.58  12.80  -0.25  -0.61  -12.34  -2.88  4.46  13.56  
2911-3010 5.95  9.17  -3.88  -4.25  -15.98  -6.51  0.82  9.92  
2912-3012 26.78  30.00  16.95  16.59  4.86  14.32  21.66  30.76  
3001-3012 9.21  12.43  -0.62  -0.98  -12.71  -3.24  4.09  13.19  
3001-3102 14.75  17.97  4.92  4.55  -7.18  2.29  9.62  18.72  
3002-3101 16.50  19.72  6.67  6.31  -5.43  4.04  11.37  20.47  
3002-3102 19.10  22.32  9.27  8.91  -2.82  6.64  13.97  23.07  
3010-3109 29.42  32.64  19.59  19.23  7.50  16.96  24.30  33.40  
3010-3110 -27.28  -24.06  -37.12  -37.48  -49.21  -39.74  -32.41  -23.31  
3010-3111 17.97  21.19  8.13  7.77  -3.96  5.51  12.84  21.94  
3011-3110 14.57  17.79  4.74  4.38  -7.35  2.11  9.45  18.55  
3101-3112 16.06  19.28  6.22  5.86  -5.87  3.60  10.93  20.03  
3101-3201 -3.99  -0.78  -13.83  -14.19  -25.92  -16.45  -9.12  -0.02  
3102-3202 -2.34  0.87  -12.18  -12.54  -24.27  -14.80  -7.47  1.63  
3106-3205 -7.32  -4.10  -17.15  -17.51  -29.24  -19.78  -12.44  -3.34  
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Province 
       Coefficient 
 
Year, Month                  
Coefficient    
Hopeh 
wwm 
wwg 
Anhwei 
wwg 
yrw rt 
Kiangsu 
wwg yrw 
Liaoning 
sw wwg 
Shantung 
wwg 
Che 
-kiang 
yrw rt 
Hupeh 
yrw 
3.22  -9.83  -10.19  -21.93  -12.46  -5.13  3.97  
3107-3206 22.30  25.52  12.47  12.10  0.37  9.84  17.17  26.27  
3107-3207 12.67  15.89  2.84  2.48  -9.25  0.21  7.54  16.64  
3108-3208 14.15  17.37  4.32  3.96  -7.77  1.69  9.03  18.13  
3109-3209 16.02  19.24  6.18  5.82  -5.91  3.56  10.89  19.99  
3110-3209 -23.28  -20.07  -33.12  -33.48  -45.21  -35.74  -28.41  -19.31  
3111-3210 -13.58  -10.37  -23.42  -23.78  -35.51  -26.04  -18.71  -9.61  
3111-3211 -6.18  -2.96  -16.02  -16.38  -28.11  -18.64  -11.31  -2.21  
3112-3212 7.52  10.74  -2.32  -2.68  -14.41  -4.94  2.39  11.49  
3201-3212 10.08  13.30  0.25  -0.11  -11.84  -2.38  4.96  14.06  
3201-3301 21.44  24.65  11.60  11.24  -0.49  8.98  16.31  25.41  
3202-3301 13.59  16.81  3.76  3.39  -8.34  1.13  8.46  17.56  
3202-3302 5.85  9.07  -3.98  -4.35  -16.08  -6.61  0.72  9.82  
3203-3302 3.96  7.18  -5.87  -6.23  -17.96  -8.50  -1.16  7.94  
3205-3305 32.12  35.34  22.29  21.93  10.20  19.66  27.00  36.10  
3206-3305 -4.99  -1.78  -14.83  -15.19  -26.92  -17.45  -10.12  -1.02  
3210-3309 2.42  5.64  -7.41  -7.78  -19.51  -10.04  -2.71  6.39  
 
TableA-7 Coefficient and Covariance of Time Span and Provinces for the Ratio 
of Average to Normal (3) 
Province 
        Coefficient 
Year, Month                  
Coefficient    
Kiangsi 
yrw rt dcr 
Fukien 
rt dcr 
Szechwan 
szr 
Kwangsi 
rt dcr 
Kwang 
-tung 
dcr 
Kweichow 
swr 
Yunnan 
swr 
-1.40  1.55  3.87  -4.82  -4.39  -1.68  -5.26  
2901-2912 6.00  4.60  7.55  9.87  1.18  1.62  4.33  0.74  
2901-3001 -32.73  -34.13  -31.18  -28.86  -37.55  -37.11  -34.40  -37.99  
2902-3001 3.08  1.68  4.63  6.95  -1.74  -1.31  1.40  -2.18  
2910-3009 13.02  11.62  14.57  16.89  8.20  8.63  11.34  7.76  
2910-3010 9.58  8.19  11.14  13.46  4.76  5.20  7.91  4.33  
2911-3010 5.95  4.55  7.50  9.82  1.13  1.56  4.27  0.69  
2912-3012 26.78  25.39  28.34  30.66  21.96  22.40  25.11  21.53  
3001-3012 9.21  7.82  10.77  13.09  4.39  4.83  7.54  3.96  
3001-3102 14.75  13.35  16.30  18.62  9.93  10.36  13.07  9.49  
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Province 
        Coefficient 
Year, Month                  
Coefficient    
Kiangsi 
yrw rt dcr 
Fukien 
rt dcr 
Szechwan 
szr 
Kwangsi 
rt dcr 
Kwang 
-tung 
dcr 
Kweichow 
swr 
Yunnan 
swr 
-1.40  1.55  3.87  -4.82  -4.39  -1.68  -5.26  
3002-3101 16.50  15.10  18.05  20.37  11.68  12.11  14.82  11.24  
3002-3102 19.10  17.70  20.65  22.97  14.28  14.72  17.43  13.84  
3010-3109 29.42  28.02  30.98  33.29  24.60  25.04  27.75  24.16  
3010-3110 -27.28  -28.68  -25.73  -23.41  -32.10  -31.67  -28.96  -32.54  
3010-3111 17.97  16.57  19.52  21.84  13.15  13.58  16.29  12.71  
3011-3110 14.57  13.17  16.13  18.44  9.75  10.19  12.90  9.31  
3101-3112 16.06  14.66  17.61  19.93  11.24  11.67  14.38  10.80  
3101-3201 -3.99  -5.39  -2.44  -0.12  -8.82  -8.38  -5.67  -9.25  
3102-3202 -2.34  -3.74  -0.79  1.53  -7.17  -6.73  -4.02  -7.60  
3106-3205 -7.32  -8.71  -5.76  -3.44  -12.14  -11.70  -8.99  -12.57  
3107-3206 22.30  20.90  23.85  26.17  17.48  17.91  20.62  17.04  
3107-3207 12.67  11.27  14.22  16.54  7.85  8.28  11.00  7.41  
3108-3208 14.15  12.75  15.71  18.02  9.33  9.77  12.48  8.89  
3109-3209 16.02  14.62  17.57  19.89  11.20  11.63  14.34  10.76  
3110-3209 -23.28  -24.68  -21.73  -19.41  -28.10  -27.67  -24.96  -28.54  
3111-3210 -13.58  -14.98  -12.03  -9.71  -18.40  -17.97  -15.26  -18.84  
3111-3211 -6.18  -7.58  -4.63  -2.31  -11.00  -10.57  -7.86  -11.44  
3112-3212 7.52  6.12  9.07  11.39  2.70  3.13  5.84  2.26  
3201-3212 10.08  8.69  11.64  13.96  5.26  5.70  8.41  4.82  
3201-3301 21.44  20.04  22.99  25.31  16.61  17.05  19.76  16.18  
3202-3301 13.59  12.19  15.14  17.46  8.77  9.20  11.91  8.33  
3202-3302 5.85  4.45  7.40  9.72  1.03  1.46  4.17  0.59  
3203-3302 3.96  2.57  5.52  7.84  -0.86  -0.42  2.29  -1.30  
3205-3305 32.12  30.72  33.68  35.99  27.30  27.74  30.45  26.86  
3206-3305 -4.99  -6.39  -3.44  -1.12  -9.81  -9.38  -6.67  -10.25  
3210-3309 2.42  1.02  3.97  6.29  -2.40  -1.97  0.74  -2.84  
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2) Restricted Regression with Agricultural Areas and Time Span 
regress  ratio_avg_to_normal spring_wheat winter_wheat_millet winter_wheat_gaoliang 
yangtze_rice_wheat szechwan_rice double_cropping_rice southwestern_rice yr1929_01_12 
yr1929_01_1930_01 yr1929_02_1930_01 yr1929_10_1930_09 yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 
yr1929_12_1930_12 yr1930_01_12 yr1930_01_1931_02 yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 
yr1930_10_1931_09 yr1930_10_1931_10 yr1930_10_1931_11 yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 
yr1931_01_1932_01 yr1931_02_1932_02 yr1931_06_1932_05 yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 
yr1931_08_1932_08 yr1931_09_1932_09 yr1931_10_1932_09 yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 
yr1931_12_1932_12 yr1932_01_12 yr1932_01_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 
yr1932_03_1933_02 yr1932_05_1933_05 yr1932_06_1933_05 yr1932_10_1933_09, r 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2819
         chi2(1)      =     1.16
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_normal
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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Table A-8 Coefficient and Covariance of Time Span and Agricultural Areas for 
the Ratio of Average to Normal 
Agricultural Area 
         Coefficient 
Year, Month                  
Coefficient    
Spring 
wheat 
Winter 
Wheat 
millet 
Winter 
Wheat 
gaoliang 
Yangtze 
Rice wheat 
Szechwan 
rice 
Double 
Cropping rice 
South 
-western 
rice 
-8.41  -14.93  -5.59  -8.08  3.35  -1.87  -1.68  
2901-2912 7.15  -1.26  -7.77  1.56  -0.93  10.51  5.28  5.48  
2901-3001 -23.74  -32.15  -38.67  -29.33  -31.82  -20.39  -25.61  -25.42  
2902-3001 5.51  -2.90  -9.42  -0.08  -2.57  8.86  3.64  3.83  
2910-3009 8.07  -0.34  -6.86  2.48  -0.01  11.42  6.20  6.39  
2910-3010 7.65  -0.76  -7.28  2.06  -0.43  11.00  5.78  5.97  
2911-3010 -0.74  -9.15  -15.67  -6.33  -8.82  2.61  -2.61  -2.42  
2912-3012 24.85  16.44  9.92  19.26  16.77  28.20  22.98  23.17  
3001-3012 8.86  0.45  -6.07  3.27  0.78  12.21  6.99  7.18  
3001-3102 8.06  -0.35  -6.87  2.47  -0.02  11.41  6.19  6.38  
3002-3101 3.58  -4.83  -11.35  -2.01  -4.50  6.93  1.71  1.90  
3002-3102 18.75  10.34  3.82  13.16  10.67  22.10  16.87  17.07  
3010-3109 13.74  5.33  -1.19  8.14  5.66  17.09  11.86  12.06  
3010-3110 -24.15  -32.56  -39.08  -29.74  -32.23  -20.80  -26.02  -25.83  
3010-3111 14.45  6.04  -0.48  8.86  6.37  17.80  12.57  12.77  
3011-3110 8.29  -0.12  -6.64  2.70  0.21  11.64  6.42  6.61  
3101-3112 17.66  9.25  2.74  12.07  9.58  21.02  15.79  15.99  
3101-3201 -4.38  -12.79  -19.30  -9.97  -12.46  -1.02  -6.25  -6.05  
3102-3202 5.65  -2.76  -9.28  0.06  -2.43  9.01  3.78  3.97  
3106-3205 -9.25  -17.66  -24.18  -14.84  -17.33  -5.90  -11.12  -10.93  
3107-3206 19.45  11.04  4.52  13.86  11.37  22.80  17.57  17.77  
3107-3207 16.27  7.87  1.35  10.68  8.20  19.63  14.40  14.60  
3108-3208 10.53  2.12  -4.40  4.94  2.45  13.88  8.65  8.85  
3109-3209 11.07  2.66  -3.86  5.48  2.99  14.42  9.20  9.39  
3110-3209 -11.05  -19.46  -25.98  -16.64  -19.13  -7.70  -12.92  -12.73  
3111-3210 -1.35  -9.76  -16.28  -6.94  -9.43  2.00  -3.22  -3.03  
3111-3211 -11.13  -19.54  -26.06  -16.72  -19.21  -7.78  -13.00  -12.81  
3112-3212 2.57  -5.84  -12.36  -3.02  -5.51  5.92  0.70  0.89  
3201-3212 8.14  -0.27  -6.78  2.55  0.06  11.50  6.27  6.46  
3201-3301 19.10  10.69  4.17  13.51  11.02  22.46  17.23  17.42  
3202-3301 13.77  5.36  -1.16  8.18  5.69  17.12  11.90  12.09  
3202-3302 -0.84  -9.25  -15.77  -6.43  -8.92  2.51  -2.71  -2.52  
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Agricultural Area 
         Coefficient 
Year, Month                  
Coefficient    
Spring 
wheat 
Winter 
Wheat 
millet 
Winter 
Wheat 
gaoliang 
Yangtze 
Rice wheat 
Szechwan 
rice 
Double 
Cropping rice 
South 
-western 
rice 
-8.41  -14.93  -5.59  -8.08  3.35  -1.87  -1.68  
3203-3302 4.14  -4.27  -10.78  -1.45  -3.94  7.50  2.27  2.46  
3205-3305 30.55  22.14  15.62  24.96  22.47  33.90  28.68  28.87  
3206-3305 -2.35  -10.76  -17.28  -7.94  -10.43  1.00  -4.22  -4.03  
3210-3309 0.36  -8.05  -14.57  -5.23  -7.72  3.71  -1.51  -1.32  
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For Ratio of Average to Best: 
1) Restricted Regression with Provinces and Time Span 
regress  ratio_avg_to_best kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw shansi_sw_wwm shensi_sw_wwm_sr suiyuan_sw 
tsinghai_sw honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt kiangsu_wwg_yrw 
liaoning_sw_wwg shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr fukien_rt_dcr 
szechwan_szr kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr kweichow_swr yunnan_swr yr1929_01_12 
yr1929_01_1930_01 yr1929_02_1930_01 yr1929_10_1930_09 yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 
yr1929_12_1930_12 yr1930_01_12 yr1930_01_1931_02 yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 
yr1930_10_1931_09 yr1930_10_1931_10 yr1930_10_1931_11 yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 
yr1931_01_1932_01 yr1931_02_1932_02 yr1931_06_1932_05 yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 
yr1931_08_1932_08 yr1931_09_1932_09 yr1931_10_1932_09 yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 
yr1931_12_1932_12 yr1932_01_12 yr1932_01_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 
yr1932_03_1933_02 yr1932_05_1933_05 yr1932_06_1933_05 yr1932_10_1933_09, r 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
  
         Prob > chi2  =   0.5088
         chi2(1)      =     0.44
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_best
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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Table A-9 Coefficient and Covariance of Time Span and Provinces for the Ratio 
of Average to Best (1) 
Province 
       Coefficient 
 
Year, Month                  
Coefficient    
Kansu 
sw 
wwm 
Ningsia 
sw 
Shansi 
sw wwm 
Shensi 
sw wwm 
sr 
Suiyuan 
sw 
Tsinghai 
sw 
Honan 
wwm 
wwg 
yrw 
-24.76  -13.23  -30.06  -27.74  -13.46  -26.67  -27.46  
2901-2912 7.98  -16.78  -5.25  -22.07  -19.76  -5.48  -18.69  -19.48  
2901-3001 -20.50  -45.25  -33.73  -50.55  -48.24  -33.96  -47.17  -47.96  
2902-3001 5.16  -19.59  -8.07  -24.89  -22.58  -8.30  -21.51  -22.30  
2910-3009 23.53  -1.22  10.30  -6.52  -4.21  10.07  -3.14  -3.93  
2910-3010 10.00  -14.76  -3.23  -20.06  -17.74  -3.46  -16.68  -17.46  
2911-3010 6.88  -17.87  -6.35  -23.17  -20.86  -6.58  -19.79  -20.58  
2912-3012 20.80  -3.96  7.57  -9.26  -6.94  7.34  -5.88  -6.66  
3001-3012 13.49  -11.27  0.26  -16.57  -14.25  0.03  -13.18  -13.97  
3001-3102 15.12  -9.64  1.89  -14.94  -12.63  1.66  -11.56  -12.34  
3002-3101 12.77  -11.99  -0.47  -17.29  -14.98  -0.70  -13.91  -14.69  
3002-3102 21.57  -3.19  8.34  -8.49  -6.17  8.11  -5.10  -5.89  
3010-3109 34.39  9.63  21.16  4.33  6.65  20.93  7.71  6.93  
3010-3110 -15.77  -40.52  -29.00  -45.82  -43.51  -29.23  -42.44  -43.23  
3010-3111 10.37  -14.39  -2.86  -19.68  -17.37  -3.09  -16.30  -17.09  
3011-3110 17.47  -7.29  4.24  -12.59  -10.27  4.01  -9.20  -9.99  
3101-3112 19.95  -4.81  6.71  -10.11  -7.80  6.49  -6.73  -7.51  
3101-3201 4.01  -20.75  -9.23  -26.05  -23.74  -9.45  -22.67  -23.45  
3102-3202 5.97  -18.79  -7.27  -24.09  -21.78  -7.49  -20.71  -21.49  
3106-3205 0.80  -23.96  -12.43  -29.26  -26.94  -12.66  -25.88  -26.66  
3107-3206 27.87  3.11  14.64  -2.19  0.13  14.41  1.20  0.41  
3107-3207 13.92  -10.83  0.69  -16.13  -13.82  0.46  -12.75  -13.53  
3108-3208 19.53  -5.23  6.30  -10.53  -8.21  6.07  -7.14  -7.93  
3109-3209 18.73  -6.02  5.50  -11.32  -9.01  5.27  -7.94  -8.73  
3110-3209 -12.01  -36.76  -25.24  -42.06  -39.75  -25.47  -38.68  -39.46  
3111-3210 -8.41  -33.16  -21.64  -38.46  -36.15  -21.87  -35.08  -35.86  
3111-3211 5.03  -19.72  -8.20  -25.02  -22.71  -8.43  -21.64  -22.43  
3112-3212 14.23  -10.52  1.00  -15.82  -13.51  0.77  -12.44  -13.23  
3201-3212 15.55  -9.20  2.32  -14.50  -12.19  2.09  -11.12  -11.91  
3201-3301 21.81  -2.95  8.58  -8.25  -5.93  8.35  -4.87  -5.65  
3202-3301 10.42  -14.34  -2.81  -19.64  -17.32  -3.04  -16.25  -17.04  
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Province 
       Coefficient 
 
Year, Month                  
Coefficient    
Kansu 
sw 
wwm 
Ningsia 
sw 
Shansi 
sw wwm 
Shensi 
sw wwm 
sr 
Suiyuan 
sw 
Tsinghai 
sw 
Honan 
wwm 
wwg 
yrw 
-24.76  -13.23  -30.06  -27.74  -13.46  -26.67  -27.46  
3202-3302 9.18  -15.57  -4.05  -20.87  -18.56  -4.28  -17.49  -18.28  
3203-3302 2.95  -21.81  -10.28  -27.11  -24.79  -10.51  -23.73  -24.51  
3205-3305 39.08  14.32  25.85  9.02  11.33  25.62  12.40  11.62  
3206-3305 1.57  -23.19  -11.66  -28.49  -26.17  -11.89  -25.10  -25.89  
3210-3309 0.51  -24.25  -12.73  -29.55  -27.24  -12.95  -26.17  -26.95  
 
Table A-9 Coefficient and Covariance of Time Span and Provinces for the Ratio 
of Average to Best (2) 
Province 
         Coefficient 
Year, Month                  
Coefficient    
Hopeh 
wwm 
wwg 
Anhwei 
wwg 
yrw rt 
Kiangsu 
wwg yrw 
Liaoning 
sw wwg 
Shantung 
wwg 
Chekiang 
yrw rt 
Hupeh 
yrw 
-14.68  -23.26  -21.28  -18.17  -26.56  -15.61  -7.17  
2901-2912 7.98  -6.70  -15.27  -13.29  -10.19  -18.58  -7.63  0.81  
2901-3001 -20.50  -35.18  -43.75  -41.77  -38.67  -47.06  -36.11  -27.67  
2902-3001 5.16  -9.52  -18.09  -16.11  -13.01  -21.40  -10.45  -2.01  
2910-3009 23.53  8.85  0.28  2.26  5.36  -3.03  7.92  16.36  
2910-3010 10.00  -4.68  -13.26  -11.28  -8.17  -16.56  -5.61  2.83  
2911-3010 6.88  -7.80  -16.37  -14.39  -11.29  -19.68  -8.73  -0.29  
2912-3012 20.80  6.12  -2.46  -0.48  2.63  -5.76  5.19  13.63  
3001-3012 13.49  -1.19  -9.76  -7.79  -4.68  -13.07  -2.12  6.32  
3001-3102 15.12  0.44  -8.14  -6.16  -3.05  -11.44  -0.49  7.94  
3002-3101 12.77  -1.92  -10.49  -8.51  -5.40  -13.80  -2.85  5.59  
3002-3102 21.57  6.89  -1.68  0.30  3.40  -4.99  5.96  14.40  
3010-3109 34.39  19.71  11.13  13.11  16.22  7.83  18.78  27.22  
3010-3110 -15.77  -30.45  -39.02  -37.04  -33.94  -42.33  -31.38  -22.94  
3010-3111 10.37  -4.31  -12.88  -10.90  -7.80  -16.19  -5.24  3.20  
3011-3110 17.47  2.79  -5.79  -3.81  -0.70  -9.09  1.86  10.30  
3101-3112 19.95  5.26  -3.31  -1.33  1.78  -6.62  4.34  12.77  
3101-3201 4.01  -10.68  -19.25  -17.27  -14.16  -22.56  -11.60  -3.17  
3102-3202 5.97  -8.72  -17.29  -15.31  -12.20  -20.60  -9.64  -1.21  
3106-3205 0.80  -13.88  -22.46  -20.48  -17.37  -25.76  -14.81  -6.37  
3107-3206 27.87  13.19  4.61  6.59  9.70  1.31  12.26  20.70  
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Province 
         Coefficient 
Year, Month                  
Coefficient    
Hopeh 
wwm 
wwg 
Anhwei 
wwg 
yrw rt 
Kiangsu 
wwg yrw 
Liaoning 
sw wwg 
Shantung 
wwg 
Chekiang 
yrw rt 
Hupeh 
yrw 
-14.68  -23.26  -21.28  -18.17  -26.56  -15.61  -7.17  
3107-3207 13.92  -0.76  -9.33  -7.35  -4.24  -12.64  -1.69  6.75  
3108-3208 19.53  4.85  -3.72  -1.75  1.36  -7.03  3.92  12.36  
3109-3209 18.73  4.05  -4.52  -2.54  0.56  -7.83  3.12  11.56  
3110-3209 -12.01  -26.69  -35.26  -33.28  -30.17  -38.57  -27.62  -19.18  
3111-3210 -8.41  -23.09  -31.66  -29.68  -26.57  -34.97  -24.02  -15.58  
3111-3211 5.03  -9.65  -18.22  -16.24  -13.14  -21.53  -10.58  -2.14  
3112-3212 14.23  -0.45  -9.02  -7.04  -3.94  -12.33  -1.38  7.06  
3201-3212 15.55  0.87  -7.70  -5.72  -2.62  -11.01  -0.06  8.38  
3201-3301 21.81  7.13  -1.45  0.53  3.64  -4.75  6.20  14.64  
3202-3301 10.42  -4.26  -12.83  -10.85  -7.75  -16.14  -5.19  3.25  
3202-3302 9.18  -5.50  -14.07  -12.09  -8.99  -17.38  -6.43  2.01  
3203-3302 2.95  -11.73  -20.31  -18.33  -15.22  -23.61  -12.66  -4.22  
3205-3305 39.08  24.40  15.82  17.80  20.91  12.52  23.47  31.91  
3206-3305 1.57  -13.11  -21.68  -19.71  -16.60  -24.99  -14.04  -5.60  
3210-3309 0.51  -14.18  -22.75  -20.77  -17.66  -26.06  -15.10  -6.67  
 
Table A-9 Coefficient and Covariance of Time Span and Provinces for the Ratio 
of Average to Best (3) 
Province 
       Coefficient 
Year,Month                  
Coefficient    
Kiangsi 
yrw rt 
dcr 
Fukien 
rt dcr 
Szechwan 
szr 
Kwangsi 
rt dcr 
Kwang 
-tung 
dcr 
Kwei 
-chow 
swr 
Yunnan 
swr 
-12.74  -9.87  -5.90  -15.54  -18.58  -15.99  -17.38  
2901-2912 7.98  -4.76  -1.89  2.08  -7.56  -10.59  -8.01  -9.40  
2901-3001 -20.50  -33.24  -30.37  -26.40  -36.04  -39.07  -36.49  -37.88  
2902-3001 5.16  -7.58  -4.71  -0.74  -10.38  -13.41  -10.83  -12.22  
2910-3009 23.53  10.79  13.66  17.63  7.99  4.96  7.54  6.15  
2910-3010 10.00  -2.74  0.13  4.10  -5.54  -8.58  -6.00  -7.38  
2911-3010 6.88  -5.86  -2.99  0.98  -8.65  -11.69  -9.11  -10.50  
2912-3012 20.80  8.06  10.93  14.90  5.26  2.22  4.80  3.42  
3001-3012 13.49  0.75  3.62  7.59  -2.05  -5.09  -2.50  -3.89  
3001-3102 15.12  2.38  5.25  9.22  -0.42  -3.46  -0.88  -2.26  
3002-3101 12.77  0.02  2.89  6.87  -2.77  -5.81  -3.23  -4.61  
3002-3102 21.57  8.83  11.70  15.67  6.03  2.99  5.58  4.19  
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Province 
       Coefficient 
Year,Month                  
Coefficient    
Kiangsi 
yrw rt 
dcr 
Fukien 
rt dcr 
Szechwan 
szr 
Kwangsi 
rt dcr 
Kwang 
-tung 
dcr 
Kwei 
-chow 
swr 
Yunnan 
swr 
-12.74  -9.87  -5.90  -15.54  -18.58  -15.99  -17.38  
3010-3109 34.39  21.65  24.52  28.49  18.85  15.81  18.39  17.01  
3010-3110 -15.77  -28.51  -25.64  -21.67  -31.31  -34.34  -31.76  -33.15  
3010-3111 10.37  -2.37  0.50  4.47  -5.17  -8.21  -5.62  -7.01  
3011-3110 17.47  4.73  7.60  11.57  1.93  -1.11  1.48  0.09  
3101-3112 19.95  7.20  10.08  14.05  4.41  1.37  3.95  2.57  
3101-3201 4.01  -8.74  -5.86  -1.89  -11.53  -14.57  -11.99  -13.37  
3102-3202 5.97  -6.78  -3.91  0.07  -9.57  -12.61  -10.03  -11.41  
3106-3205 0.80  -11.94  -9.07  -5.10  -14.74  -17.78  -15.20  -16.58  
3107-3206 27.87  15.13  18.00  21.97  12.33  9.29  11.88  10.49  
3107-3207 13.92  1.18  4.05  8.03  -1.61  -4.65  -2.07  -3.45  
3108-3208 19.53  6.79  9.66  13.63  3.99  0.95  3.54  2.15  
3109-3209 18.73  5.99  8.86  12.83  3.19  0.16  2.74  1.35  
3110-3209 -12.01  -24.75  -21.88  -17.90  -27.54  -30.58  -28.00  -29.38  
3111-3210 -8.41  -21.15  -18.28  -14.30  -23.94  -26.98  -24.40  -25.78  
3111-3211 5.03  -7.71  -4.84  -0.87  -10.51  -13.54  -10.96  -12.35  
3112-3212 14.23  1.49  4.36  8.33  -1.31  -4.34  -1.76  -3.15  
3201-3212 15.55  2.81  5.68  9.65  0.02  -3.02  -0.44  -1.83  
3201-3301 21.81  9.07  11.94  15.91  6.27  3.23  5.81  4.43  
3202-3301 10.42  -2.32  0.55  4.52  -5.12  -8.16  -5.57  -6.96  
3202-3302 9.18  -3.56  -0.69  3.28  -6.35  -9.39  -6.81  -8.20  
3203-3302 2.95  -9.79  -6.92  -2.95  -12.59  -15.63  -13.05  -14.43  
3205-3305 39.08  26.34  29.21  33.18  23.54  20.50  23.08  21.70  
3206-3305 1.57  -11.17  -8.30  -4.33  -13.97  -17.01  -14.42  -15.81  
3210-3309 0.51  -12.24  -9.36  -5.39  -15.03  -18.07  -15.49  -16.87  
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2) Restricted Regression with Agricultural Areas and Time Span 
regress  ratio_avg_to_best spring_wheat winter_wheat_millet winter_wheat_gaoliang yangtze_rice_wheat 
szechwan_rice double_cropping_rice southwestern_rice yr1929_01_12 yr1929_01_1930_01 
yr1929_02_1930_01 yr1929_10_1930_09 yr1929_10_1930_10 yr1929_11_1930_10 yr1929_12_1930_12 
yr1930_01_12 yr1930_01_1931_02 yr1930_02_1931_01 yr1930_02_1931_02 yr1930_10_1931_09 
yr1930_10_1931_10 yr1930_10_1931_11 yr1930_11_1931_10 yr1931_01_12 yr1931_01_1932_01 
yr1931_02_1932_02 yr1931_06_1932_05 yr1931_07_1932_06 yr1931_07_1932_07 yr1931_08_1932_08 
yr1931_09_1932_09 yr1931_10_1932_09 yr1931_11_1932_10 yr1931_11_1932_11 yr1931_12_1932_12 
yr1932_01_12 yr1932_01_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_01 yr1932_02_1933_02 yr1932_03_1933_02 
yr1932_05_1933_05 yr1932_06_1933_05 yr1932_10_1933_09, r 
 
Test for heteroskedasticity: 
hettest 
 
  
         Prob > chi2  =   0.2880
         chi2(1)      =     1.13
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_best
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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Table A-10 Coefficient and Covariance of Time Span and Agricultural Areas 
for the Ratio of Average to Best 
Agricultural Area 
       Coefficient 
Year,Month                  
Coefficient    
Spring 
wheat 
Winter 
Wheat 
millet 
Winter 
Wheat 
gaoliang 
Yangtze 
Rice wheat 
Szechwan 
rice 
Double 
Cropping 
rice 
South- 
western 
rice 
-15.65  -19.15  -12.62  -11.24  2.17  -6.16  -4.47  
2901-2912 3.10  -12.55  -16.05  -9.51  -8.14  5.27  -3.06  -1.36  
2901-3001 -19.96  -35.61  -39.11  -32.57  -31.20  -17.79  -26.12  -24.43  
2902-3001 0.65  -15.01  -18.51  -11.97  -10.59  2.81  -5.52  -3.82  
2910-3009 10.53  -5.13  -8.63  -2.09  -0.71  12.69  4.36  6.06  
2910-3010 2.56  -13.09  -16.59  -10.05  -8.67  4.73  -3.60  -1.90  
2911-3010 -4.46  -20.11  -23.61  -17.07  -15.70  -2.29  -10.62  -8.93  
2912-3012 13.36  -2.29  -5.79  0.75  2.13  15.53  7.20  8.90  
3001-3012 7.81  -7.85  -11.35  -4.81  -3.43  9.97  1.64  3.34  
3001-3102 3.77  -11.88  -15.38  -8.84  -7.46  5.94  -2.39  -0.69  
3002-3101 3.28  -12.37  -15.87  -9.34  -7.96  5.45  -2.88  -1.19  
3002-3102 14.66  -0.99  -4.49  2.04  3.42  16.83  8.50  10.19  
3010-3109 15.06  -0.59  -4.09  2.45  3.82  17.23  8.90  10.59  
3010-3110 -17.54  -33.19  -36.69  -30.15  -28.77  -15.37  -23.70  -22.00  
3010-3111 3.23  -12.43  -15.92  -9.39  -8.01  5.40  -2.93  -1.24  
3011-3110 6.87  -8.79  -12.29  -5.75  -4.37  9.03  0.71  2.40  
3101-3112 13.63  -2.02  -5.52  1.02  2.39  15.80  7.47  9.16  
3101-3201 -5.75  -21.40  -24.90  -18.36  -16.99  -3.58  -11.91  -10.22  
3102-3202 7.91  -7.75  -11.25  -4.71  -3.33  10.08  1.75  3.44  
3106-3205 -6.64  -22.29  -25.79  -19.25  -17.87  -4.47  -12.80  -11.10  
3107-3206 22.14  6.49  2.99  9.53  10.91  24.31  15.98  17.68  
3107-3207 12.82  -2.84  -6.34  0.20  1.58  14.99  6.66  8.35  
3108-3208 9.17  -6.49  -9.99  -3.45  -2.07  11.33  3.01  4.70  
3109-3209 5.73  -9.93  -13.43  -6.89  -5.51  7.89  -0.44  1.26  
3110-3209 -5.34  -20.99  -24.49  -17.95  -16.57  -3.17  -11.50  -9.80  
3111-3210 -1.74  -17.39  -20.89  -14.35  -12.97  0.43  -7.90  -6.20  
3111-3211 -7.97  -23.63  -27.13  -20.59  -19.21  -5.81  -14.14  -12.44  
3112-3212 1.23  -14.43  -17.93  -11.39  -10.01  3.39  -4.94  -3.24  
3201-3212 5.81  -9.84  -13.34  -6.80  -5.43  7.98  -0.35  1.34  
3201-3301 12.00  -3.66  -7.16  -0.62  0.76  14.16  5.84  7.53  
3202-3301 13.03  -2.63  -6.13  0.41  1.79  15.19  6.86  8.56  
3202-3302 -2.16  -17.81  -21.31  -14.77  -13.40  0.01  -8.32  -6.63  
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Agricultural Area 
       Coefficient 
Year,Month                  
Coefficient    
Spring 
wheat 
Winter 
Wheat 
millet 
Winter 
Wheat 
gaoliang 
Yangtze 
Rice wheat 
Szechwan 
rice 
Double 
Cropping 
rice 
South- 
western 
rice 
-15.65  -19.15  -12.62  -11.24  2.17  -6.16  -4.47  
3203-3302 5.55  -10.10  -13.60  -7.06  -5.69  7.72  -0.61  1.08  
3205-3305 29.66  14.01  10.51  17.05  18.43  31.83  23.50  25.20  
3206-3305 -2.59  -18.24  -21.74  -15.20  -13.82  -0.42  -8.75  -7.05  
3210-3309 -3.12  -18.78  -22.28  -15.74  -14.36  -0.95  -9.28  -7.59  
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Further Regressions about Calamities and Conflicts 
For Ratio of Average to Normal: 
Restricted Regression with Provinces, Calamities and Conflicts 
regress ratio_avg_to_normal kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw shansi_sw_wwm shensi_sw_wwm_sr 
suiyuan_sw tsinghai_sw honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt 
kiangsu_wwg_yrw liaoning_sw_wwg shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr 
fukien_rt_dcr szechwan_szr kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr kweichow_swr yunnan_swr major_drought 
major_drought_plus_1 major_flood major_flood_plus_1 communism communist_suppression civil_war 
northern_war, r 
                                                                                        
                _cons     91.90042   3.362568    27.33   0.000     85.26293    98.53791
         northern_war     4.839897   5.224915     0.93   0.356    -5.473741    15.15353
            civil_war    -.3216592   5.389147    -0.06   0.952    -10.95948    10.31616
communist_suppression     1.990568   3.913976     0.51   0.612    -5.735362    9.716498
            communism     3.334564   2.974853     1.12   0.264    -2.537599    9.206726
   major_flood_plus_1    -1.717911    4.49593    -0.38   0.703    -10.59258    7.156757
          major_flood    -9.751392   3.458128    -2.82   0.005    -16.57751   -2.925275
 major_drought_plus_1    -15.75366   9.181148    -1.72   0.088    -33.87664    2.369324
        major_drought     -7.19614   3.881172    -1.85   0.065    -14.85732    .4650366
           yunnan_swr    -11.09929   3.502981    -3.17   0.002    -18.01394   -4.184634
         kweichow_swr    -7.630079   4.558472    -1.67   0.096     -16.6282    1.368044
        kwangtung_dcr    -10.33337   4.718847    -2.19   0.030    -19.64806   -1.018677
       kwangsi_rt_dcr    -13.96145   4.234558    -3.30   0.001    -22.32019   -5.602716
         szechwan_szr    -1.088833   4.150524    -0.26   0.793    -9.281693    7.104026
        fukien_rt_dcr    -4.695083   3.903147    -1.20   0.231    -12.39964    3.009471
   kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr    -.2587862    6.27928    -0.04   0.967    -12.65367     12.1361
            hupeh_yrw    -17.27467   3.386811    -5.10   0.000    -23.96001   -10.58933
      chekiang_yrw_rt    -13.35557   5.374547    -2.48   0.014    -23.96457    -2.74657
         shantung_wwg    -17.48887   5.591886    -3.13   0.002    -28.52689   -6.450859
      liaoning_sw_wwg    -28.60042   3.362568    -8.51   0.000    -35.23791   -21.96293
      kiangsu_wwg_yrw    -18.39632   5.487202    -3.35   0.001    -29.22769   -7.564944
    anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt    -14.56927   5.635316    -2.59   0.011    -25.69301   -3.445527
        hopeh_wwm_wwg    -4.792725   7.921435    -0.61   0.546    -20.42911    10.84366
    honan_wwm_wwg_yrw    -10.11365   4.616812    -2.19   0.030    -19.22693   -1.000367
          tsinghai_sw    -10.75042   3.744809    -2.87   0.005    -18.14242   -3.358411
           suiyuan_sw     9.497109   3.348917     2.84   0.005     2.886568    16.10765
     shensi_sw_wwm_sr     -10.6725   6.174454    -1.73   0.086    -22.86047    1.515461
        shansi_sw_wwm    -19.66877   3.874536    -5.08   0.000    -27.31685   -12.02069
           ningsia_sw     .6995792   3.362568     0.21   0.835    -5.937907    7.337066
         kansu_sw_wwm     -9.44042   10.48876    -0.90   0.369    -30.14455    11.26371
                                                                                       
  ratio_avg_to_normal        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                      Robust
                                                                                       
                                                       Root MSE      =  12.991
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2358
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 27,   171) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     201
 196 
 
hettest 
 
 
  
         Prob > chi2  =   0.6983
         chi2(1)      =     0.15
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_normal
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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Table A-11 Coefficient of Provinces, Calamities and Conflicts for the Ratio of 
Average to Normal (1) 
                Province 
Coefficient 
Calamity      
Conflict                  
Coefficient    
Kansu 
sw 
wwm 
Ningsia 
sw 
Shansi 
sw 
wwm 
Shensi 
sw 
wwm 
sr 
Suiyuan 
sw 
Tsinghai 
sw 
Honan 
wwm 
wwg 
yrw 
-9.44  0.70  -19.67  -10.67  9.50  -10.75  -10.11  
Major drought -7.20  -16.64  -6.50  -26.86  -17.87  2.30  -17.95  -17.31  
Major drought +1 -15.75  -25.19  -15.05  -35.42  -26.43  -6.26  -26.50  -25.87  
Major flood -9.75  -19.19  -9.05  -29.42  -20.42  -0.25  -20.50  -19.87  
Major flood +1 -1.72  -11.16  -1.02  -21.39  -12.39  7.78  -12.47  -11.83  
Communism 3.33  -6.11  4.03  -16.33  -7.34  12.83  -7.42  -6.78  
Communist 
suppression 
1.99  -7.45  2.69  -17.68  -8.68  11.49  -8.76  -8.12  
Civil war -0.32  -9.76  0.38  -19.99  -10.99  9.18  -11.07  -10.44  
Northern war 4.84  -4.60  5.54  -14.83  -5.83  14.34  -5.91  -5.27  
 
Table A-11 Coefficient of Provinces, Calamities and Conflicts for the Ratio of 
Average to Normal (2) 
              Province             
Coefficient 
Calamity      
Conflict                  
Coefficient  
Hopeh
wwm 
wwg 
Anhwei 
wwg 
yrw rt 
Kiangsu 
wwg yrw 
Liaoning 
sw wwg 
Shan 
-tung 
wwg 
Che 
-kiang 
yrw rt 
Hupeh 
yrw 
-4.79  -14.57  -18.40  -28.60  -17.49  -13.36  -17.27  
Major drought -7.20  -11.99  -21.77  -25.59  -35.80  -24.69  -20.55  -24.47  
Major drought +1 -15.75  -20.55  -30.32  -34.15  -44.35  -33.24  -29.11  -33.03  
Major flood -9.75  -14.54  -24.32  -28.15  -38.35  -27.24  -23.11  -27.03  
Major flood +1 -1.72  -6.51  -16.29  -20.11  -30.32  -19.21  -15.07  -18.99  
Communism 3.33  -1.46  -11.23  -15.06  -25.27  -14.15  -10.02  -13.94  
Communist 
suppression 
1.99  -2.80  -12.58  -16.41  -26.61  -15.50  -11.37  -15.28  
Civil war -0.32  -5.11  -14.89  -18.72  -28.92  -17.81  -13.68  -17.60  
Northern war 4.84  0.05  -9.73  -13.56  -23.76  -12.65  -8.52  -12.43  
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Table A-11 Coefficient of Provinces, Calamities and Conflicts for the Ratio of 
Average to Normal (3) 
               Province 
             Coefficient 
Calamity     
Conflict                  
Coefficient    
Kiangsi 
yrw 
rt dcr 
Fukien 
rt dcr 
Szech 
-wan 
szr 
Kwangsi 
rt dcr 
Kwang 
-tung 
dcr 
Kwei 
-chow 
swr 
Yunnan 
swr 
-0.26  -4.70  -1.09  -13.96  -10.33  -7.63  -11.10  
Major drought -7.20  -7.45  -11.89  -8.28  -21.16  -17.53  -14.83  -18.30  
Major drought +1 -15.75  -16.01  -20.45  -16.84  -29.72  -26.09  -23.38  -26.85  
Major flood -9.75  -10.01  -14.45  -10.84  -23.71  -20.08  -17.38  -20.85  
Major flood +1 -1.72  -1.98  -6.41  -2.81  -15.68  -12.05  -9.35  -12.82  
Communism 3.33  3.08  -1.36  2.25  -10.63  -7.00  -4.30  -7.76  
Communist 
suppression 
1.99  1.73  -2.70  0.90  -11.97  -8.34  -5.64  -9.11  
Civil war -0.32  -0.58  -5.02  -1.41  -14.28  -10.66  -7.95  -11.42  
Northern war 4.84  4.58  0.14  3.75  -9.12  -5.49  -2.79  -6.26  
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For Ratio of Average to Best 
Restricted Regression with Provinces, Calamities and Conflicts 
regress ratio_avg_to_best kansu_sw_wwm ningsia_sw shansi_sw_wwm shensi_sw_wwm_sr 
suiyuan_sw tsinghai_sw honan_wwm_wwg_yrw hopeh_wwm_wwg anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt 
kiangsu_wwg_yrw liaoning_sw_wwg shantung_wwg chekiang_yrw_rt hupeh_yrw 
kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr fukien_rt_dcr szechwan_szr kwangsi_rt_dcr kwangtung_dcr 
kweichow_swr yunnan_swr major_drought major_drought_plus_1 major_flood 
major_flood_plus_1 communism communist_suppression civil_war northern_war, r 
 
                                                                                        
                _cons     88.39107   3.634124    24.32   0.000     81.21755    95.56459
         northern_war     6.272253   4.792236     1.31   0.192    -3.187305    15.73181
            civil_war     3.737161   6.611331     0.57   0.573    -9.313169    16.78749
communist_suppression      .838061   3.380139     0.25   0.804    -5.834111    7.510233
            communism     2.385397   2.529353     0.94   0.347    -2.607378    7.378173
   major_flood_plus_1     .6463284   3.990509     0.16   0.872    -7.230673     8.52333
          major_flood    -7.843338   3.464835    -2.26   0.025    -14.68269   -1.003982
 major_drought_plus_1    -14.92711   8.774892    -1.70   0.091    -32.24816     2.39395
        major_drought     -6.97616   4.807612    -1.45   0.149    -16.46607    2.513748
           yunnan_swr    -15.12378   3.804342    -3.98   0.000     -22.6333   -7.614265
         kweichow_swr    -14.36333   5.241728    -2.74   0.007    -24.71015   -4.016501
        kwangtung_dcr    -16.41094   4.306096    -3.81   0.000    -24.91089   -7.910988
       kwangsi_rt_dcr     -15.4835   6.485142    -2.39   0.018    -28.28474   -2.682257
         szechwan_szr    -4.803345   4.781144    -1.00   0.316    -14.24101    4.634317
        fukien_rt_dcr    -9.679237   3.941321    -2.46   0.015    -17.45914   -1.899329
   kiangsi_yrw_rt_dcr    -6.396688   5.348584    -1.20   0.233    -16.95444    4.161064
            hupeh_yrw    -18.61502   3.557987    -5.23   0.000    -25.63825   -11.59179
      chekiang_yrw_rt    -15.01745   5.414923    -2.77   0.006    -25.70615   -4.328748
         shantung_wwg    -27.61012   5.450457    -5.07   0.000    -38.36897   -16.85128
      liaoning_sw_wwg    -17.79107   3.634124    -4.90   0.000    -24.96459   -10.61755
      kiangsu_wwg_yrw    -25.04141   5.795039    -4.32   0.000    -36.48044   -13.60239
    anhwei_wwg_yrw_rt    -21.19403   5.942727    -3.57   0.000    -32.92458    -9.46348
        hopeh_wwm_wwg    -15.70645   7.121945    -2.21   0.029     -29.7647   -1.648202
    honan_wwm_wwg_yrw    -20.42755   4.341078    -4.71   0.000    -28.99655   -11.85855
          tsinghai_sw    -19.84107   3.739534    -5.31   0.000    -27.22266   -12.45947
           suiyuan_sw    -3.771569   6.705773    -0.56   0.575    -17.00832    9.465185
     shensi_sw_wwm_sr    -13.47017   7.148765    -1.88   0.061    -27.58136    .6410236
        shansi_sw_wwm    -27.88907   3.951545    -7.06   0.000    -35.68916   -20.08899
           ningsia_sw    -10.79107   3.634124    -2.97   0.003    -17.96459   -3.617547
         kansu_sw_wwm    -21.99107   8.061877    -2.73   0.007    -37.90468   -6.077452
                                                                                       
    ratio_avg_to_best        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                      Robust
                                                                                       
                                                       Root MSE      =  12.046
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2660
                                                       Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F( 27,   171) =       .
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     201
 200 
 
hettest 
 
 
 
 
 
  
         Prob > chi2  =   0.0073
         chi2(1)      =     7.20
         Variables: fitted values of ratio_avg_to_best
         Ho: Constant variance
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
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Table A-12 Coefficient of Provinces, Calamities and Conflicts for the Ratio of 
Average to Best (1) 
               Province 
             Coefficient 
Calamity       
Conflict                  
Coefficient    
Kansu 
sw 
wwm 
Ningsia 
sw 
Shansi 
sw 
wwm 
Shensi 
sw 
wwm 
sr 
Suiyuan 
sw 
Tsinghai 
sw 
Honan 
wwm 
wwg 
yrw 
-21.99  -10.79  -27.89  -13.47  -3.77  -19.84  -20.43  
Major drought -6.98  -28.97  -17.77  -34.87  -20.45  -10.75  -26.82  -27.40  
Major drought +1 -14.93  -36.92  -25.72  -42.82  -28.40  -18.70  -34.77  -35.35  
Major flood -7.84  -29.83  -18.63  -35.73  -21.31  -11.61  -27.68  -28.27  
Major flood +1 0.65  -21.34  -10.14  -27.24  -12.82  -3.13  -19.19  -19.78  
Communism 2.39  -19.61  -8.41  -25.50  -11.08  -1.39  -17.46  -18.04  
Communist 
suppression 
0.84  -21.15  -9.95  -27.05  -12.63  -2.93  -19.00  -19.59  
Civil war 3.74  -18.25  -7.05  -24.15  -9.73  -0.03  -16.10  -16.69  
Northern war 6.27  -15.72  -4.52  -21.62  -7.20  2.50  -13.57  -14.16  
 
Table A-12 Coefficient of Provinces, Calamities and Conflicts for the Ratio of 
Average to Best (2) 
              Province 
            Coefficient 
Calamity      
Conflict                  
Coefficient    
Hopeh 
wwm 
wwg 
Anhwei 
wwg 
yrw rt 
Kiangsu 
wwg 
yrw 
Liaoning 
sw wwg 
Shantung 
wwg 
Che 
-kiang 
yrw rt 
Hupeh 
yrw 
-15.71  -21.19  -25.04  -17.79  -27.61  -15.02  -18.62  
Major drought -6.98  -22.68  -28.17  -32.02  -24.77  -34.59  -21.99  -25.59  
Major drought +1 -14.93  -30.63  -36.12  -39.97  -32.72  -42.54  -29.94  -33.54  
Major flood -7.84  -23.55  -29.04  -32.88  -25.63  -35.45  -22.86  -26.46  
Major flood +1 0.65  -15.06  -20.55  -24.40  -17.14  -26.96  -14.37  -17.97  
Communism 2.39  -13.32  -18.81  -22.66  -15.41  -25.22  -12.63  -16.23  
Communist 
suppression 
0.84  -14.87  -20.36  -24.20  -16.95  -26.77  -14.18  -17.78  
Civil war 3.74  -11.97  -17.46  -21.30  -14.05  -23.87  -11.28  -14.88  
Northern war 6.27  -9.43  -14.92  -18.77  -11.52  -21.34  -8.75  -12.34  
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Table A-12 Coefficient of Provinces, Calamities and Conflicts for the Ratio of 
Average to Best (3) 
                Province 
Calamity       Coefficient 
Conflict                  
Coefficient    
Kiangsi 
yrw 
rt dcr 
Fukien 
rt dcr 
Szech 
-wan 
szr 
Kwangsi 
rt dcr 
Kwang 
-tung 
dcr 
Kwei 
-chow 
swr 
Yunnan 
swr 
-6.40  -9.68  -4.80  -15.48  -16.41  -14.36  -15.12  
Major drought -6.98  -13.37  -16.66  -11.78  -22.46  -23.39  -21.34  -22.10  
Major drought +1 -14.93  -21.32  -24.61  -19.73  -30.41  -31.34  -29.29  -30.05  
Major flood -7.84  -14.24  -17.52  -12.65  -23.33  -24.25  -22.21  -22.97  
Major flood +1 0.65  -5.75  -9.03  -4.16  -14.84  -15.76  -13.72  -14.48  
Communism 2.39  -4.01  -7.29  -2.42  -13.10  -14.03  -11.98  -12.74  
Communist 
suppression 
0.84  -5.56  -8.84  -3.97  -14.65  -15.57  -13.53  -14.29  
Civil war 3.74  -2.66  -5.94  -1.07  -11.75  -12.67  -10.63  -11.39  
Northern war 6.27  -0.12  -3.41  1.47  -9.21  -10.14  -8.09  -8.85  
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Description of Locality Surveyed 
Table A-13 Time Span, Agricultural Area, and Province for Each Locality 
Locality Time Span 
Agr. 
Area Province Locality 
Time 
Span 
Agr. 
Area Province 
Chenfan 
 
SW Kansu Wutsin(2) 2901-2912 YRW Kiangsu 
Kaolan (1) 3101-3112 SW Kansu Wutsin(3) 3201-3212 YRW Kiangsu 
Kaolan (2) 3101-3201 SW Kansu Yencheng(1) 2901-2912 YRW Kiangsu 
Linsia 
 
SW Kansu Yencheng(2) 2910-3010 YRW Kiangsu 
Wuwei 3201-3212 SW Kansu Yencheng(3) 3001-3012 YRW Kiangsu 
Yungteng 
 
SW Kansu Yencheng(4) 3001-3012 YRW Kiangsu 
Tuchuan 
 
SW Liaoning Shih  RT Anhwei 
Ningsia 3201-3212 SW Ningsia Shihtai  RT Anhwei 
Ningwu(1) 3201-3212 SW Shansi Siuning 3201-3212 RT Anhwei 
Ningwu(2) 3201-3212 SW Shansi Suancheng  RT Anhwei 
Ningwu(3) 3201-3212 SW Shansi Taiping  RT Anhwei 
Tatung 2901-2912 SW Shansi Tsingyang  RT Anhwei 
Tsinglo 2901-2912 SW Shansi Wuyuan  RT Anhwei 
Hwangyuan 3101-3112 SW Tsinghai Chuki  RT Chekiang 
Kweiteh(1) 
 
SW Tsinghai Fenghwa 3101-3112 RT Chekiang 
Kweiteh(2) 
 
SW Tsinghai Fuyang  RT Chekiang 
Sining 3101-3112 SW Tsinghai Hwangyen  RT Chekiang 
Weiyuan 
 
SW Tsinghai Kinhwa  RT Chekiang 
Yushu 
 
SW Tsinghai Lanki  RT Chekiang 
Tingpien 3001-3012 SW Shensi Linan  RT Chekiang 
Yulin 3002-3101 SW Shensi Linhai 3111-3211 RT Chekiang 
Kweisui 2901-2912 SW Suiyuan Lishui 3112-3212 RT Chekiang 
Paotow 2901-2912 SW Suiyuan Ning  RT Chekiang 
Lingpao 3101-3112 WWM Honan Shaohing  RT Chekiang 
Loyang(1) 3101-3112 WWM Honan Shunan(2) 2910-3009 RT Chekiang 
Loyang(2) 3101-3112 WWM Honan Sinteng  RT Chekiang 
Tsiyuan 3001-3012 WWM Honan Tangki 3101-3201 RT Chekiang 
Fowping(1) 3101-3112 WWM Hopeh Tunglu(1) 3108-3208 RT Chekiang 
Fowping(2) 3101-3112 WWM Hopeh Tunglu(2) 3108-3208 RT Chekiang 
Fowping(3) 3101-3112 WWM Hopeh Tungyang 3011-3110 RT Chekiang 
Pingliang 3101-3112 WWM Kansu Yungkia 3109-3209 RT Chekiang 
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Locality Time Span 
Agr. 
Area Province Locality 
Time 
Span 
Agr. 
Area Province 
Tienshui 3101-3112 WWM Kansu Yuyao(2)  RT Chekiang 
Anyi 3010-3111 WWM Shansi Changting  RT Fukien 
Lin(1) 3101-3112 WWM Shansi Minhow 2902-3001 RT Fukien 
Lin(2) 3101-3112 WWM Shansi Nanping 3108-3208 RT Fukien 
Lin(3) 3101-3112 WWM Shansi Changsha  RT Hunan 
Lin(4) 3101-3112 WWM Shansi Changteh 3210-3309 RT Hunan 
Lin(5) 3101-3112 WWM Shansi Chen(2) 3202-3301 RT Hunan 
Pingting(1) 3101-3112 WWM Shansi Hengshan(1)  RT Hunan 
Pingting(2) 3101-3112 WWM Shansi Hengshan(2)  RT Hunan 
Pingting(3) 3101-3112 WWM Shansi Ichang(1)  RT Hunan 
Showyang(1) 3101-3112 WWM Shansi Ichang(2)  RT Hunan 
Showyang(2) 3101-3112 WWM Shansi Leiyang(1)  RT Hunan 
Showyang(3) 3101-3112 WWM Shansi Leiyang(2)  RT Hunan 
Sin 2901-2912 WWM Shansi Liling(1)  RT Hunan 
Taiku 2901-2912 WWM Shansi Liling(2)  RT Hunan 
Tsincheng 3001-3012 WWM Shansi Ningsiang(1)  RT Hunan 
Tsingyuan 3001-3012 WWM Shansi Ningsiang(2)  RT Hunan 
Wusiang 2901-2912 WWM Shansi Ningsiang(3)  RT Hunan 
Changan 
 
WWM Shensi Shaoyang(1)  RT Hunan 
Chenan 3101-3112 WWM Shensi Shaoyang(2)  RT Hunan 
Chowchih 3011-3110 WWM Shensi Siangtan  RT Hunan 
Fengsiang 
 
WWM Shensi Sinhwa 3203-3302 RT Hunan 
Fu 
 
WWM Shensi Taoyuan(1)  RT Hunan 
Fufeng 
 
WWM Shensi Taoyuan(2)  RT Hunan 
Fushih 
 
WWM Shensi Wukang 3203-3302 RT Hunan 
Hancheng 
 
WWM Shensi Yiyang(1) 3211-3310 RT Hunan 
Hingping(1) 
 
WWM Shensi Yiyang(2) 3211-3310 RT Hunan 
Hingping(2) 
 
WWM Shensi Yiyang(3) 3211-3310 RT Hunan 
Hingping(3) 
 
WWM Shensi Yoyang  RT Hunan 
Hu 
 
WWM Shensi Yu(1)  RT Hunan 
Hwa 
 
WWM Shensi Yu(2)  RT Hunan 
Ichuin 
 
WWM Shensi Fowliang 3201-3212 RT Kiangsi 
Lintung 
 
WWM Shensi Hukow(1)  RT Kiangsi 
Shang 3107-3206 WWM Shensi Hukow(2)  RT Kiangsi 
Sienyang(1) 
 
WWM Shensi Kaoan 3201-3212 RT Kiangsi 
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Locality Time Span 
Agr. 
Area Province Locality 
Time 
Span 
Agr. 
Area Province 
Sienyang(2) 
 
WWM Shensi Nanchang(1) 3201-3212 RT Kiangsi 
Sunyi 3101-3112 WWM Shensi Nanchang(2) 3201-3212 RT Kiangsi 
Tali 
 
WWM Shensi Nanchang(3) 3201-3212 RT Kiangsi 
Weinan 3010-3111 WWM Shensi Nanchang(4) 3201-3212 RT Kiangsi 
Wukung(1) 
 
WWM Shensi Nanchang(5) 3201-3212 RT Kiangsi 
Wukung(2) 
 
WWM Shensi Pingsiang  RT Kiangsi 
Wukung(3) 
 
WWM Shensi Poyang(1)  RT Kiangsi 
Fowyang 3201-3212 WWG Anhwei Poyang(2)  RT Kiangsi 
Su 3001-3012 WWG Anhwei Poyang(3)  RT Kiangsi 
Anyang 
 
WWG Honan Poyang(4)  RT Kiangsi 
Chi 3001-3012 WWG Honan Teian(1) 3201-3212 RT Kiangsi 
Hiangcheng 3108-3208 WWG Honan Teian(2) 3201-3212 RT Kiangsi 
Kaifeng 3108-3208 WWG Honan Teian(3) 3201-3212 RT Kiangsi 
Linchang(1) 3101-3112 WWG Honan Tuchang(1) 3201-3212 RT Kiangsi 
Linchang(2) 3101-3112 WWG Honan Tuchang(2) 3201-3212 RT Kiangsi 
Linchang(3) 3101-3112 WWG Honan Mien 3010-3109 SZR Shensi 
Mengtsing 
 
WWG Honan Nancheng(1)  SZR Shensi 
Nanyang 3108-3208 WWG Honan Nancheng(2)  SZR Shensi 
Shangkiu 3102-3202 WWG Honan Nancheng(3)  SZR Shensi 
Siuwu 
 
WWG Honan Nancheng(4)  SZR Shensi 
Tsinyang 3001-3012 WWG Honan Nancheng(5)  SZR Shensi 
Yencheng 3201-3212 WWG Honan Chengtu  SZR Szechwan 
Changli(1) 2901-3001 WWG Hopeh Chung  SZR Szechwan 
Changli(2) 3001-3012 WWG Hopeh Chungking 2901-2912 SZR Szechwan 
Chengting(1) 3101-3112 WWG Hopeh Fengtu  SZR Szechwan 
Chengting(2) 3101-3112 WWG Hopeh Fowling 2901-2912 SZR Szechwan 
Kiaoho 2901-2912 WWG Hopeh Jenshow  SZR Szechwan 
Nankung 3001-3012 WWG Hopeh Kaikiang  SZR Szechwan 
Sushui 3001-3012 WWG Hopeh Lifan(1)  SZR Szechwan 
Ting 
 
WWG Hopeh Lifan(2)  SZR Szechwan 
Tsang 2901-2912 WWG Hopeh Lu  SZR Szechwan 
Tsing 2901-2912 WWG Hopeh Mienyang 3001-3012 SZR Szechwan 
Tung 3001-3012 WWG Hopeh Neikiang 3107-3206 SZR Szechwan 
Kwanyun 3210-3309 WWG Kiangsu Pi  SZR Szechwan 
Liaochung 3001-3012 WWG Liaoning Shwangliu  SZR Szechwan 
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Locality Time Span 
Agr. 
Area Province Locality 
Time 
Span 
Agr. 
Area Province 
Ankiu 2901-2912 WWG Shantung Sinfan  SZR Szechwan 
Chu 
 
WWG Shantung Sintu  SZR Szechwan 
En(2) 3010-3109 WWG Shantung Suining 2901-2912 SZR Szechwan 
Fushan 3011-3110 WWG Shantung Ta 3101-3112 SZR Szechwan 
Hweimin 3101-3112 WWG Shantung Wenkiang  SZR Szechwan 
Ishui 3001-3102 WWG Shantung Futsing  DCR Fukien 
Jihchao 
 
WWG Shantung Hweian 3001-3012 DCR Fukien 
Laiyang 3101-3112 WWG Shantung Lungki 3002-3102 DCR Fukien 
Lini 
 
WWG Shantung Putien 3107-3207 DCR Fukien 
Lintsing(1) 
 
WWG Shantung Jung 3201-3212 DCR Kwangsi 
Lintsing(2) 
 
WWG Shantung Kweilin  DCR Kwangsi 
Lintze 
 
WWG Shantung Liucheng  DCR Kwangsi 
Ningyang 3001-3102 WWG Shantung Yungning 3201-3212 DCR Kwangsi 
Pingyuan 
 
WWG Shantung Kan  DCR Kiangsi 
Showkwang 3001-3012 WWG Shantung Kanchow  DCR Kiangsi 
Taian 3001-3102 WWG Shantung Tayu  DCR Kiangsi 
Tancheng 
 
WWG Shantung Chaoan 3002-3102 DCR Kwangtung 
Tangyi(1) 3011-3110 WWG Shantung Chungshan 3201-3212 DCR Kwangtung 
Tangyi(2) 3011-3110 WWG Shantung Fa  DCR Kwangtung 
Teh(1) 
 
WWG Shantung Fungshan  DCR Kwangtung 
Teh(2) 
 
WWG Shantung Fungshun  DCR Kwangtung 
Tsimo 3202-3302 WWG Shantung Hingning  DCR Kwangtung 
Tsining 2911-3010 WWG Shantung Hoihong  DCR Kwangtung 
Wei 3001-3012 WWG Shantung Hoiping  DCR Kwangtung 
Yi 2901-2912 WWG Shantung Kityang 3002-3102 DCR Kwangtung 
Yucheng 
 
WWG Shantung Koyiu 3201-3212 DCR Kwangtung 
Fengyang 3206-3305 YRW Anhwei Kukong 3201-3301 DCR Kwangtung 
Ho (1) 3001-3012 YRW Anhwei Limkong  DCR Kwangtung 
Ho (2) 3201-3212 YRW Anhwei Lin  DCR Kwangtung 
Hofei 3101-3112 YRW Anhwei Loting  DCR Kwangtung 
Hwokiu 
 
YRW Anhwei Mowming 3201-3212 DCR Kwangtung 
Laian 
 
YRW Anhwei Mei  DCR Kwangtung 
Liuan 3201-3212 YRW Anhwei Namyung(1) 3201-3212 DCR Kwangtung 
Taihu 2901-2912 YRW Anhwei Namyung(2) 3201-3212 DCR Kwangtung 
Tingyuan 
 
YRW Anhwei Namyung(3) 3201-3212 DCR Kwangtung 
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Locality Time Span 
Agr. 
Area Province Locality 
Time 
Span 
Agr. 
Area Province 
Tungcheng 2901-2912 YRW Anhwei Suihai  DCR Kwangtung 
Wuhu 3205-3305 YRW Anhwei Sunwui  DCR Kwangtung 
Hang 
 
YRW Chekiang Taishan  DCR Kwangtung 
Kashing 2901-2912 YRW Chekiang Takhing  DCR Kwangtung 
Shaohing(2) 
 
YRW Chekiang Tinpak  DCR Kwangtung 
Tehtsing 2902-3001 YRW Chekiang Tsengshing  DCR Kwangtung 
Yuyao 3010-3110 YRW Chekiang Tsiaoling  DCR Kwangtung 
Shangcheng 
 
YRW Honan Tzekam  DCR Kwangtung 
Sinyang 3201-3212 YRW Honan Waiyeung  DCR Kwangtung 
Anlu(1) 
 
YRW Hupeh Watnam  DCR Kwangtung 
Anlu(2) 
 
YRW Hupeh Yanping  DCR Kwangtung 
Anlu(3) 
 
YRW Hupeh Yeungkong  DCR Kwangtung 
Anlu(4) 
 
YRW Hupeh Anshun(1) 3201-3212 SWR Kweichow 
Chungsiang 2901-2912 YRW Hupeh Anshun(2) 3201-3212 SWR Kweichow 
Hanchwan 
 
YRW Hupeh Anshun(3) 3201-3212 SWR Kweichow 
Hwangpei 
 
YRW Hupeh Kweiyang  SWR Kweichow 
Kishui 3001-3012 YRW Hupeh Pan(1) 3201-3212 SWR Kweichow 
Siaokan(1) 
 
YRW Hupeh Pan(2) 3201-3212 SWR Kweichow 
Siaokan(2) 
 
YRW Hupeh Pan(3) 3201-3212 SWR Kweichow 
Tsaoyang(1) 3111-3210 YRW Hupeh Tingfan 3201-3212 SWR Kweichow 
Tsaoyang(2) 3111-3210 YRW Hupeh Tsunyi(1) 3201-3212 SWR Kweichow 
Wuchang 
 
YRW Hupeh Tsunyi(2) 3201-3212 SWR Kweichow 
Yingcheng(1) 3102-3202 YRW Hupeh Tsunyi(3) 3201-3212 SWR Kweichow 
Yingcheng(2) 3102-3202 YRW Hupeh Tuhshan 3201-3212 SWR Kweichow 
Yingcheng(3) 3102-3202 YRW Hupeh Iliang(1) 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
Yunmeng(1) 3110-3209 YRW Hupeh Iliang(2) 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
Yunmeng(2) 3110-3209 YRW Hupeh Iliang(3) 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
Yunmeng(3) 3110-3209 YRW Hupeh Kunming(1)  SWR Yunnan 
Yunmeng(4) 3110-3209 YRW Hupeh Kunming(2)  SWR Yunnan 
Pengtseh 3206-3305 YRW Kiangsi Kunming(3)  SWR Yunnan 
Changshu 2901-2912 YRW Kiangsu Kunming(4)  SWR Yunnan 
Chinkiang 
 
YRW Kiangsu Mengtsz(1) 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
Fowning 2901-2912 YRW Kiangsu Mengtsz(2) 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
Hinghwa 
 
YRW Kiangsu Mengtsz(3) 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
Hwaian(1) 
 
YRW Kiangsu Pinchwan(1) 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
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Locality Time Span 
Agr. 
Area Province Locality 
Time 
Span 
Agr. 
Area Province 
Hwaian(2) 
 
YRW Kiangsu Pinchwan(2) 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
Hwaiyin 3210-3309 YRW Kiangsu Tali  SWR Yunnan 
Kiangtu(2) 2901-2912 YRW Kiangsu Tsuyung(1) 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
Kiangyin 
 
YRW Kiangsu Tsuyung(2) 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
Kunshan 3001-3012 YRW Kiangsu Tsuyung(3) 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
Tai 2912-3012 YRW Kiangsu Yuankiang 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
Tanyang 
 
YRW Kiangsu Yuki(1) 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
Wu 
 
YRW Kiangsu Yuki(2) 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
Wukiang 
 
YRW Kiangsu Yuki(3) 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
Wusih(2) 3106-3205 YRW Kiangsu Yungien 3201-3212 SWR Yunnan 
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